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estimate a set of latent parameters that explains their “preferences” for choices of linkages.
Discrete-choice models are incorporated into the proposed estimation framework to model
decision-making behaviors. Most generative models for random graphs are based on the
specification of a joint probability distribution over the observed pairings, with an emphasis
on the structural properties of the networks. The method proposed here, however, takes
into account the role of decision making and therefore offers insight into the rationale for the
choices of connection. Understanding such decisions may in turn provide insights into any
intervention that can induce the network connectivity into a more desirable state.
The interest of this dissertation is limited to large bipartite networks in which edges
occur only between nodes from different sets where the decision to form an edge is mutual.
A non-transferable utility (NTU) setting is assumed and isolated nodes are allowed.
The dissertation also includes an investigation of the statistical properties of one-to-many
and many-to-many relationships and the specification of their statistical models. Inference
for the preference parameters is then performed for the proposed statistical models, and
simulations are used to evaluate their performance.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This dissertation focuses on estimating the latent parameters that govern decision making
in two-mode networks with non-transferable utility (NTU) when the number of network
participants is large. In particular, we use estimation methods that are based on the concept
of revealed preferences, which is based on the belief that a person’s observed choice of one
alternative over another indicates or reveals his or her preference for the characteristics of the
alternative chosen. This idea, though prevalent in discrete-choice models where information
about each alternative is observed, is not immediately applicable to two-mode networks where
the needed information about the alternatives available to each decision maker is not known.
For example, typical college admission data sets include characteristics of students (e.g. SAT
scores, ethnicity, gender, and grades) and colleges (e.g. ranking, financial aid availability,
location, mean SAT score, and degrees awarded); however, there are no lists of students that
a college would have accepted if they had applied and vice versa for the students. Information
about the values of characteristics that would have made each student and college more or less
attractive as a prospect is also unavailable. Without this information, the observed choices
of students and colleges do not directly reveal preferences for their matches, but instead
reflect some unknown combination of preferences and limitations in their opportunities.
In economics, a two-mode network is also known as a two-sided matching market. The
term two-sided refers to the fact that agents in such markets belong, from the outset, to one
of two disjoint sets (for example, firms and workers). This contrasts with the stock market
in which any particular participant might be a buyer at one price and a seller at another;
thus, the market is not two-sided in the sense we consider here since the term “matching”
refers to the bilateral nature of exchange in these markets. In our proposed method, we also
1
consider estimation under different types of matching in two-node networks: 1) one-to-one
relationships where each agent can be paired with at most one agent from the other side,
2) one-to-many relationships where an agent from one side can be matched to a number of
agents from the other side but where an agent from the latter side can only be paired with at
most one agent from the former side, and 3) many-to-many relationships where each agent
in the network can be matched to numerous agents on the other side. In this project, we
only consider matchings where each side is allowed the same number of maximum pairings
and the outside option (i.e. remaining unpaired) is also allowed up to the same maximum
number of pairing. The one-to-one and one-to-many relationships can be viewed as special
cases of the many-to-many matching where there is a match “quota” placed on at least one
side. However, these different types of relationships may not share the same the statistical
properties because of these restrictions.
Chapter 2 describes existing methods for estimating preference parameters in various
settings; however, each of them, on its own, is insufficient for estimation of preference param-
eters in two-sided choice situations in large networks with one-to-many and many-to-many
relationships. Proposed estimation methods for one-to-one and many-to-many relationships
are analyzed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 focuses on examining the statistical properties of
the proposed model and evaluating the estimation method for one-to-many and many-to-
many relationships. Chapter 5 shows a potential application of the proposed method using
the 1996–2012 data from the U.S. Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
The main interest is to investigate any correlation between the longevity of marital and co-
habiting relationships and the degree of homophily in personal characteristics between the
partners. The novel findings and other potential applications from this project are sum-
marized in Chapter 6. Potential future work is discussed in Chapter 7. The remainder of
this introductory chapter discusses background information and the definitions of various
concepts required for the subsequent chapters.
2
1.1 Preliminaries
This section introduces our basic notation and formalizes the fundamental concepts of our
proposed estimation method. We then outline the basic intuition of the necessary assump-
tions that serve as the basis of our formulation. These topics are discussed further in Chapters
2 and 3 as we develop our model. Without loss of generality, the two sides of the network
are referred to as “suppliers” and “consumers” herein.
1.1.1 Random Utility Model (RUM)
This project considers models in which each agent has a random utility function for members
on the opposite side of the network and all agents’ characteristics are only partially observed.
In the econometrics and game-theory literature, the set of latent parameters that governs
decision making in pair formation is commonly known as the “preference” parameters in
the broad sense that they represent how agents would choose among different alternatives if
they were faced with a choice (Roth and Sotomayor [RS90]). Each decision maker can have
different preference parameters, and therefore the perceived utility for the corresponding
agent on the other side can differ from one decision maker to the next. However, all agents
are assumed to choose the partner(s) within their respective choice sets that can provide the
maximum gain in utility. Given the utility-maximizing behavior of the decision makers, we
define the utility gained by supplier s with observed attributes xi from pairing with consumer
c with observed attributes zj as
Usc = U(xi, zj|θUs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
systematic or
deterministic component
+ ηsc︸︷︷︸
unobserved random and/or
idiosyncratic component
(1.1)
where θUs is the set of preference parameters for supplier s. Similarly, we define the utility
gained by consumer c with observed attributes zj from pairing with supplier s with observed
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attributes xi as
Vcs = V (zj, xi|θVc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
systematic or
deterministic component
+ ζcs︸︷︷︸
unobserved random and/or
idiosyncratic component
(1.2)
where θVc is the set of preference parameters for consumer c. The random utility model
above has a deterministic and a random component. The random component, or the taste
shifter, is assumed to be identically distributed (i.i.d.) draws from an extreme-value type-I
(Gumbel) distribution.1 For simplicity reasons, an additive linear utility function is used for
the deterministic component, but other choices of utility functions can also be used.2 In this
project, the deterministic linear utility function takes the following form:
U(xi, zj|θUs) = θUs0 + θUs1Ωs1(xi, zj) + θUs2Ωs2(xi, zj) + . . .
V (zj, xi|θVc) = θVc0 + θVc1Ωc1(zj, xi) + θVc2Ωc2(zj, xi) + . . .
(1.3)
where xi and zj can be measurement vectors of observed characteristics, and Ωs(.)(xi, zj) are
functions that represent the pair’s characteristics as perceived by supplier s. For example,
they can be an indicator function that represents whether certain observed attributes are
identical for the pair (e.g. from homophily). The corresponding functions for the consumer
side are denoted as Ωc(.)(zj, xi). Chapters 4 and 5 provide further examples for such functions.
In this example, θUs = [θUs0 , θUs1 , θUs2 , . . . ]
T and θVc = [θVc0 , θVc1 , θVc2 , . . . ]
T are the preference
parameters, which are vectors of the scalar coefficients in the utility functions.
1.1.2 Stable Matching
Agents from the two sides are assumed to be “matched” to each other in a manner that
reaches a pairwise stable equilibrium where no two individuals can gain from forming a
new partnership, and no single individual can gain from breaking from his/her partner. In
addition, each agent has a strict preference ordering over individuals on the opposite side of
1The assumption on the type of distribution can be relaxed. See Menzel’s Assumption 2.2 in [Men15] for
details.
2See Dagsvik [Dag94] for latent choice set derivation for other choices of utility functions.
4
the network based on latent utility functions. In our notation, this is equivalent to
Ui,c∗(i) ≥ Uij ∀ j ∈ {O(i) ∪ 0}
Vj,s∗(j) ≥ Vji ∀ i ∈ {O(j) ∪ 0} (1.4)
where c∗(i) is the consumer with whom supplier i is paired in a stable matching, and s∗(j)
is the supplier with whom consumer j is paired in a stable matching. The notation {0}
denotes the option to remain unpaired (i.e. the outside option). The opportunity set O(i) is
the set of consumers who prefer supplier i at least equally to the suppliers with whom they
are currently paired. This set of consumers is also referred to as being available to supplier
i, and vice versa for O(j).
Although this project assumes that the dataset is a realization of a pairwise stable match-
ing where each agent’s decision to pair is assumed to be maximizing utility over a set of
potential partners who are available, our proposed estimation method is indifferent to any
particular underlying mechanism in generating the matching itself, as long as the matching
is pairwise stable. There are many algorithms in the literature that generate matchings using
either pre-specified preference ranking or parameters for the RUM. The most notable algo-
rithm is the Gale–Shapley stable matching model for the marriage market where the stable
extremal matchings (i.e. women-preferred and men-preferred matchings) are guaranteed to
exist for any equal number of men and women. In Chapter 4, modifications are made to
the Gale–Shapley stable matching model to generate one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-
many matchings to study their statistical properties and evaluate the proposed estimation
method.
1.1.3 Non-transferable Utility (NTU)
In cooperative game theory and economics, assuming a non-transferable utility (NTU) setting
means that coalition worths cannot be freely distributed amongst agents. In the context of
this project, a NTU setting means that the agent’s observed attributes remain unchanged
upon pair formation and dissolution. For example, in an NTU setting, the individual net
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worth of the two spouses is assumed to remain unchanged before and after their union.
Their coalition worth upon union does not result in any change in the distribution of their
individual net worths. The only exception is the type of transfer that is deterministic in
nature and can therefore be modeled as part of the systematic utility function U(xi, zj|θUs)
or V (zj, xi|θVc). Nevertheless, any type of transfer in utility must be independent from the
unobserved taste shifters ηsc and ζcs. In this project, our proposed model extends Menzel’s
NTU model ([Men15]), which is qualitatively different from models assuming transferable
utility (TU). Under the TU setting, pairwise stable matchings are typically unique, whereas
in the NTU case, the number of distinct matching outcomes can be very large.
1.1.4 Latent Opportunity Sets in Two-sided Choice Situations
In a two-mode network such as a supplier-consumer network, any edges formed between the
supply side and the demand side are assumed to be mutual decisions made to maximize
the utility of each participant, not that of the network as a whole. In such decisions, the
mere desire for a supplier to sell a product to a consumer is not enough for a transaction to
occur; the consumer also has to agree to buy the product from that supplier, and vice versa.
This mutual decision requirement inevitably creates an additional layer of complexity for
the researcher because he/she can only observe the attributes of the chosen alternative but
cannot observe the agent’s constrained choice set. This difficulty is what sets the two-sided
choice situations apart from the one-sided choice situations in discrete-choice models where
only one decision maker is involved in each choice situation. Fundamentally, we characterize
the matching outcome as a result of all agents choosing from their opportunity sets, which
are the constrained sets of potential partners, the constituents and cardinality of which the
researcher cannot observe. Specifically, a potential partner is available to an agent if and
only if it prefers that agent at least equally to its current match. In this way, the estimation
under the pairwise stability condition is analogous to estimating two-sided discrete-choice
problem with latent choice sets that are unknown to the researcher.
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1.1.5 Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
From the definition in section 1.1.1, the random taste shifter component of the utility func-
tion represents the unobserved factor each individual has for each member on the opposite
side. The most relevant aspect of the IIA property in the context of this project is that for
simple models such as the logit model (which will be discussed further in section 2.1.2), the
taste shifter is assumed to be independent across all agents in the market and therefore no
correlation is induced in the utility ranking across agents. This independence assumption
also carries over to multiple choice situations where the logit model can only be used appro-
priately if the unobserved factors that affect decision makers are independent over repeated
choices. Essentially, the logit model can handle any dynamics related to observed factors
that enter the decision process, such as state dependence where the past choices can influence
the current choices and lagged response to changes in characteristics. However, dynamics
associated with unobserved factors cannot be accommodated because the unobserved fac-
tors are assumed to be unrelated over choices. While it may be reasonable to assume no
correlation in the unobserved factors over a set of alternatives in one-to-one relationships
where each individual is allowed a single decision, this strict requirement might not always
be realistic in one-to-many and many-to-many relationships.
For example, if the taste shifters in the college admission problem were indeed indepen-
dent, strictly speaking, each student would have to have distinct preferences over “seats” in
each school, and the priorities on the school side of the admission mechanism would have
to be randomized independently across schools and across “seats” [Men15]. In essence, the
model needs to be highly well-defined such that all sources of correlation over alternatives
are captured by the deterministic utility, and therefore only white noise remains. However, it
is easy to argue that especially in repeated choice situations, the choices made by the same
individual share some common characteristics that are favored because of personal taste,
which cannot be simply defined by a finite set of attributes. Motivated by the difficulty
in satisfying the IIA assumption in various repeated choice settings, part of this project
specifically focuses on estimation methods that do not require the IIA property as a limiting
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property when the network is large.
Other situations where IIA is violated often arise from the use of publicly available
data sets that do not contain information about individual characteristics or the final choice
selection made by those individuals (e.g. census and voting data). Due to information privacy
concerns, most public data sets are in the form of aggregate data where only the majority
vote or count of the final selection(s) made by the sampled population is observed. In this
situation, IIA no longer holds [Wika] due to, for example, the Condorcet (voting) paradox
[Wikb] where the collective preferences of a group can be cyclic (even if the preferences of the
constituents are not cyclic), or the discursive dilemma [Wikc], where aggregating judgments
with majority voting can result in self-contradictory judgments. The recent prevalent use of
public data gives us additional motivation to derive estimation methods that do not require
the IIA assumption.
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CHAPTER 2
Existing Estimation Methods
This chapter reviews the various methods that serve as the foundation for the development
of our proposed estimation method. We begin with an overview of discrete-choice models
that are widely used in econometrics to model and predict decision-making behavior. We
then summarize the key ideas from a Bayesian method by Logan, Hoff, and Newton. Finally,
we present the key findings from a large-population approximation method by Menzel.
2.1 Discrete-Choice Models
Discrete-choice models attempt to approximate the probability of a decision maker choos-
ing a particular choice among a known set of alternatives. Specifically, these models relate
the choice decision to the decision maker’s attributes and the attributes of the alternatives
available. It is therefore important to note that different decision makers with the same ob-
servable characteristics are mostly expected to make similar decisions, and that the decision
variation among such decision makers is assumed to be caused by our inability to observe all
factors affecting individual choices. It is these unobserved factors that lead us to describe
all choice situations in a probabilistic fashion. This section provides the definition of choice
probability and describes different assumptions regarding the unobserved factors that lead
to different methods in modeling choice situations.1 However, all of these models only deal
with one-sided choice situations, where each decision only involves a single decision maker.
In a two-sided choice situation, decision makers and agents belong to one of two disjoint
1Advanced models such as the mixed logit and latent class models are included here because they are
relevant in section 3.3.2. However, they are not directly involved in the development of our proposed
estimation method. Nevertheless, they are logical extensions for future work.
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sets—for example, women and men in a marriage market, college and students in the college
admission process, or firms and workers in a job market. In such markets, we not only study
how an agent chooses from a set of agents on the opposite side but also have to consider
the dynamics between pairs of agents in a choice situation and the stability of the matching
result. In particular, agents from the opposing sides have to choose each other voluntarily in
order for a “match” to occur. Any agents can also choose to remain unmatched if no agents
on the opposite side are deemed “acceptable.” Furthermore, the set of alternatives for each
agent is not observable by the researcher. In this way, two-sided choice problems are different
from what discrete-choice models are intended to solve. Nevertheless, discrete-choice models
can be used as key components in estimating the preference parameters in two-sided choice
problems.
2.1.1 Derivation of Choice Probabilities
Most discrete-choice models are derived under the assumption of utility-maximizing behavior
by the decision makers. Therefore, the derivation assures that the model is consistent with
such behavior, but this does not preclude its application to other types of decision making
behavior that do not entail utility maximization. For example, these models can be used
to simply describe the relation of explanatory variables to the outcome of a choice, without
reference to exactly how the choice is made. Nevertheless, in the context of this project,
we consider a decision maker, labeled s, who faces a choice among C alternatives, where
each alternative offers a certain level of utility (or gain) for the decision maker. The utility
that the decision maker gains from alternative c is Usc, c = 1, . . . , C, which is known to the
decision maker but not to the researcher. In each decision, the decision maker chooses the
alternative that provides the highest utility possible, including the outside option. Recall
the random utility model from section 1.1.1:
Usc = U(xi, zj|θUs) + ηsc (2.1)
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where U(xi, zj|θUs) is the deterministic parts of the utility decision maker s and ηsc is the
unobserved part of the utility function. For brevity, U(xi, zj|θUs) will abbreviated as U(xi, zj)
henceforth. Since ηsc is not observed, it has to be interpreted as a random variable. The
joint density of the random vector ηs = 〈ηs1, . . . , ηsC〉 is denoted as f(ηs). With this density,
probability statements can be made about the decision maker’s choice.
Consider in a one-sided case, where zm represents the type of observed characteristics
that is associated with alternative k, the probability that supplier s chooses alternative c is
Psc = Prob(Usc > Usk ∀k 6= c)
= Prob(U(xi, zj) + ηsc > U(xi, zm) + ηsk ∀k 6= c)
= Prob(ηsk − ηsc < U(xi, zj)− U(xi, zm) ∀k 6= c)
(2.2)
This probability is cumulative in nature and is the probability that each random term ηsk−ηsc
is below the deterministic quantity U(xi, zj) − U(xi, zm). With the density f(ηs), this can
be written as
Psc =
∫
η
I(ηsk − ηsc < U(xi, zj)− U(xi, zm) ∀k 6= c)f(ηs)dηs (2.3)
where I(.) is the indicator function with I(.) = 0 when the expression in parentheses is false
and I(.) = 1 otherwise. Note that this is a multidimensional integral over the density of the
random portion of utility f(ηs). Train [Tra09] provides a clear meaning of the distribution
f(ηs). Consider a population of suppliers who face the same deterministic utility for all
alternatives as supplier s, but the values of the unobserved factor differ among them. The
density f(ηs) is the distribution of the random component of the utility within the popu-
lation of suppliers who face the same deterministic component of the utility. Under this
interpretation, the probability Psc is the share of suppliers who choose alternative c within
the population of suppliers who face the same deterministic utility for each alternative as
supplier s. This implies that the suppliers do not necessarily choose alternative c even when
it offers the highest utility from the deterministic component because there are other unob-
served factors at play. The probability that another alternative is chosen is the probability
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that the effect from its unobserved factors is sufficiently better than those for c to overcome
the advantage that c has on the deterministic component. This interpretation is consistent
with equation 2.3.
In general, the researcher’s representation of the choice situation drives the underlying
assumptions about the density f(ηs), which in turn determine which discrete model is ap-
propriate for the situation. Various choice models that are relevant to our proposed method
are discussed further in the following sections.
2.1.2 The Standard Logit (MNL) Model
As noted earlier, different discrete-choice models are derived under different specifications
of the density of the unobserved factors, f(ηs). Broadly speaking, there are two types of
logit models: the conditional and the multinomial logit models. The multinomial logit
model applies when the attributes in the data are individual specific—that is, the observed
characteristics are specific to the decision maker (e.g. race, education level, and gender
are the independent variables and occupational choice is the dependent variable). On the
other hand, the conditional logit model is appropriate when the data contains choice-specific
attributes instead of individual-specific attributes (e.g. travel time, privacy, cost, and wait
time are the independent variables and transportation choice is the dependent variable). Yet,
these two models can be combined to use the characteristics of both the alternatives and
the individuals to form a hybrid as illustrated in equation 1.3. There are some differences
in the interpretation of the parameters due to the context of the attributes. However, these
models make the same assumptions regarding the unobserved factors. Therefore, we treat
these similar models as a single group and address them collectively as the “standard” logit
(MNL) model.
The standard logit model is by far the most widely used model because of its simplicity.
Thus, the choice probability has a closed form. The MNL assumes that the unobserved part
of the utility, ηsc ∀c, is i.i.d. extreme-value type-I (Gumbel) distributed and is therefore
uncorrelated over the alternatives and has the same variance for all alternatives. The critical
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part of this assumption in the context of this project is that the independence assumption
also applies to sequences of choices over time—each choice is also independent of the others.
In repeated choice situations, it is likely reasonable to expect that unobserved factors, such
as personal taste, that affect one choice would persist into the next, inducing dependence
among the choices. A basic introduction of the MNL model from Train [Tra09] is provided
below. Under extreme-value type-I, the density for each unobserved component of utility is
f(ηsc) = e
−ηsce−e
−ηsc
(2.4)
and the cumulative distribution is
F (ηsc) = e
−e−ηsc (2.5)
Continuing from 2.2,
Psc = Prob(ηsk − ηsc < U(xi, zj)− U(xi, zm) ∀k 6= c)
= Prob(ηsk < ηsc + U(xi, zj)− U(xi, zm) ∀k 6= c)
If ηsc is considered given, this expression is the cumulative distribution for each ηsk evaluated
at ηsc + U(xi, zj) − U(xi, zm), which takes the form in 2.5. Since the η’s are independent,
this cumulative distribution over all k 6= c is the product of the individual cumulative
distributions:
Psc|ηsc =
∏
k 6=c
e−e
−(ηsc+U(xi,zj)−U(xi,zm))
But since ηsc is not given, the choice probability is the integral of Psc|ηsc over all values of
ηsc weighted by its density illustrated in 2.4:
Psc =
∫ (∏
k 6=c
e−e
−(ηsc+U(xi,zj)−U(xi,zm))
)
e−ηsce−e
−ηsc
dηsc
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which can be simplified to the familiar expression for the logit choice probability:
Psc =
eU(xi,zj)∑
k e
U(xi,zm)
(2.6)
Note that the denominator is the sum over all alternatives in the choice set, including the
chosen alternative. As an aside, from the form of the logit choice probability in 2.6, it is
clear that the relation of the logit probability to the deterministic component of the utility
is sigmoid. Therefore, if the deterministic utility of an alternative is very low compared with
other alternatives in the choice set, a small increase in the utility of this alternative has
little effect in boosting the probability of it being chosen. Similarly, if one alternative is far
superior to the others, a further increase in the utility also has little effect. The point at
which the increase in utility has the greatest effect on the probability of an alternative being
chosen is when the probability is close to 0.5. As the sigmoid shape of logit probability
is shared by most discrete-choice models, this can have important implications for policy
makers in terms of making improvement to services to induce desirable behavior.
Another implication of this simple model is that it assumes proportional substitution
across alternatives where an improvement in one alternative draws proportionately from the
other alternatives (and the opposite for a decrease in utility for an alternative). This pattern
of substitution is known as proportionate shifting, which is also a restriction brought on by
the IIA property. The IIA assumption holds when the ratio of any of two choice probabilities,
Psc
Psr
, stays constant regardless of the available alternatives:
Psc
Psr
=
eU(xi,zj)/
∑
k e
U(xi,zm)
eU(xi,zh)/
∑
k e
U(xi,zm)
=
eU(xi,zj)
eU(xi,zh)
= eU(xi,zj)−U(xi,zh)
where zh is the observed characteristics of alternative r. Therefore, this ratio does not depend
on any alternatives other than c and r.
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2.1.3 Mixed Logit (MIXL) Model
The MNL model can represent deterministic taste variations that are related to the observed
characteristics but are not related to unobserved factors. The MNL cannot represent taste
variations that are purely random either. Therefore, if the taste variation is at least partly
random, using the logit model would be a misspecification. Even if it is used as an approxi-
mation to capture average tastes, MNL does not provide any information on the distribution
of tastes around the average. To capture random taste variation appropriately, a mixed
logit model can be used because it allows the unobserved factors to follow any distribution.
The most important idea of MIXL is that the unobserved factors can be decomposed into a
part that contains all the correlation and heteroskedasticity and a separate part that is i.i.d.
extreme-value. It is a highly flexible model because the first part can follow any distribution
that suits the researcher’s representation of the problem. [Tra09] also demonstrates that
MIXL can approximate any discrete-choice model and thus is fully general.
MIXL views the preference parameter θU in 2.1 as random and variable over the decision
makers’ observed characteristics. Mixed logit choice probability is defined as the integral of
standard logit probability over a density of parameters with the form
Psc =
∫ (
eU(xi,zj)∑
k e
U(xi,zm)
)
f(θU |φU)︸ ︷︷ ︸
weight
dθU (2.7)
where φU is the parameter that determines the density of θU and thus can accommodate
correlation in the unobserved factors. Therefore, the resulting choice probability can be
viewed as a weighted average of the standard logit formula evaluated at different values of
θU , with the weights given by a continuous mixing distribution f(θU |φU), which is specified
by the researcher. It is important to note that Psc is actually a function of φU because the
preference parameter θU is integrated out. Therefore, φU is the parameter of interest in
estimation. Nevertheless, the values of θU represent the tastes heterogeneity of individual
decision makers and can be obtained from the estimate of φU , in conjunction with the
observed choices of each decision maker. Further details are discussed in Chapter 7.
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2.1.4 Latent Class Model (LCM)
The LCM is a semi-parametric extension of the MNL that resembles the mixed logit model.
However, it does not require the researcher to make specific assumptions about the distribu-
tions of parameters across individuals. The LCM model is proposed by Green and Hensher
[GH03] and a useful review is also provided by Sarrias and Daziano [SD17].
When the mixing distribution is discrete with θU taking a finite set of distinct values, the
MIXL model becomes the LCM model. In this representation, agents belonging to the same
group (or class) share the same preference parameters. Thus, the researcher only needs to
specify the number of distinct characteristics groups. The latent class choice probability is
defined as
Psc =
QU∑
q
wsiq
(
eU(xi,zj |θUq )∑
k e
U(xi,zm|θUq )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
class-specific
contributions
(2.8)
where QU is the number of characteristics group (or classes) and w
s
iq is the class assignment
probability of supplier s with characteristics xi belonging to class q, with
∑
q w
s
iq = 1 and
wsiq ≥ 0. As such, the vector wsi contains the probabilities for class assignment for supplier
s. Since the LCM requires a different set of parameters for each class, there are QU sets of
parameters for the supplier side of the vector θU .
In the LCM, the class assignment is unobserved. Therefore, wsiq from equation 2.8 can
be interpreted as the prior probability of supplier s being in class q. The most widely used
and convenient form is also a MNL model
wsiq =
eh
s
i
′γUq∑QU
q=1 e
hsi
′γUq
, q = 1, . . . , QU , γU1 = 0
where γU2,...,Qs are the total class share parameters to be estimated along with θUq , and the
vector hsi is usually a set of observed socio-economic factors that determines class member-
ship. The first classes in the γUq parameters are normalized to zero for the identification of
the model. If there are no such socio-economic characteristics to be observed, then hsi is just
the constant vector 1, and the latent class probabilities are the set of constants, γUq , that
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sum to one.
As with MIXL, the posterior estimate of latent class membership can be obtained from
the observed choices of each decision maker. It is suggested in the literature that the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) be used to determine the optimal number of classes.
2.1.4.1 Comparison of the MNL, MIXL, and LCM Models
The MNL is the most restrictive model of the three with respect to the objective of this
project, mainly because it does not allow 1) random taste variation that is not due to observed
characteristics and 2) correlation in unobserved factors over repeated choice situations. Both
MIXL and LCM are popular choice models used in practice because they obviate these
limitations due to the IIA assumption. In terms of two-mode networks, the lack of random
taste variation in the MNL model would require that all agents on the same side share the
same set of preference parameters. By allowing heterogeneity in taste, both the MIXL and
LCM specifications allow a more realistic setting. In MIXL, the preferences of agents on
the same side can be a statistical distribution described by a mean and a variance; in LCM,
only agents belonging to the same class are required to share the same set of preference
parameters.
In addition, in one-to-many and many-to-many relationships, the LCM assumes that the
choices made are independent from each other conditional on the latent class assignment,
whereas in MIXL, it is assumed that they are independent conditional on the preference
parameters. However, the MNL assumes that all taste variations are entirely due to observed
characteristics, there can be no correlation among the choices, and therefore all choices are
strictly independent from each other. In most practical settings, it is reasonable to assume
that agents often have unobserved favoritism for some attributes in common among the
chosen alternatives. Therefore, the LCM and MIXL are usually the natural models for
repeated choice situations.
The differences in the specifications of these models also lead to differences in the types
of estimation procedures used. Both the MNL and LCM are usually simple enough to
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be estimated using maximum likelihood estimators. However, the higher the dimension a
preference parameter vector has, the more likely that simulation is required. On the other
hand, the MIXL is estimated by simulation because the choice probability does not have a
closed form. For example, using maximum simulated likelihood estimation, R draws of the
parameter vectors are obtained from the parameter distribution f(θU |φU). The logit choice
probability is then computed from each draw and the MIXL probability is approximated by
the average of the R logit probabilities. As a result, estimation using a MIXL model can be
much more computationally intensive than a MNL or LCM model.
2.2 Bayesian Method by Logan, Hoff, and Newton
A Bayesian approach that is also based on revealed preferences is proposed by Logan et al.
[LHN08]. The main goal in their study is to infer mate preferences from observed matches in
heterosexual marriages and to formulate the problem such that the estimated preferences can
be used to make counterfactual predictions of matching outcomes in different circumstances
of supply and demand. They acknowledge that discrete-choice models for situations where
each individual’s available alternatives are observed is not immediately applicable to typical
two-sided matching data because the needed information about each individual’s complete
choice set is not recorded. Therefore, in order to infer the preference of each individual
from each side, they assume all agents on the opposite side in the sample is representative
of the alternatives available in that individual’s choice set. Subject to the stable matching
constraints in 1.4, the utility of every agent in the choice set can be estimated in this
way. In their model, the utilities for agents on each side is modeled as having a mean value
determined by mean preference parameters, with a distribution around the mean that reflects
differences of opinion as well as imperfect information about both measured and unmeasured
characteristics. Rather than considering the observed pairs to be independent draws from
suitable distributions, they view them as highly interdependent observations result from
mutually dependent effects of preferences and characteristics, and base their estimations on
a model of the interdependence.
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They also acknowledge that there are unobserved factors other than preferences that also
govern the matching process, such as strategic behavior. However, due to the difficulty in
accounting for their effects without any knowledge of the exact matching mechanism, they
choose to base their inference only on the probability of stability of the observed matching
and ignore these effects caused by unobserved factors. They argue that although some
information may be lost with the simplification, their method of estimation does not depend
on the particular process that generated the observed matching. Therefore, their simplified
model is based on the following posterior distribution
P (θ| m ∈ S︸ ︷︷ ︸
matching m is in the set S of
stable matching
) ∝ P (θ)︸︷︷︸
prior
P (m ∈ S|θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
probability of stability
given θ (likelihood)
where θ = (θU , θV ), the observed matching is m, and S is the set of stable matchings. The
last quantity involves integrating over all values of U and V because none of them is observed,
therefore making it impractical to calculate it directly. Instead, Logan et al. suggest using
a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to approximate such integrals by sampling
values of (θ, U, V ) from a distribution approximating the joint distribution P (θ, U, V |m ∈ S).
The marginal distribution for θ can then be used as the estimate for P (θ|m ∈ S). Specifically,
they use a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to iteratively construct sequences of (θ, U, V ) from
which P (θ|m ∈ S) can be approximated. Given the previous state, a new state value can
be constructed by separately updating each utility U and V , subject to the stable matching
constraints, as well as separately updating each component of the preference parameters θ.
Each update consists of sampling a proposal value for the utility or preference parameter
being updated, then accepting or rejecting the proposal with the appropriate probability.
In their paper, a Gibbs sampling procedure is outlined for a two-sided probit model and a
Metropolis algorithm for a two-sided logit model. Although their method is presented in the
context of one-to-one relationships, it can be potentially generalized to accommodate one-
to-many and many-to-many relationships as described by Admiraal and Handcock [AH08].
Our proposed method is different from this method by Logan et al. in that we model the
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choice sets as being qualitatively and quantitatively distinct for individuals with different
observable characteristics (we use Menzel’s approach in estimating latent opportunity sets
discussed in section 2.3). However, our current basic model only estimates mean preference
coefficients for all agents on the same side without accounting for individual’s variation of
preferences around the means, although a more advanced model using our proposed method
can be constructed to allow for individual-level parameters. Another major difference be-
tween the two models is that we explicitly account for the effects caused by unobserved
factors (and any strategic behavior involved) in our estimation procedure because these
effects from the underlying matching mechanism are significant in one-to-many and many-
to-many matchings. Specifically, we account for the effects that are ignored by Logan et al.
in the form of mean utility for common unobserved factors that are shared across agents.
2.3 Large-Population Approximation by Menzel
Menzel [Men15] proposed an approximation to the likelihood in the Bayesian approach by
Logan et al. with a composite likelihood that asymptotically approximates the true like-
lihood as the network size approaches infinity. Assuming the observed data is a result at
equilibrium from pairwise stable matchings, Menzel’s composite likelihood estimate is based
on a large-sample approximation to the distribution of matched observable characteristics
at the pair level. In his analysis, as the number of agents in the network increases, this
limiting distribution of matched characteristics remains unique, even though the number
of distinct stable matchings actually increases. From the agents’ perspective, those stable
matchings are different in terms of the constituents and the size of their opportunity sets,
but the matchings are observationally equivalent from the researcher’s perspective in terms
of the distribution of matched observable characteristics.
Menzel proposed a sampling mechanism to maintain the attractiveness of the outside
option such that a nontrivial fraction of the population remains unmatched even when the
population size grows. The key is to strike a balance so that in the limit, the joint distribution
of matched characteristics of the agents does not degenerate to a deterministic rule that is
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independent of observed characteristics. His method provides a construct to compute the
utility of the outside option, such that it is made more attractive at exactly the right rate
as the size of the network grows.
An important aspect in Menzel’s study that is different from Logan et al. is that Menzel
takes advantage of the latent opportunity set approach proposed by Dagsvik [Dag94], where
each opportunity set is modeled as a homogeneous Poisson process in a space defined by the
observed attributes. Therefore, his approach does not compute an opportunity set directly
for each agent as in the Bayesian method of Logan et al. Instead, he demonstrates that in
the limit, the average exponentiated utility value of the opportunity set (termed “inclusive
value”) for an individual is a deterministic function of the individual’s observable attributes
alone. Therefore, applying the equilibrium constraints for pairwise stability he derived in
the same paper, the inclusive value of the opportunity set for each unique combination of
observed characteristics can be estimated as auxiliary parameters along with the preference
parameters.
Menzel also demonstrates that many commonly used random utility models in fact exhibit
IIA as a limiting property when the set of choice alternatives is large, as in a large network.
Specifically, the choice probabilities from Dagsvik’s latent opportunity set approach converge
to their logit analog for a broad class of random utility models. Therefore, in the limit, an
individual’s matching opportunity can be summarized by the expected utility value of the
opportunity set, which is a scalar sufficient statistic with respect to the choice probabilities
under the MNL model. As a result, in the NTU case, the analysis is greatly simplified because
the pairwise stability condition translates into a discrete-choice problem with unobserved
choice sets with a large number of alternatives.
However, this IIA limiting property also prohibits any correlation caused by unobserved
factors that may result from the matching mechanism or among repeated choices by the
same decision maker. Furthermore, Menzel’s method assumes all agents on the same side of
the network share the same set of preference parameters. Motivated by these restrictions,
in Chapter 3, we focus on extending Menzel’s method by modeling the unobserved effects
explicitly and imposing an additional constraint to ensure the consistency of our proposed
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estimator. Moreover, in Chapter 7, we propose incorporating MIXL in our basic model to
achieve a more realistic setting in our proposed method where individual-level variations can
be accommodated.
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CHAPTER 3
Probabilistic Framework for Preference Estimation
This chapter focuses on this project’s contribution to the literature. For clarity, we begin
with an introduction to our novel formulation of the two-sided estimation framework and
provide a proof of the existence of a unique maximum likelihood estimator under the as-
sumption that there is no correlation among the choices made by the network participants.
We then examine the convexity of the equality constraint that enforces the stable matching
equilibrium condition. Overall, our results demonstrate that if the equality constraint is
not sufficiently satisfied, the optimization procedure may converge on local maxima, which
may lead to parameter identification issues. Other model identification problems are then
discussed. Next, we use the first-order condition for the maximum likelihood estimator of
the standard logit model to reveal that the resulting estimates guarantee that the predicted
share of individuals who choose alternative j equal the observed share for alternative j.
From this result, we motivate the need to model the average effect of unobserved factors to
handle correlation explicitly in repeated choice situations and apply an additional equality
constraint to account for departure from the standard logit model; that is, the latent op-
portunity set is not an exhaustive choice set that includes all possible alternatives. Finally,
we present empirical evidence of some connections between many-to-many and one-to-one
relationships. We discuss the Monte Carlo simulations in detail in Chapter 4.
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3.1 Modeling Two-sided Matchings with No Correlation Caused
by Unobserved Factors
This section focuses on developing a model for two-mode networks using multinomial dis-
tributions to model decisions made by agents from both sides under the assumption that
there is no correlation caused by unobserved factors among choices made in repeated choice
situations. In particular, unlike previous formulations by Menzel [Men15] and Logan et al.
[LHN08] in which consideration is restricted to one-to-one relationships, the proposed model
herein allows for one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many relationships. We first address
the use of latent choice sets in large-population approximation and summarize the resulting
choice probabilities proposed by Dagsvik [Dag94]. We then summarize Menzel’s finding on
the effect of endogeneity in opportunity sets that suggests agents from one side of the net-
work make decisions independently from agents on the other side. Based on the findings from
both Dagsvik and Menzel, we then use McFadden’s [McF73] one-sided MNL choice model
as the foundation to develop our proposed two-sided model, in which latent choice sets are
used with the MNL model, thereby imposing the assumption of independence across choices
made by the same individual. Next, we focus on the estimation of the preference parameters
in such a model and examine the sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the
maximum likelihood estimator. We then introduce the optimization constraints proposed
by Menzel, which are necessary when using the latent opportunity set approach. Finally, we
discuss some model identification issues that arise from discrete-choice models that extend
to two-side matching models.
3.1.1 Choice Probability with Latent Opportunity Sets in Large Populations
The two-sided demand system model departs from the conventional discrete-choice model in
the way a match is formed. In conventional discrete-choice model, an agent simply chooses
the alternative that maximizes his or her utility from a set of alternatives that the researcher
offers. As such, the entire set of possible choices is known and the alternative that offers
the maximum utility in the set is observed. On the other hand, in the two-sided demand
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system setting, a match is formed only when the two agents are each the best choice in
their counterpart’s opportunity set. Furthermore, in this setting, the opportunity sets are
not known to the researcher and only the resulting match is observed. In addition, the
composition and size of opportunity sets can vary across agents due to their differences in
observed and unobserved qualities.
Menzel adopted a stochastic approach proposed by Dagsvik [Dag94] to model latent
choice sets. In his proposed framework, an alternative in a choice set is represented by
a point in space defined by the attributes of the alternatives and the taste shifters of the
decision maker associated with those attributes. The taste shifters are also both agent-
specific and random relative to an agent in the sense that preferences for a specific attribute
may vary whimsically from one moment to the next. In this setting, the random set of
alternatives in any given choice situation is generated by an inhomogeneous Poisson process
in time with an intensity measure at time t that is comprised of a cumulative distribution
of the attribute set, G(dt), and an extreme-value distribution of the taste shifter, M(dη):
λ(t, η) = µG(dt) ·M(dη)
where µ > 0 is a constant and η is the random taste shifter. The multiplicative form of
the intensity measure means that the attributes of the alternatives and the taste shifters are
assumed to be independently distributed (i.e. tastes are not correlated with the attribute
values). In this view, heterogeneity in the opportunity set is a result of different agents
facing different and independent copies of the Poisson process.
In our proposed model, the preferences of agents for potential partners are specified by
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the following latent random utility functions 1
Usc = U(xi, zj) + ηsc
Vcs = V (zj, xi) + ζcs
(3.1)
where U(xi, zj) and V (zj, xi) are deterministic functions based on the observed characteristics
of the agents; the non-deterministic components, or the taste shifters, ηsc and ζcs, are i.i.d.
draws from an extreme-value type-I distribution. The random utility for the outside option
of remaining unpaired is
Us0 = 0 + max
k=1,...,J
{ηs0,k}
Vc0 = 0 + max
k=1,...,J
{ζc0,k}
(3.2)
where J =
√
n with n being the number of network participants on each side, assuming there
is the same number of agents on each side.2 This specification means that the deterministic
components of the utility for the outside option are zero. Therefore, it is equivalent to setting
the observable characteristics for the outside option, x0 and z0, to zero. Also for the outside
option, following Menzel’s approach, these non-deterministic components are defined as the
maximum of J independent draws for the taste shifters. The reason for this specification is
that the outside option will remain attractive enough to maintain a stable share of singles as
the network size increases. Bierlaire, Bolduc, and McFadden [BBM03] proved that random
utility functions of this form are also distributed as extreme-value type-I.
The most important result from Dagsvik [Dag94] in the context of our proposed model
is the probability of an agent choosing an alternative from a random choice set where the
composition and the size of the choice set is unknown. Although his focus was on alternatives
defined by a consumption bundle satisfying a continuous version of the IIA assumption, his
1Menzel’s definition of the random utility functions are Usc = U(xi, zj) + σηsc and Us0 = 0 +
σmaxk=1,...,J{ηs0,k} where σ is a scale parameter that may depend on the network size. Throughout this
writing, we use σ = 1 for simplicity reasons. The random taste shifters, ηsc and ζcs, are also assumed to be
zero-mean. Appendix B includes a brief discussion of this assumption.
2However, this assumed 1:1 ratio is mainly asserted for simplicity reasons in our Monte Carlo simulations
presented in Chapter 4. Our simulation results indicate that the estimator for one-to-one relationships
generally remains consistent until around 9:1.
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work provided part of the theoretical foundation for Menzel’s work. Under Dagsvik’s random
utility framework with latent choice sets, the probability, for decision maker i, of alterna-
tive j being the utility maximizing alternative from a latent choice set with k alternatives
(excluding the outside option) is, in our current notation:
P (Uij ≥ Uik ∀k 6= j) = e
U(xi,zj)m(zj)∫
eU(xi,k)m(k)dk
where xi and zj are the decision maker’s and alternative j’s observable characteristics, re-
spectively, and m(zj) is the marginal distribution of alternatives with zj characteristics. Note
that the integral in the denominator is over i’s opportunity sets of all possible sizes, and that
the marginal distribution in the numerator takes the availability of the alternative itself into
account.
Recall that Menzel’s approach for the outside option focuses on raising the attractiveness
of the outside option to keep up with the network size. In order to establish his method’s
convergence to the logit model in large population, he proved the following (Lemma 3.1 in
[Men15], presuming Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 are satisfied): Supposed that z1, . . . , zJ are J
i.i.d. draws from a distribution M(z) with p.d.f. m(z). Then as J →∞,
P (Ui0 ≥ Uil, l = 0, . . . , J)→ 1
1 +
∫
eU(xi,s)m(s)ds
(3.3)
JP (Uij ≥ Uil, l = 0, . . . , J |zj = z)→ e
U(xi,zj)
1 +
∫
eU(xi,s)m(s)ds
(3.4)
almost surely for any fixed j = 1, 2, . . . , J . This result describes the limiting choice probabil-
ities for random opportunity sets under the IIA assumption, since they are developed under
the condition that the random utility model has independent extreme-value distributed util-
ities [Dag94]. Equation 3.3 specifies the limiting probability of agent i of type xi choosing
the outside option given a draw of J alternatives.3 Equation 3.4 illustrates the limiting
probability that decision maker i chooses a type zj alternative instead of the outside option,
3Moreover, applying our definition of the random utility for the outside option in 3.2 leads to e0 = 1 in the
numerator above. This outside option is also included as one of the possible alternatives in the denominator.
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conditional on the chosen alternative being included in the choice set of J alternatives. This
probability is computed using the utility perceived by the decision maker. As such, together
with Dagvik’s result, the unconditional probability (i.e. the choice probability that accounts
for the probability of the chosen alternative being included) that parallels equation 3.4 is
JP (Uij ≥ Uil, l = 0, . . . , J)→ e
U(xi,zj)m(zj)
1 +
∫
eU(xi,s)m(s)ds
(3.5)
Note that in Menzel’s formulation, this extreme-value approximation to the logit choice prob-
ability requires that individuals’ opportunity sets grow in size as the network size increases.
In fact, his simulation results reveal that the opportunity sets do grow at the rate of J =
√
n.
Thus a sufficiently attractive outside option is maintained as the network size grows. We
explore this property for one-to-many and many-to-many relationships in section 4.1.
3.1.2 Endogeneity of the Opportunity Sets Vanishes in Large Populations
In most estimation problems, it is assumed that the explanatory variables are independent of
the unobserved factors. In reality, however, the explanatory variables are often endogenous,
that is, are correlated or otherwise not independent of the unobserved factors. For example,
endogenous effects can be substantial in situations where unobserved attributes of a product
can affect its price and marketing efforts can be related to prices. They can also be substantial
in interrelated choices in which observed factors affecting one choice may be determined by
another choice made by the same decision maker. In such cases, estimation without regard
to the correlation between observed and unobserved factors is inconsistent.
The implications from the approximation in 3.4 are that the conditional choice probabili-
ties for supplier s, given its opportunity set, depend only on its observable characteristics, xi,
as the network size increases (proven by Menzel in Lemma B.5 in the supplemental materials
for [Men15]). Furthermore, the unobserved taste shifters do not have any effect in the condi-
tional choice probabilities through the opportunity sets. This phenomenon can be explained
by the fact that the endogenous effect in the opportunity sets vanishes with respect to the
taste shifters as the number of market participants grows. Intuitively, in a small market, a
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consumer’s opportunity set is endogenous with respect to its own taste shifters; a shift in
a consumer’s preferences can change its opportunity set through chain rejections that can
cause a feedback cycle. Therefore, such preference cycle can generate dependence between
a consumer’s taste shifters and its own opportunity set. However, a rejected supplier could
make a proposition to many other similar consumers in a large network, thus terminating the
feedback cycle. In addition, a very long chain rejection is unlikely since we always keep up
the attractiveness of the outside option through the random utility model as the network size
grows. Therefore, the next best option for a rejected supplier could be the outside option,
which also terminates the chain. Menzel gave a formal proof of the vanishing endogeneity
of an opportunity set in a large network in Lemma 3.2 [Men15]. In light of this reason-
ing, we can also expect that agents with the same observed attributes would share similar
choice probabilities since they face very similar matching opportunities as the network size
increases.
We have established that conditional choice probabilities only depend on the decision
maker’s observable characteristics. Thus, we can assert that given their respective oppor-
tunity sets, the conditional probability of supplier s with type xi characteristics choosing
consumer c with type zj characteristics is independent from the conditional probability of
consumer c with type zj characteristics choosing supplier s with type xi characteristics. For
convenience, we will abbreviate the conditional probabilities P (Usc ≥ Usl, l = 0, . . . , J |zj = z)
as P Ssc(xi, zj) and P (Vcs ≥ Vcl, l = 0, . . . , J |xi = x) as PCcs(zj, xi), with the superscripts S and
C indicating the supplier and consumer sides, respectively. We re-express 3.4 as
P Ssc(xi, zj) =
eU(xi,zj)
1 +
∫
eU(xi,r)c(r)dr
PCcs(zj, xi) =
eV (zj ,xi)
1 +
∫
eV (zj ,r)s(r)dr
(3.6)
where c(r) and s(r) are the marginal distributions for the consumer and supplier sides with
observed characteristics type r, respectively. Replacing J with
√
n from 3.4, the conditional
probability that a match between supplier s of type xi and consumer c of type zj takes place
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is
(√
nP Ssc(xi, zj)
) (√
nPCcs(zj, xi)
)
=
(
eU(xi,zj)
1 +
∫
eU(xi,r)c(r)dr
)(
eV (zj ,xi)
1 +
∫
eV (zj ,r)s(r)dr
)
P Ssc(xi, zj)P
C
cs(zj, xi) =
1
n
(
eU(xi,zj)
1 +
∫
eU(xi,r)c(r)dr
)(
eV (zj ,xi)
1 +
∫
eV (zj ,r)s(r)dr
)
=
1
n
(
eU(xi,zj)+V (zj ,xi)(
1 +
∫
eU(xi,r)c(r)dr
) (
1 +
∫
eV (zj ,r)s(r)dr
))
(3.7)
Therefore, the corresponding unconditional probability that accounts for the prevalence of
type xi suppliers and type zj consumers is
pSsc = p
C
cs := P
S
sc(xi, zj)c(zj)P
C
cs(zj, xi)s(xi) (3.8)
Similarly, denoting P (Us0 ≥ Usl, l = 0, . . . , J) as P Ss0(xi) and P (Vc0 ≥ Vcl, l = 0, . . . , J) as
PCc0(zj),
P Ss0(xi) =
1
1 +
∫
eU(xi,r)c(r)dr
PCc0(zj) =
1
1 +
∫
eV (zj ,r)s(r)dr
(3.9)
Following 3.3, the corresponding unconditional probability for the outside option for the two
sides is
pSs0 := P
S
s0(xi)s(xi)
pCc0 := P
C
c0(zj)c(zj)
(3.10)
Menzel’s asymptotic analysis for one-to-one relationships demonstrates that the matched
characteristics4 of any stable matching converges in distribution to some limiting match-
ing frequency distribution, which is equivalent to the unconditional probabilities defined in
equations 3.8 and 3.10 (see Appendix A). This result suggests that the number of distinct
matchings may in fact be very large. However, from an observer’s perspective in terms of the
matching frequency distribution, the different matchings become observationally equivalent
4“Matched characteristics” consists of the pair’s individual characteristics types. For example, the match-
ing frequency distribution can have 10 pairs formed between type xi suppliers and type zj consumers, 15
pairs formed between type xk suppliers and type zl consumers, etc.
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in the limit as the number of agents in the network grows. We will revisit the asymptotic
matching frequency distribution again in section 3.1.5.1 when we discuss the equilibrium
condition. In the next section, we will use these unconditional probabilities to develop our
proposed model for decision making in two-mode networks.
3.1.3 Stable Matching and Equilibrium Conditions
Section 1.1.2 introduced the concept of stable matching in terms of the random utility model
where a pairwise stable equilibrium state is achieved when no two agents of opposite sides
would both be better off pairing with each other than with their current partners. In this
section, we discuss the implications of stable matching in terms of the conditional choice
probabilities and the resulting constraint on the network as a whole.
The quantity in the denominator of the choice probabilities,
∫
eU(xi,r)c(r)dr, is a weighted
average of the exponentiated utility of an opportunity set for a supplier with xi character-
istic. As such, this quantity is a mixture of the exponentiated utility evaluated at different
consumer characteristics, r, with the marginal distribution of the consumer characteristics as
the mixing distribution. Recall from equation 3.9 that the unconditional choice probability
for a supplier with observed characteristics xi to remain unpaired is
P Ss0(xi) =
1
1 +
∫
eU(xi,r)c(r)dr
Therefore, the weighted average of the exponentiated utility from pairing with potential
consumers within its opportunity set can be computed as
∫
eU(xi,r)c(r)dr =
1
P Ss0(xi)
− 1
=
1− P Ss0(xi)
P Ss0(xi)
(3.11)
In this representation, the weighted average of the exponentiated utility of a latent oppor-
tunity set is, in essence, the odds of being paired (against remaining unpaired), given the
decision maker’s observed characteristics. In fact, the odds of being paired remains un-
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changed when stable matching is reached because no agents can do better by breaking off
with their current partner. Note that the odds are a deterministic function of the individ-
ual’s observable attributes alone. This weighted average, termed ΓSxi by Menzel, converges
to the “inclusive value”5 for suppliers with characteristics xi as the network size increases.
6.
Furthermore, Menzel demonstrated that the inclusive value, after scaling by 1√
n
(where n is
the number of agents on the side of the network of interest), approaches an asymptotic limit
as the population size approaches infinity in one-to-one relationships. We illustrate that
the same asymptotic behavior also occurs in many-to-many relationships in section 4.1.3.
However, solving the weighted average of the exponentiated utility directly may prove to
be difficult, especially given the fact that it is a component of the choice probabilities that
we are trying to estimate in the first place. Following Menzel’s suggestion, we also esti-
mate this weighted average as an auxiliary parameter along with the preference parameters
without solving for it explicitly. Nevertheless, the estimation procedure needs to satisfy this
equilibrium condition for all possible characteristics types in the network in order to obtain
consistent estimates of the preference parameters. We examine the optimization constraint
in detail in section 3.1.5.1.
3.1.4 Two-sided Matchings in Large Population Using the MNL Model with
Latent Opportunity Sets
The random nature of a two-sided matching outcome can be modeled as a multinomial
distribution. This modeling approach shares much in common with McFadden’s method in
[McF73] for one-sided matching. The multinomial distribution models the N individuals in
the sample as N experiments, with Tn choice situations as repetitions for each individual
n. Furthermore, the number of times each alternative is chosen by individual n is recorded.
As such, one-to-one relationships are a special case in this specification where Tn = 1 ∀n.
Without loss of generality, consider a two-mode network with S suppliers with JS mutually
5Also see section 3.3.3 for a discussion of the inclusive value.
6Each component of the Γ vector corresponds to a unique combination of the observable types for each
side, e.g. ΓSxi ,Γ
S
xj ,Γ
C
zj ,Γ
C
zk
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exclusive types of observed characteristics and C consumers with JC mutually exclusive
types of observed characteristics. For the supplier side, the vector {S1s, . . . , SJCs} denotes
the number of times supplier s chooses consumers of type {1, . . . , JC}, where Ts =
∑JC
j=1 Sjs.
This vector can also be viewed as the result of Ts independent drawings from a multinomial
distribution with the corresponding choice probabilities, which are in turn determined by
the utility model and the preference parameters. Recall that we established in section 3.1.2
that the network participants on each side make decisions independently from those on the
other side due to the diminishing effect of endogeneity in the opportunity sets in a large
sample. Therefore, the likelihood of a given two-sided matching sample is
L(θU , θV |x, z, SJC , CJS) =
 S∏
s=1
Ts!
S1s! . . . SJC+1s !
JC+1∏
j=1
p
Sjs
sj
 C∏
c=1
Tc!
C1c! . . . CJS+1c !
JS+1∏
j=1
p
Cjc
cj

(3.12)
where psj is the unconditional probability of observing the sequence of choices that supplier s
made as defined by 3.8 and 3.10.7 Note that the size of the choice set for supplier s is JC + 1
because the outside option is an option that is always available. The usual superscript S of
pSsc that indicates supplier side choice probability is dropped for clarity here. The notation is
similar for the consumer side. Note that the likelihood function specified in 3.12 implicitly
assumes independence across choices made by the same individual, which is consistent with
the MNL model.
3.1.5 Maximum Likelihood Estimator
Menzel [Men15] establishes that if the distribution of η (and ζ) in the random utility model
is in the domain of attraction of the extreme-value type-I distribution, then for large sets of
alternatives (i.e. a large number of potential partners in a two-mode network), the resulting
conditional choice probabilities specified in equations 3.6 and 3.9 can be approximated by
7The unconditional probabilities as defined require partners from the two sides to choose each other in
order for a match to occur, as evident by the multiplication. Therefore, the likelihood function may have
the appearance of double-counting the matches observed. However, this is appropriate when an individual
sampling protocol is used because each partner in a pair has two chances of being sampled—once as an
individual selected from the population, and again if the partner is selected.
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the corresponding analogs (2.6) in the MNL model. This approximation also requires that
individuals’ opportunity sets grow in size as the network size gets large. He then proves that
the random utility defined for the outside option in 3.2 does indeed satisfy this requirement.
Due to Menzel’s proof of convergence of conditional choice probabilities to logit probabilities
when the set of alternative is large, we choose, for simplicity, to follow McFadden’s[McF73]
analysis of the logit model with linear-in-parameters utility8 to examine the concavity of the
likelihood function in 3.12. Through this simplified MNL model, we establish the existence of
a unique maximum likelihood estimator, θˆ = (θˆU , θˆV ), for our proposed two-sided matching
model. Specifically, we use the standard logit probabilities below for the two sides
psj =
e
U(xs,zj)∑JC+1
i=1 e
U(xs,zi)
=
exsj
′θU∑JC+1
i=1 e
xsi′θU
pcj =
e
V(zc,xj)∑JS+1
i=1 e
V(zc,xi)
=
ezcj
′θV∑JS+1
i=1 e
zci′θV
where xsjθU represents the characteristics vector of consumer j as perceived by supplier s,
which can be based on assortative matching (matching of likes or unlikes). The counterpart
for the consumer side is notated as zcjθV . Substituting the unconditional probabilities in
the likelihood function in 3.12 (abbreviated as L) with the logit probabilities yields the
8The deterministic component of our RUM in equation 1.3 is also linear-in-parameters.
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log-likelihood
log(L) =K1 +
S∑
s=1
JC+1∑
j=1
Sjs log (psj) +K2 +
C∑
c=1
JS+1∑
j=1
Cjc log (pcj)
=K1 +
S∑
s=1
JC+1∑
j=1
Sjs log
(
exsjθU∑JC+1
i=1 e
xsiθU
)
+K2 +
C∑
c=1
JS+1∑
j=1
Cjc log
(
ezcjθV∑JC+1
i=1 e
zciθV
)
=K +
S∑
s=1
JC+1∑
j=1
Sjs
xsjθU − log
JC+1∑
i=1
exsiθU
+
C∑
c=1
JS+1∑
j=1
Cjc
zcjθV − log
JC+1∑
i=1
ezciθV

=K +
S∑
s=1
JC+1∑
j=1
Sjs xsjθU −
JC+1∑
j=1
Sjs log
JC+1∑
i=1
exsiθU
+
C∑
c=1
JS+1∑
j=1
Cjc zcjθV −
JS+1∑
j=1
Cjc log
JC+1∑
i=1
ezciθV

=K +
S∑
s=1
JC+1∑
j=1
Sjs xsj
 θU − Ts log
JC+1∑
i=1
exsiθU
+
C∑
c=1
JS+1∑
j=1
Cjc zcj
 θV − Tc log
JC+1∑
i=1
ezciθV

(3.13)
where
K = K1 +K2 =
S∑
s=1
log(Ts!)− JC+1∑
j=1
log(Sjs!)
+ C∑
c=1
log(Tc!)− JS+1∑
j=1
log(Cjc!)

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Differentiation of the log-likelihood function in 3.13 yields
∂ log(L)
∂θ
=
S∑
s=1
JC+1∑
j=1
Sjs xsj − Ts
(
1∑JC+1
i=1 e
xsiθU
)(
exsjθU
)
(xsj)
+
C∑
c=1
JS+1∑
j=1
Cjc zcj − Tc
(
1∑JS+1
i=1 e
zciθV
)(
ezcjθV
)
(zcj)

=
S∑
s=1
JC+1∑
j=1
Sjs xsj − Ts psj xsj
+ C∑
c=1
JS+1∑
j=1
Cjc zcj − Tc pcj zcj

=
S∑
s=1
JC+1∑
j=1
(Sjs − Ts psj) xsj
+ C∑
c=1
JS+1∑
j=1
(Cjc − Tc pcj) zcj

(3.14)
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∂2 log(L)
∂θ∂θ′
=−
S∑
s=1
JC+1∑
j=1
(Ts xsj)
∂
∂θU
(
exsjθU∑JC+1
i=1 e
xsiθU
)
−
C∑
c=1
JS+1∑
j=1
(Tc zcj)
∂
∂θV
(
ezcjθV∑JS+1
i=1 e
zciθV
)
=−
S∑
s=1
Ts
JC+1∑
j=1
xsj
exsjθU xsj ∑JC+1i=1 exsiθU − exsjθU ∑JC+1i=1 exsiθUxsi(∑JC+1
i=1 e
xsiθU
)2
−
C∑
c=1
Tc
JS+1∑
j=1
zcj
ezcjθV zcj∑JS+1i=1 ezciθV − ezcjθV ∑JS+1i=1 ezciθV zcj(∑JS+1
i=1 e
zciθV
)2

=−
S∑
s=1
Ts
JC+1∑
j=1
xsj
[
exsjθUxsj∑JC+1
i=1 e
xsiθU
−
(
exsjθU∑JC+1
i=1 e
xsiθU
)(∑JC+1
i=1 e
xsiθUxsi∑JC+1
i=1 e
xsiθU
)]
−
C∑
c=1
Tc
JS+1∑
j=1
zcj
[
ezcjθV zcj∑JS+1
i=1 e
zciθV
−
(
ezcjθV∑JS+1
i=1 e
zciθV
)(∑JS+1
i=1 e
zciθV zci∑JS+1
i=1 e
zciθV
)]
=−
S∑
s=1
Ts
JC+1∑
j=1
xsj
psj xsj − psj JC+1∑
i=1
psi xsi
−
C∑
c=1
Tc
JS+1∑
j=1
zcj
pcj zcj − pcj JS+1∑
i=1
pcizci

=−
 S∑
s=1
Ts
JC+1∑
j=1
xsj psj (xsj − x¯s) +
C∑
c=1
Tc
JS+1∑
j=1
zcj pcj (zcj − z¯c)

=−
 S∑
s=1
Ts
JC+1∑
j=1
xsj psj (xsj − x¯s)− x¯s psj (xsj − x¯s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
C∑
c=1
Tc
JS+1∑
j=1
zcj pcj (zcj − z¯c)− z¯cpcj (zcj − z¯c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0

=−
 S∑
s=1
Ts
JC+1∑
j=1
(xsj − x¯s)′ psj (xsj − x¯s) +
C∑
c=1
Tc
JS+1∑
j=1
(zcj − z¯c)′ pcj (zcj − z¯c)

(3.15)
where x¯s =
∑JC+1
i=1 psi xsi and z¯c =
∑JS+1
i=1 pcizci. The second to last equality involves adding
quantities that equate to zero in order to get the function into the final quadratic form:
JC+1∑
j=1
x¯s psj (xsj − x¯s) =
JC+1∑
j=1
x¯s (psj xsj − psj x¯s) =
JC+1∑
j=1
x¯s (x¯s − psj x¯s) = 0
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since
∑JC+1
j=1 psj = 1. Similarly for
∑JS+1
j=1 z¯c pcj (zcj − z¯c). Note that equation 3.15 is the
negative of the sum of two positive semi-definite matrices. Therefore, if the matrix ∂
2 log(L)
∂θ∂θ′ is
nonsingular, it would be negative definite and the log-likelihood would be strictly concave.9
Hence, under general conditions, the likelihood function is globally concave and thus has a
unique maximum.
3.1.5.1 Optimization Constraints
Section 3.1.3 introduced the stable matching equilibrium condition for the choice probabilities
that is necessary for a consistent estimator. While the definition of the MNL model in
equation 2.6 guarantees that the sum of the conditional choice probabilities is normalized to
1 because the choice set is exhaustive, the same property does not hold for our modified logit
model with latent choice set. In this case, it is necessary to impose an explicit constraint
to ensure that the estimated choice probabilities (computed via the weighted average of the
exponentiated utility) sum to 1 since they are estimated separately. Therefore, it is necessary
to impose both the stable matching condition on the estimate for each characteristic type
and a constraint to ensure that the estimated choice probabilities for each characteristic type
sum to 1. To this end, let
∑JC
j=1 p
S
sj be the unconditional probability for supplier s of xi type
to pair with a consumer of any type (hence s(xi) =
∑JC
j=1 p
S
sj + p
S
s0), the odds from equation
3.11 can also be obtained equivalently from the following
∑JC
j=1 p
S
sj
pSs0
=
s(xi)− pSs0
pSs0
=
s(xi)− P Ss0(xi)s(xi)
P Ss0(xi)s(xi)
=
s(xi)(1− P Ss0(xi))
P Ss0(xi)s(xi)
=
1− P Ss0(xi)
P Ss0(xi)
(3.16)
9Axiom 5 and 6 in McFadden [McF73] are general data conditions that further guarantee the existence
of a vector θˆ maximizing the log-likelihood function.
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Therefore, the log-likelihood maximization procedure is subject to the following constraint
that serves both purposes:
h(θU , θV ) =
1
S
S∑
s=1
(∑JC
j=1 p
S
sj
pSs0
− 1− P
S
s0(xi)
P Ss0(xi)
)
+
1
C
C∑
c=1
(∑JS
j=1 p
C
cj
pcc0
− 1− P
C
c0(zj)
PCc0(zj)
)
= 0
Overall, the estimation procedure is to maximize log(L(θU , θV )) subject to h(θU , θV ) = 0.
10
11 With the equality constraint, the Lagrangian is then
L(θU , θV , λ) = log(L(θU , θV ))− λh(θU , θV ) (3.17)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. We now examine the terms in h(θU , θV ) for the supplier
side to check for concavity. The conclusion also applies to the consumer side. For the first
term,
fs(θU |xs) =
∑JC
j=1 p
S
sj
pSs0
=
∑JC
j=1 P
S
sj(xs, zj)c(zj)P
C
js(zj, xs)s(xs)
P Ss0(xs)s(xs)
(substituted with 3.8 and 3.10)
=
∑JC
j=1
e
xsjθU∑JC+1
i=1 e
xsiθU
e
zjsθV∑JS+1
i=1 e
zjiθV
c(zj)s(xs)
1∑JC+1
i=1 e
xsiθU
s(xs)
=
JC∑
j=1
exsjθUPCjs(zj, xs)c(zj)
10For the reasons discussed in section 3.1.2, agents with the same observed attributes are expected to
share similar choice probabilities because they face very similar matching opportunities as the network size
increases. Therefore, instead of summing over each agent, the computation for the equality constraint can
be simplified by summing over all the possible combinations of the characteristics types multiplied by their
respective marginal distribution. However, h(θU , θV ) is written as, for clarity, summing over each individual
instead.
11Appendix A shows the derivations to demonstrate its equivalence to Menzel’s model.
39
∂fs(θU |xs)
∂θU
=
JC∑
j=1
exsjθUxsj P
C
js(zj, xs)c(zj) (since P
C
js(zj, xs) only depends on θV )
∂2fs(θU |xs)
∂θU∂θ′U
=
JC∑
j=1
exsjθUxsj
′xsj PCjs(zj, xs) c(zj)
=
JC∑
j=1
exsjθUxsj
′xsj (since
JC∑
j=1
PCjs(zj, xs) =
JC∑
j=1
c(zj) = 1) (3.18)
For the second term,
gs(θU |xs) = 1− P
S
s0
P Ss0
=
1
P Ss0
− 1
=
JC+1∑
i=1
exsiθU − 1
∂gs(θU |xs)
∂θU
=
JC+1∑
i=1
exsiθUxsi
∂2gs(θU |xs)
∂θ′UθU
=
JC+1∑
i=1
exsiθUxsi
′xsi
=
JC∑
i=1
exsiθUxsi
′xsi (since xs0 = 0 for the outside option) (3.19)
As expected, the Hessians from 3.18 and 3.19 are identical as both terms represent the
odds of supplier s with characteristics xs pairing up with any consumers against remaining
unpaired. When the equality constraint is satisfied (i.e. when h(θU , θV ) = 0 or sufficiently
close to zero), the Lagrangian in 3.17 remains strictly concave and has a unique maximum.
3.2 Model Identification
We examined the concavity of the Lagrangian in the last section and concluded that the
Lagrangian remains strictly concave when the equality constraint is satisfied. Otherwise, the
strictly concave property of the log-likelihood function may no longer be preserved because
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each term in the equality constraint h(θU , θV ) is a strictly convex function since their second
derivative yields a positive definite matrix (i.e.
∑JC
i=1 e
xsiθUxsi
′xsi > 0). As a result, there
may be multiple local maxima, and in some cases, the model may be unidentifiable—there
may be two or more parameters in the model whose values are observationally equivalent.
Hence, it may not be possible to learn the true values of the model’s underlying parameters
even after obtaining an infinite number of observations in such situation.
Nevertheless, there are other fundamental reasons that can cause the preference param-
eters to be unidentifiable. The definition of choice probability from equation 2.2 implies
that only the difference in utility matter, not the absolute level. The scale of utility is also
arbitrary. The level of utility is irrelevant because a constant can be added to the utility
of all alternatives without changing which alternative has the highest utility; multiplying
each alternative’s utility by a positive constant does not change this fact either. Further-
more, it can be seen from the likelihood function and the conditional probability of a match
defined in equation 3.7 that only the sum of the deterministic parts of the random util-
ity, U(xi, zj) + V (zj, xi), can be estimated (through the preference parameters θ). In other
words, the Lagrangian is only globally concave in the sum of the deterministic utility parts,
U(xi, zj) + V (zj, xi). Hence, U(xi, zj) and V (zj, xi) cannot be identified separately without
additional restrictions. Therefore, not only different levels or scales of the preference param-
eters can result in observationally equivalent matching frequency distribution, but also any
parameter combinations from the two sides that produce the same combined deterministic
utility can cause the model to be unidentifiable. This identification issue is similarly noted
in Menzel [Men15] and Logan et al. [LHN08]. Logan et al. gave the following example
in a marriage market where weaker preferences of one side can be approximately offset by
stronger preferences of the other. Consider a population in which women with a relatively
high value for some characteristics x tend to be single. This trend in the population could be
explained by a male preference for low values of x (θVx < 0), a female self-preference for high
values of x (θUx > 0), or both. They suggest that such identification problem may be miti-
gated by including additional characteristics in the model, or by restricting the signs of the
preference parameters if a priori assumptions about the desirability of certain characteristics
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can be made.
3.3 Modeling Two-sided Matchings with Correlated Choices Caused
by Unobserved Factors
The estimation method in the previous section assumes no correlation among choices made
by the same individual, and that in general, the observed factors are independent of the
unobserved factors in decision making. In other words, the explanatory variables are assumed
to be uncorrelated with the unobserved factors. In situations that involve repeated choices
by the same individual, it is reasonable to expect that these choices are interrelated through
similarities that are shared among the chosen alternatives. The bias towards these desirable
attributes such as style, appearance, and tastes are difficult to capture and are most often left
unobserved by the researcher. In the context of one-to-many and many-to-many matchings,
the correlation among choices stems from the underlying matching mechanism itself through
some sort of unobserved utility ranking “standard” that is readily recognized and widely
accepted by agents on the same side. For example, top-tier schools tend to be matched with
students with high level of achievement; more successful firms tend to employ and retain
highly skilled and productive workers. To state explicitly, in both of these examples, agents
from the same side generally agree on what overall qualities are desirable in a candidate,
including qualities that are unobserved or difficult to quantify. Therefore, agents on the
same side also necessarily share the same unobserved factors to some degree—this is why
the choices among the decision makers can be correlated. Therefore, estimation would be
inconsistent without acknowledging the correlation caused by such unobserved yet common
ranking standards. Attractiveness, brand image, and prestige are examples of attributes that
are difficult to characterize but are important determinants of the choices of agents on each
side.
We begin this section by exploring fundamental properties of the standard logit model
that are important for estimation but do not extend to our modified logit model with latent
choice sets. We propose using an additional equality constraint to ensure the estimator
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remains consistent in the limit. We also discuss in this section the mathematical reasons
behind the need to handle the unobserved effects explicitly in our proposed method. Without
loss of generality, we use our random utility model defined by equations 3.1, 3.2, and 1.3 to
develop mechanisms to correct for the bias in the utility gain for pair formation. However,
other utility models can be used and changes to the proposed mechanism can be adopted
accordingly. Finally, we give a preview of some of our empirical findings on many-to-many
relationships that emerge from the Monte Carlo simulations which we discuss in Chapter 4.
3.3.1 The Predicted vs. Observed Shares of Matching Types
All of the aforementioned models assume the random taste shifters ηij and ζji to be zero-
mean random variables. However, in the presence of correlation among choices that is not
captured by the observed factors, these random taste shifters conditional on the observed
variables alone are not zero-mean, as is usually required for standard estimation. Recall
from equation 3.14 that the first-order condition for the maximum likelihood estimator is
S∑
s=1
JC+1∑
j=1
(Sjs − Ts psj) xsj
+ C∑
c=1
JS+1∑
j=1
(Cjc − Tc pcj) zcj
 = 0 (3.20)
Rearranging and dividing by the total number of agents on the respective sides, we obtain
1
S
S∑
s=1
JC+1∑
j=1
Sjsxsj +
1
C
C∑
c=1
JS+1∑
j=1
Cjczcj =
1
S
S∑
s=1
JC+1∑
j=1
Ts psj xsj +
1
C
C∑
c=1
JS+1∑
j=1
Tc pcj zcj (3.21)
The terms on the LHS are the observed average values of the explanatory variables with the
number of times an alternative has been chosen taken into account, while the terms on the
RHS are the analogs for the predicted average values. Therefore, these two averages are equal
by construction at the maximum likelihood estimates for the MNL model. In other words,
the maximum likelihood estimate of θ = (θU , θV ) is precisely the estimate that makes the
predicted average of each explanatory variable equal to the observed average in the sample.
Consider the case where a binary dummy (or indicator) variable is included in the utility
function for each alternative, that is, a dummy for alternative k is a variable whose value
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in the utility of alternative j is dkj = 1 for j = k and zero otherwise. We denote the set of
dummy variables separately for the two sides with superscripts: dS
k
j and d
Cm
j for the supplier
and consumer sides, respectively. In estimation, an alternative-specific constant, or ASC, is
the coefficient of the dummy variable that identifies an alternative.12 By 3.21, the estimated
ASCs are the ones that ensure
1
S
S∑
s=1
JC+1∑
j=1
Sjsd
Sk
j +
1
C
C∑
c=1
JS+1∑
j=1
Cjcd
Cm
j =
1
S
S∑
s=1
JC+1∑
j=1
Ts psj d
Sk
j +
1
C
C∑
c=1
JS+1∑
j=1
Tc pcj d
Cm
j
In words, this means the ASCs induce the predicted share of type k suppliers who choose to
match with type m consumers to equal to the observed share of the same matching type.13
As a result, the estimated model is correct on average within the sample. This property
of the estimator for the MNL model is analogous to the function of the constant term in
linear regression, where the constant guarantees that the average of the predicted value of
the dependent variable equals its observed average in the sample.
Unfortunately, the preference parameters for two-sided matching need to be estimated
using the latent choice set approach instead of the MNL model for the reason discussed in
section 1.1.4. As such, in order to guarantee a consistent estimate, we propose using an
additional equality constraint to equate the predicted shares of the matching types with the
observed shares. But before we discuss a related methodology that gives rise to our proposed
constraint, we first note that in our specific implementation of the proposed method, we
estimate a single ASC for pair formation between any type of suppliers and consumers.
Furthermore, the ASC for remaining unmatched is normalized to zero for identification
purposes, thereby conforming to the random utility defined for the outside option in 3.2.
This specification also implies that there is a utility “payoff”, or gain, in pairing only.
12However, the ASC for one of the alternatives should always be set to zero because only the difference in
utility matters in decision making. Hence, only J − 1 ASCs are needed.
13In an effort to produce results comparable to those in [Men15], we use a single dummy variable for
matches between all types of suppliers and consumers in our specific implementation of the proposed model.
In other words, dS
k
j = 0 only for suppliers who choose to remain unpaired. The same convention is used for
the consumer side.
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We now focus on a particular method from econometrics that is used to estimate choice
models when the explanatory variables are endogenous (i.e. when the unobserved attributes
can have an effect on the observed attributes). For example, the observed price of a product
can be affected by the presence of some unmeasured (and thus unobserved) factors such
as non-price market promotional activities (e.g. such as advertising and coupons). Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (BLP) [BLP95] propose an estimation procedure that is based on
the idea that if the distribution of consumer unobservables is known, the market share of
a product depends only on its product-specific mean utility level; hence conditional on its
true value, the predicted market share from the model should fit the data exactly. In their
formulation, the mean utility level of a product is a constant quantity that pertains to both
observed and unobserved product characteristics and does not vary with consumer charac-
teristics. The utility derived by consumer i from consuming product j is U(ζi, pj, xj, ξj; θ),
where pj represents the price of product j, and xj and ξj are the observed and unobserved
product attributes, respectively. Consumers with different ζ values make different choices (ζi
is unobserved), and θ includes any parameters to be estimated. The premise of the problem
is that the unobserved product attribute, ξj, is correlated with price, pj (e.g. higher quality
products have higher prices), which is the source of endogeneity. Consider a special case,
U(ζi, pj, xj, ξj; θ) = xjβ − αpj + ξj + ij
= δj + ij
where
δj = xjβ − αpj + ξj
The parameters β and α are the elements in θ to be estimated. The ’s are the only elements
of the vector of consumer characteristics, ξ, and they are independently distributed across
both consumers and products. The mean of the utility from product j is denoted as δj. For
the standard logit model, the market share function that computes the predicted share is
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given by
sj =
eδj∑N
k=0 e
δk
where alternative 0 is the outside option. The authors proposed a two-step iterative in-
strument variable-based estimation: in the first step, they equate the observed share to the
predicted share for each product j, and they “invert” the market function to solve for δj ∀j;
then in step two, they regress the newly obtained δj’s on xj’s using instrumental variables.
Essentially, at each iteration, β and α are chosen such that the predicted share is approxi-
mately equal to the observed share for each product j. [Tra09] provides a detailed summary
of their method.
Inspired by their iterative procedure, our proposed method also rests on the fact that for
a correctly specified model, the predicted share of an alternative should equal the observed
share, and our preference parameters can be found such that this equality is satisfied. We
denote the observed share of matches between type s suppliers and type c consumers as
f(s, c). Furthermore, we propose imposing the following equality constraint during our
optimization procedure14
log
 JS∑
s
JC∑
c
f(s, c) +
JC∑
c
JS∑
s
f(c, s)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
observed shares
= log
 JS∑
s
JC∑
c
pSsc +
JC∑
c
JS∑
s
pCcs

︸ ︷︷ ︸
predicted shares
(3.22)
where pSsc and p
C
cs are the unconditional probabilities defined in 3.8. Again, note that this
particular equality constraint corresponds to the fact that we use a single ASC to capture
the average effect of all matching types. In fact, if JS×JC−1 ASCs are used for the distinct
types of matching, then the same number of constraints is needed.15 When this additional
equality constraint is satisfied, the estimated model is therefore correct on average within the
sample, regardless of whether the MNL model is used. Also, note that when this constraint
14In two-sided matching, f(s, c) = f(c, s) and pSsc = p
C
cs. Although it is redundant to have both terms,
they are shown here for completeness.
15The usage of multiple ASCs has never been tested in this project.
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is sufficiently satisfied, we have
log
(∑JS
s
∑JC
c f(s, c) +
∑JC
c
∑JS
s f(c, s)∑JS
s
∑JC
c p
S
sc +
∑JC
c
∑JS
s p
C
cs
)
≈ 0
since log(1) = 0. Therefore, the Lagrangian in 3.17 remains strictly concave and has a unique
maximum.
Result 1
The following additional equality constraint is necessary for estimation with non-
standard logit models:
log
(∑JS
s
∑JC
c f(s, c) +
∑JC
c
∑JS
s f(c, s)∑JS
s
∑JC
c p
S
sc +
∑JC
c
∑JS
s p
C
cs
)
= 0
To summarize, this additional equality constraint is needed to ensure that the predicted
shares of the matching type equal to that of the observed because our model is a modified
logit model with latent choice sets in which the weighted averages of the exponentiated utility
are also parameters to be estimated. By definition, the maximum likelihood estimator of
a MNL model with an ASC for each alternative is a special case with the mathematical
property that necessarily yields predicted shares that equal observed shares. This property
is important for estimation because the estimated ASCs are the values that are chosen such
that the predicted shares equal the observed shares. Therefore, the model is induced to be
correct, on average, within the sample. However, any model that deviates from the MNL
model does not exhibit this property16 and therefore this additional constraint is necessary
in order to render consistent estimates of the ASCs. Moreover, the estimation of many-to-
many relationships further departs from the MNL model because the MNL assumes that
all sources of correlation are captured by the explanatory variables. Hence, for a correctly
specified model, it is imperative to impose the constraint in 3.22 to explicitly equate the
16This also applies to other models such as the probit and mixed logit models, even when a full set of
ASCs is included.
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predicted shares with the observed shares such that the first-order condition for the maximum
likelihood estimator holds asymptotically.
3.3.2 The Common Effect of Unobserved Factors
The first-order condition for the maximum likelihood estimator illustrates another implica-
tion from the definition of the standard logit model. For the reasons discussed in section
3.1.2, we can assume that each side of the network makes decisions independently from the
other side in a large population. Hence, the terms for the supplier and consumer sides on
the LHS of 3.20 can be considered separately. Therefore, for the supplier side,
S∑
s=1
JC+1∑
j=1
(Sjs − Ts psj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
residual
xsj = 0
The difference between an agent’s actual choices, Sjs, and the probability of those choices,
Ts psj, is the residual. Just as in the ordinary least squares estimation, the maximum like-
lihood estimates are therefore the parameters that make the residuals uncorrelated with
the observed explanatory variables. Same principle applies to the consumer side. Under
this interpretation, it would be correct to make the zero covariance assumption between
the residuals and the observed variables if the set of observed variables can explain through
the utility model all sources of correlation over the alternatives, thereby leaving only white
noise. However, as discussed earlier, any unobserved utility ranking standard common to
the network as a whole that is inherent to the matching process can cause correlation among
the repeated choices. Such unobserved factor can also easily invalidate this assumption and
cause bias in the estimate. Motivated by this type of model specification error, we propose
using an additional parameter to capture the correlation attributed to unobserved factors in
repeated choice situations. Again, using our specification of the utility model where there is
a payoff upon pair formation of any type, all unobserved factors that contribute to choosing
type zj consumers are denoted collectively as ψ
S
zj
for the supplier side and ψCxi for choosing
type xi suppliers for the consumer side. Therefore, the random utility function in 3.1 that
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supplier s and consumer c both have for each other becomes
Usc = U(xi, zj) + ψ
S
zj
+ ηsc
Vcs = V (zj, xi) + ψ
C
xi
+ ζcs
(3.23)
Note that ψSzj and ψ
C
xi
enter the equations for all suppliers and all consumers identically; they
also represent the average, or common, utility that suppliers obtain from the unobserved
attributes of type zj consumers, and consumers obtain from the unobserved attributes of
type xi suppliers, respectively. As a result, for type xi suppliers, the total unobserved
portion of the utility for choosing type zj consumers now becomes η
∗
ij = ψ
S
zj
+ ηij, and the
random taste shifter η∗ij is no longer i.i.d as required for standard estimation. Suppose that
U¯(•, zj) represents the portion in U(xi, zj) that varies over alternatives but is the same for
all suppliers and that U˜(xi, zj) represents the portion that varies over alternatives and also
over suppliers. The same procedure can be applied to the consumer side. Then,
U(xi, zj) = U¯(•, zj) + U˜(xi, zj)
V (zj, xi) = V¯ (•, xi) + V˜ (zj, xi)
(3.24)
Note that the notation indicates that U¯(.) and V¯ (.) do not depend on xi or zj, respectively.
Instead, U¯(.) is an average utility that is shared by all types of characteristics exhibited by
the suppliers, as is V¯ (.) to all consumers. Therefore, U¯(.) and V¯ (.) can be interpreted as the
average utilities that contribute to some sort of ranking standard that is commonly shared
or readily recognized by agents on the same side (e.g. attractiveness). This average can be
viewed as a constant term, and that variation in utility caused by the observed variables
around this average is captured by U˜(.) and V˜ (.). As such, this formulation alludes to the
preference parameters being randomly distributed around the average. Therefore, we can
represent such variations in individual tastes with models such as the mixed logit and the
probit models. An implementation of a mixed logit model that is suitable for two-mode
network with optimization constraints is discussed in Chapter 7 as future work.
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To summarize, putting 3.23 and 3.24 together, our utility specification is then
Usc =
[
U¯(•, zj) + ψ
S
zj
]
+ U˜(xi, zj) + ηsc
Vcs =
[
V¯ (•, xi) + ψ
C
xi
]
+ V˜ (zj, xi) + ζcs
Note that the terms in the brackets do not vary with the observed characteristics of the
individual agents because they are shared among agents on the same side. In fact, they
are constant for each observed characteristic type of the agents on the other side. They are
functionally similar to the mean utility δ’s in the BLP method. Denoting a separate constant
for each side as
δ¯Szj = U¯(•, zj) + ψ
S
zj
δ¯Cxi = V¯ (•, xi) + ψ
C
xi
We can rewrite our utility model as
Usc = δ¯
S
zj
+ U˜(xi, zj) + ηsc
Vcs = δ¯
C
xi
+ V˜ (zj, xi) + ζcs
(3.25)
In essence, the constants δ¯S(.) and δ¯
C
(.) extract the correlation generated from the underlying
matching mechanism away from the individual’s random taste shifters such that they remain
i.i.d.. As a result, the estimates that make the residuals uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables are now consistent estimates because the correlation has been subsumed into the
constants such that the zero covariance assumption from the usual first-order condition for
the maximum likelihood estimator is satisfied.
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Result 2
The generalized random utility model with correlated choices caused by unobserved
factors is defined as:
Usc = δ¯
S
zj
+ U˜(xi, zj) + ηsc
Vcs = δ¯
C
xi
+ V˜ (zj, xi) + ζcs
where U˜(xi, zj) and V˜ (zj, xi) are the deterministic components of the original random
utility model under the assumption that the choices are uncorrelated or otherwise fully
explained by the observed factors.
Overall, this re-specification of the utility function includes a constant term on each side
for each type of alternative to absorb the collective effects attributed to unobserved factors
(i.e. ψS(.) and ψ
C
(.)). The original utility model from equation 3.1 does not account for such
effects. As a result, the maximum likelihood estimates are the values of the preference pa-
rameters chosen to make the residual orthogonal to the column space of the design matrices,
xs and zc. Therefore, these estimates may be significantly biased if the residuals are in fact
correlated due to unobserved factors. On the other hand, the definition of the MNL model
precludes any correlation caused by unobserved factors, thereby satisfying the orthogonality
of the residual and the explanatory variables. In that case, the original utility model would
generally lead to consistent estimates. Otherwise, any correlation arises from unobserved
factors needs to be accounted for explicitly in models that deviates from the MNL model.
As an aside, as discussed previously, our specific implementation of the utility model only
allows a common payoff for pair formation regardless of the matching type. Hence, only a
single constant δ¯S is estimated for the supplier side and another constant δ¯C is estimated for
the consumer side.
3.3.3 Connections Between One-to-One and Many-to-Many Relationships
Recall from equation 3.24 that the original utility function is separated into two parts: one
that corresponds to the average utility that is shared among agents on the same side of
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the network and another that represents the utility that is specific to the decision maker,
which is a variation from the average. The latter part is identical to the original utility when
correlation does not exist or is negligible among the choices, as is assumed in one-to-one
relationships. Combining equations 1.3 and 3.25 produces an overall utility function of the
form
Usc = δ¯
S +
[
θUs0 + θUs1Ωs1(xi, zj) + θUs2Ωs2(xi, zj) + . . .
]
+ ηsc
Vcs = δ¯
C +
[
θVc0 + θVc1Ωc1(zj, xi) + θVc2Ωc2(zj, xi) + . . .
]
+ ζcs
(3.26)
As illustrated above, there are two types of constants that contribute to the overall utility:
δ¯S and δ¯C , which contribute the same amount to the utility for all agents on the same side
regardless of their observed characteristics types. In contrast, the contribution from θUs0 and
θVc0 depends on the agents’ observed characteristics, and they function more as intercept
terms for the corresponding observable type. Therefore, there is a functional difference
between them. Also, note that the equations in 3.26 are defined per pair (i.e. a single choice
situation concerning one supplier and one consumer). Hence the maximum number of pairs
that an agent can form needs to be taken into accounted for the estimation of these constants
in one-to-many and many-to-many relationships.
Result 3
The generalized utility payoff in many-to-many relationships is defined as:
κSsc = δ¯
S
zj
√
τ + θUs0
κCcs = δ¯
C
xi
√
τ + θVc0
where τ is the maximum number of pairs each agent can form (i.e. the maximum
degree of a node allowed). Therefore, the new random utility model for pair formation
in many-to-many relationships is of the form:
Usc = κ
S
sc + θUs1Ωs1(xi, zj) + θUs2Ωs2(xi, zj) + · · ·+ ηsc
Vcs = κ
C
cs + θVc1Ωc1(zj, xi) + θVc2Ωc2(zj, xi) + · · ·+ ζcs
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As a proof of concept for the proposed method, our implementation specifies that all
suppliers simply share the same set of parameters, θU , and all consumers share the same set
of parameters, θV . Agents from both sides can each pair with at most τ agents on the other
side, with the option to choose to remain unpaired for all τ times. Suppose there is an average
propensity or incentive for agents on each side to form pairs, which we denote as κS and κC ,
that corresponds to a basic utility reward for each pair formation and is common for all agents
on the same side. We find empirical evidence that supports the following relationship from
our Monte Carlo simulation performed on random graphs of many-to-many relationships
generated by a modified version of the Gale–Shapley algorithm:
κS = δ¯S
√
τ + θU0
κC = δ¯C
√
τ + θV0
(3.27)
Let us define
Is =
1√
S
∑
c∈ opp. set
eUsc (3.28)
where the summation is over each consumer c in supplier s’s opportunity set and S is the
total number of suppliers in the network. This is identical to the definition of “inclusive
value” in [Men15], which has a similar meaning to the term
∫
eUsrc(r)dr in the denomina-
tor of the choice probabilities. Hence, it is an important scalar quantity that summarizes
the deterministic component of the utility function over all the available options by way
of the opportunity set when the observed characteristics of the decision maker taken into
account. In fact, [Men15] demonstrates that the inclusive values of the opportunity sets for
the observed characteristics types are sufficient statistics with respect to the corresponding
conditional choice probabilities in the limit. Incidentally, we find evidence from our simula-
tion result using random graphs that Is also grows approximately at a rate that involves
√
τ .
The same result applies to the consumer side because both sides share the same value for τ .
Specifically, denoting the baseline value as Iτ0 and the corresponding maximum number of
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pairing as τ0, we observe empirically that
Iτ = (Iτ0 − 1)
√
τ
τ0
+ 1 (3.29)
Note that the value of 1 in 3.29 above comes from the exponentiated utility e0 = 1 for the
outside option. In both of the relationships above, the square root terms that involve τ most
likely arise from the multiplicative nature of two-mode networks in which the terms from
one side are multiplied by those from the other. In this case, there are 2τ agents who come
together to form τ pairs. Therefore, the agents from each side contribute through
√
τ .
Result 4
Many-to-many matchings with different values of τ are related through the inclusive
value by:
Iτ = (Iτ0 − 1)
√
τ
τ0
+ 1
where the quantities with the subscript 0 are the baseline reference values to infer
from.
In Chapter 4, we examine the accuracy of the inferred inclusive values using the above
relationship with different baseline values. It is our belief that understanding the behavior
of the inclusive values in one-to-many relationships will ultimately lead to a solution for
its estimation. We also present the details of our Monte Carlo simulations and the data
generation process. Other empirical findings in terms of convergence are also discussed.
3.4 Asymptotic Variance of the Maximum Likelihood Estimates
The central limit theorem establishes that for a correctly specified model,
√
n(θˆ − θ∗) d−→ N(0, (−H)−1)
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as n → ∞, where n represents the sample size (i.e. n = S + C), θ∗ = (θˆ∗U , θˆ∗V , ΓˆS∗, ΓˆC∗)
is the true parameter vector, θˆ = (θˆU , θˆV , Γˆ
S, ΓˆC) is the maximum likelihood estimator, and
H is the expected Hessian of the log-likelihood in the population (the information matrix is
−H). Note that we use the average Hessian in the sample, H, as an estimate of H to calculate
the asymptotic covariance of θˆ. This average is taken over the Hessian of each observation’s
log-likelihood, log(pSsc), defined in equation 3.8. It is necessary to sum up the contribution
from each type of pairing separately because both the choice probability computation and
the observed matching frequency are different for different types of pairing. Therefore, using
the same log-likelihood function for all observations will lead to incorrect estimate of the
variance.
The information identity states that the negative of the average Hessian in the sample,
−H, converges to the covariance of the scores at the true parameters. The score of an
observation is defined as the derivative of that observation’s log-likelihood with respect to
the parameters. For example, the score of a pairing between supplier s and consumer c is
Ks(θ) = ∂ log(p
S
sc)
∂θ
The same calculation applies to the consumer side. The outer product of supplier s’s score
is Ks(θ)Ks(θ)′.17 Therefore, the average outer product in the sample is
B =
∑S
s Ks(θ)Ks(θ)′ +
∑C
c Kc(θ)Kc(θ)′
S + C
(3.30)
The matrix B above is the average outer product of the score, in which each score is the
observation-specific gradient. It is related to the covariance matrix in that if the average score
were zero, then B would be the covariance matrix of scores in the sample. Because of the
first-order condition of the maximum likelihood estimator, the average score is indeed zero
at the parameters that maximizes the likelihood function. In other words, at the maximizing
values of the parameters, B is the variance of scores in the sample. Therefore, the asymptotic
17A centered version of the outer product of the scores can be used instead: (Ks(θ) − gS)(Ks(θ) − gS)′
where the average scores are denoted as gS =
∑S
s Ks(θ)/S.
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variance of the estimates can be calculated as −H
−1
n
or B
−1
n
because B → −H as n→∞.
In addition, the variance of the scores also provides a measure of the curvature of the
log-likelihood function, which is similar to the Hessian. For instance, if all the observations
in the sample have similar scores, then the sample contains very little information. In this
case, the curvature is small (i.e. the log-likelihood function is fairly flat) and the variance of
the scores is small. On the other hand, if the scores differ significantly over observations, the
sample contains a substantial amount of information and the variance of the scores is high.
However, a model is only a simplification or an approximation of the true data generation
process. To account for such model misspecification, we use the following variance estimate
for any model for which the expected score is zero at the true parameter:
√
n(θˆ − θ∗) d−→ N(0,H−1VH−1)
where V is the variance of the scores in the population. The asymptotic variance of θˆ
is the matrix H
−1VH−1
n
, which is known as the robust covariance matrix since it is valid
regardless of whether the model is correctly specified. This formula is also the so-called
“sandwich” estimator of the covariance. If the model is indeed correctly specified, V = −H
by the information identity and H−1VH−1 = −H−1. Otherwise, the asymptotic variance is
calculated as H
−1BH−1
n
with B defined in 3.30 because B → −H as n→∞ at the maximizing
value of θ. Also, the sample covariance approaches the population covariance, B → V, as
the sample size increases.
Section 4.4 illustrates our estimation results from Monte Carlo simulations. Figures 4.18–
4.20 display the asymptotic standard errors for the preference parameters and the weighted
average of the exponentiated utility of the opportunity set of each observed characteristics
type (i.e. the Γ vector). These figures illustrate that the asymptotic standard errors generally
decrease as the sample size increases. In addition, the estimated standard errors for the Γs
converge to lower values as τ increases, which is consistent with the faster convergence of the
inclusive values in many-to-many relationships (demonstrated in Chapter 4). The empirical
standard errors are shown in Table C.5–C.8 in Appendix C and the corresponding asymptotic
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counterparts are shown in Table C.9–C.12 in Appendix C.
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CHAPTER 4
Monte Carlo Simulations
In this chapter, we put together the components of our proposed method in Chapter 3 and
use our probabilistic framework to perform preference parameter estimation on simulated
matchings in random graphs. In particular, we use a modified Gale–Shapley algorithm as the
random graph model to generate the one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many matchings.
The focus of this chapter is to present results from Monte Carlo simulations of one-to-many
and many-to-many relationships to illustrate the different aspects of theoretical convergence.
However, estimation is only performed on one-to-one and many-to-many matchings due to
the divergent behavior in one-to-many relationships. We begin with an examination of the
statistical characteristics of the inclusive values for one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-
to-many relationships. We illustrate the degree distribution of the simulated networks to
highlight the different pairing behavior in these relationships. We then present the empirical
evidence for equations 3.27 and 3.29 which connect one-to-one relationships with many-to-
many relationships. Finally, we conclude this chapter with a discussion of hypothesis testing
and goodness of fit. Throughout this chapter, we use empirical results to demonstrate the
large-population effect that is required for our proposed method.
Before we present the results from the Monte Carlo simulations, we first discuss the
data generation process (DGP) and the parameters of the simulation used throughout this
chapter. With the restriction that all agents on the same side share the same set of preference
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parameters, we use the following random utility function:
U∗sc(xi, zj|κS, θU) = κS + θU1xi + θU2xizj + ηsc
V ∗cs(zj, xi|κC , θV ) = κC + θV1zj + θV2zjxi + ζcs
U∗s0 = 0 + max
k=1,...,J
{ηs0,k}
V ∗c0 = 0 + max
k=1,...,J
{ζc0,k}
(4.1)
where J =
√
n with n number of agents on each side (same as in equation 3.2). There
are two observable types for each the suppliers and consumers, xi, zj ∈ {0, 1}, and there
are an equal number of agents of each type. Furthermore, the random taste shifters are
i.i.d. draws from the standard extreme-value type-I distribution (i.e. location parameter
= 0 and scale parameter = 1). As discussed in section 3.3.3, κS and κC are the average
utility gains that result from pair formation and indicate the total incentive for pairing.
The second parameter, θU1 and θV1 , measures the systematic difference in the propensity for
pairing between the two observable types. The last parameter, θU2 and θV2 , measures the
strength for heterophilly where a non-zero value encourages matching between the different
observable types. Heterophilly is implemented by taking the absolute value of the difference
of the binary types.
Each replication of the Monte Carlo simulations has the same number of agents from
each side of the network (i.e. 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000, and 2000 agents). The number of
agents is denoted as n henceforth. The setup of our simulation described thus far is similar
to that in [Men15]. Therefore, our results are comparable. We also find that the matching
data generation process itself becomes costly beyond n = 2000. However, the computational
cost for the estimation is quite small. In particular, for many-to-many relationships, the
number of maximum pairs allowed for each agent, τ , is the same for both sides, which ranges
from 1 to 6. Optimization is done in R with the nloptr package using the SLSQP algorithm,
which is a local gradient-based algorithm, by setting the algorithm flag to NLOPT_LD_SLSQ.
The following stopping criteria of the optimization routine are set: ftol_rel = = 1.0e-8,
xtol_rel = 1.0e-8, ftol_abs = 1.0e-6, and maxeval = 1000. We removed any outliers
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that exceed 1 standard deviation from the mean for the results presented in this chapter.
Due to the fact that we are fitting a single set of parameters for all agents on the same side,
we do not need to sum over the log-likelihood contribution from each individual separately
as suggested in equation 3.13. Instead, the summation is performed over the proportion of
the distinct types of observed characteristics because in our case, the estimated parameters
are effectively an average of the agents on the same side. By doing so, the computational
speed improves and does not increase linearly with the sample size, although there are likely
other relatively minor overhead costs associated with memory management as the sample
size increases. An illustrative example with details is included in Appendix B.
4.1 Statistical Characteristics of Opportunity Sets
This section presents our simulation results for one-to-many and many-to-many relationships
in a format and notation that is directly comparable to the results for one-to-one relationships
in [Men15]. These results are averaged over 50 independent replications (i.e. 50 random
graphs). In particular, we examine the similarities and differences among them that pertain
to the properties of the opportunity sets as the network size increases. Throughout this
section, the following preference parameters (which are the same as Menzel’s) are used to
generate the matching data:
κS = κC = 2.0,
θU1 = θV1 = 0.0,
θU2 = θV2 = 0.0
(4.2)
As Menzel noted, this particular set of values represent the lack of observable characteristics.
Therefore, only the average propensity for pairing is considered.
Throughout this section, only the proposer-side statistics are presented. The superscripts
indicate proposer- or reviewer-optimal matching. The main letters denote the type of con-
stituents of the set in question, and the subscripts generally refer to the agent or the side
that the quantity to which the main letter belongs. For example, RPi refers to supplier i’s
opportunity set (which consists of reviewers) under the proposer-optimal matching, and RRi
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refers to its opportunity set under the reviewer-optimal matching. For the simulation results
in this section, |RPi | − |RRi | is the difference in the average size of a proposer’s opportunity
set between the extremal matchings, which serves as the upper bound of the variation in
opportunity sets across different stable matchings. The notation, #{RPi 6= RRi }, denotes the
average number of proposers whose opportunity sets differ across the extremal matchings,
RPi and R
R
i . The normalized values of the exponentiated utilities of proposer i’s opportu-
nity set (i.e. the inclusive value illustrated in equation 3.28) under proposer-optimal and
reviewer-optimal matchings are denoted as Ip[R
P
i ] and Ip[R
R
i ], respectively. In the sections
that follow, a brief description of our implementation of the deferred-acceptance algorithm is
provided before the simulation results are presented. We also note that all variations of the
Gale–Shapley algorithm implemented have been verified for pairwise stability at equilibrium.
Figure 4.1: Difference in the average size of a proposer’s opportunity set
between proposer- and reviewer-optimal matchings across various τ values in
many-to-many relationships.
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Figure 4.2: The average number of proposers whose opportunity sets differ
across proposer- and reviewer-optimal matchings in many-to-many relation-
ships.
Figures 4.1–4.4 illustrate the overall convergence behavior of the various quantities per-
taining to the opportunity sets described above. They serve to provide a visual summary
for Tables 4.1–4.8 since they contain the same information as the tables. Their details are
described in the following sections.
4.1.1 Statistical Characteristics of One-to-One Relationships
This section is provided for convenience and supplies some background information on the
original work of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. The algorithm for a stable marriage problem is
well known and is described in depth in Roth and Sotomayor [RS90]. In essence, the original
algorithm is iterative in nature and works as follows. All men and women are assumed to
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Figure 4.3: The inclusive values of the proposers’ opportunity sets under
proposer-optimal matching. Note the different convergence behavior between
many-to-many and one-to-many relationships. The corresponding inclusive
values for the reviewer side exhibit the same behavior.
have a utility value for each person from the other side. In the first round, each man proposes
to the woman he prefers most, and then each woman temporarily accepts the proposal from
the man (out of those who proposed to her) she prefers most and rejects all other proposals.
At this time, the woman and man are said to be “engaged” to each other. In each subsequent
round, each unengaged man (i.e. those rejected in the previous round) proposes to the next
most-preferred woman. Regardless of a woman’s engagement status, she would temporarily
accept the proposal from her most preferred man and reject all other proposals, even if it
means ending a prior engagement. Note that this is the only situation for an engaged man
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Figure 4.4: The inclusive values of the proposers’ opportunity sets un-
der proposer- and reviewer-optimal matchings in many-to-many relationships.
The corresponding inclusive values for the reviewer side exhibit the same be-
havior. However, the inclusive values under the extremal matchings are always
identical in one-to-many relationships. This is illustrated in Tables 4.2–4.5.
to become unengaged. This process repeats for each unengaged man until none of the men
are rejected.
Menzel added the outside option to the Gale–Shapley deferred-acceptance algorithm in
his estimation method for one-to-one relationships. The outside option is the option to
remain unpaired. Therefore, a pairing between a man and a woman occurs if and only if the
utility value of the pairing, as perceived by each party, exceeds that of the respective outside
option. The outside option allows individuals to stay single at the end of the procedure,
which is otherwise prohibited in the original algorithm if there are equal number of men and
women.
64
For convenience, the results from one-to-one relationships are reported in Table 4.1 for
comparison purposes. They are similar to the results from Table I in [Men15]. Four important
Table 4.1: Comparisons of the proposer- and reviewer-optimal matchings: 1
choice situation for both sides
n |RPi | − |RRi | #{RPi 6= RRi } Ip[RPi ] Ip[RRi ] Ip[RPi ]− Ip[RRi ]
10 0.13400 1.18 7.388407 7.075300 0.3131077
20 0.12100 1.84 7.354134 7.154213 0.1999214
50 0.22640 8.56 7.224925 6.988344 0.2365813
100 0.18740 14.70 6.642466 6.503995 0.1384709
200 0.13610 22.70 6.975909 6.904798 0.0711102
500 0.06564 59.38 6.971876 6.956538 0.0153376
1000 0.06526 120.92 6.914281 6.903498 0.0107825
2000 0.03356 161.38 6.894539 6.891032 0.0035069
characteristics emerge from this result: between the extremal matchings, 1) the difference
in the average size of the opportunity set for a proposer generally decreases in n (also see
Figure 4.1), 2) the difference in the inclusive values of the opportunity sets for a proposer
decreases in n (also see Figure 4.4), while 3) the number of proposers for whom there is
a difference in opportunity sets generally increases in n (also see Figure 4.2). Given the
equality constraint described in section 3.1.5.1, the critical characteristic observed is that
4) the inclusive value of the opportunity sets converge to a nonzero limit as n approaches
infinity (also see Figure 4.3). This convergence property is the basis for the equilibrium
conditions in Menzel’s estimation method. It is also important to note that there need not
be a unique stable matching in the limit (the third characteristics above demonstrates that
the degree of multiplicity of matching outcomes in fact increases in n) but only that the
observable matching frequency in stable matchings converges to a unique limit defined by
equations 3.8 and 3.10.
4.1.2 Statistical Characteristics of One-to-Many Relationships
The statistical characteristics of stable matchings in one-to-many relationships are examined
in the same fashion as for one-to-one relationships above. Let us consider the one-to-many
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case where the proposers can be paired with at most R reviewer, but each reviewer can
only be paired with one proposer. In this case, each proposer in the first round proposes to
the R most-preferred reviewers. Each reviewer then temporarily accepts the proposal from
the most-preferred proposer and rejects all other proposals. In the subsequent rounds, any
proposers with less than R accepted proposals propose to the next most-preferred reviewers
to fill the R total slots. Each reviewer would then reject any proposal accepted previously
upon receiving (and therefore temporarily accepting) a new proposal from a more-preferred
proposer. The process repeats until no proposers are rejected. In addition to the procedure
just described, the outside option is allowed in our estimation framework. As such, the
outside option can be used to fill any or all of the R slots of the proposers. Similarly, a
reviewer can also choose to remain unpaired. Therefore, a proposer would only propose
to the reviewers whose utility values exceed the utility value of the outside option of the
proposer, and a reviewer would only accept a proposer whose utility value exceeds that of
the outside option of the reviewer. The procedure works similarly if each proposer is only
allowed to pair with at most one reviewer and each reviewer can be paired with at most P
proposers. In this case, a proposer would only propose to the most-preferred reviewer at a
time and a reviewer would temporarily accept at most P proposals at a time.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate the average inclusive values of the opportunity sets for the
proposers if the proposers were to change from the single-pairing side to the multiple-pairing
side with τ = 6. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate the corresponding scenario for τ = 20. Note
that the average inclusive values of the opportunity sets practically remain unchanged even as
the number of choice situations increases significantly from 6 to 20 for the side with multiple
pairings (also see Figure 4.3). In section 4.2, we demonstrate the effect of this characteristic
of the inclusive value for one-to-many relationships through the degree distribution of the
networks formed.
As in one-to-one-relationships, the inclusive values of the side with only single pairings
also converge to a nonzero limit as the sample size increases. However, it is unclear from
Figure 4.3 whether the inclusive values of the side with multiple pairings also converge in n.
Another important observation is that the opportunity sets for any given sample size and
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Table 4.2: Comparisons of the proposer- and reviewer-optimal matchings: 1
choice situation for the propsers and 6 choice situations for the reviewers
n |RPi | − |RRi | #{RPi 6= RRi } Ip[RPi ] Ip[RRi ] Ip[RPi ]− Ip[RRi ]
10 0 0 2.990880 2.990880 0
20 0 0 2.627067 2.627067 0
50 0 0 1.885126 1.885126 0
100 0 0 1.662538 1.662538 0
200 0 0 1.486993 1.486993 0
500 0 0 1.270509 1.270509 0
1000 0 0 1.194810 1.194810 0
2000 0 0 1.127325 1.127325 0
Table 4.3: Comparisons of the proposer- and reviewer-optimal matchings: 6
choice situations for the proposers and 1 choice situations for the reviewers
n |RPi | − |RRi | #{RPi 6= RRi } Ip[RPi ] Ip[RRi ] Ip[RPi ]− Ip[RRi ]
10 0 0 13.55242 13.55242 0
20 0 0 19.21559 19.21559 0
50 0 0 20.10523 20.10523 0
100 0 0 21.98540 21.98540 0
200 0 0 27.03129 27.03129 0
500 0 0 31.60715 31.60715 0
1000 0 0 32.86444 32.86444 0
2000 0 0 34.26873 34.26873 0
value of τ are identical, as indicated by the lack of difference in the size and constituents of the
opportunity sets between the extremal matchings. This provides evidence that the pairwise
stable matching outcome is unique for one-to-many relationships for any given combination
of sample size and value of τ . In contrast, one-to-one (and many-to-many) relationships
exhibit multiplicity of stable matching outcomes which increases in n.
4.1.3 Statistical Characteristics of Many-to-Many Relationships
The results from this section use a similarly modified version of the Gale–Shapley deferred-
acceptance algorithm to generate many-to-many matchings. In this case, proposers can be
paired with at most R reviewers, and each reviewer can be paired with at most P proposers.
67
Table 4.4: Comparisons of the proposer- and reviewer-optimal matchings: 1
choice situations for the proposer and 20 choice situations for the reviewer
n |RPi | − |RRi | #{RPi 6= RRi } Ip[RPi ] Ip[RRi ] Ip[RPi ]− Ip[RRi ]
10 0 0 3.388106 3.388106 0
20 0 0 2.354446 2.354446 0
50 0 0 2.163089 2.163089 0
100 0 0 1.651454 1.651454 0
200 0 0 1.419853 1.419853 0
500 0 0 1.275532 1.275532 0
1000 0 0 1.243318 1.243318 0
2000 0 0 1.103657 1.103657 0
Table 4.5: Comparisons of the proposer- and reviewer-optimal matchings:
20 choice situations for the proposer and 1 choice situations for the reviewer
n |RPi | − |RRi | #{RPi 6= RRi } Ip[RPi ] Ip[RRi ] Ip[RPi ]− Ip[RRi ]
10 0 0 14.95440 14.95440 0
20 0 0 16.10937 16.10937 0
50 0 0 21.23380 21.23380 0
100 0 0 21.57974 21.57974 0
200 0 0 27.90463 27.90463 0
500 0 0 31.16197 31.16197 0
1000 0 0 32.05429 32.05429 0
2000 0 0 34.40619 34.40619 0
In the first round, each proposer proposes to the R most-preferred reviewers. Each reviewer
then temporarily accepts the P most-preferred proposals and rejects all other proposals. In
the subsequent rounds, any proposers with less than R accepted proposals propose to the
next most-preferred reviewers to fill the R total slots. Each reviewer would then reject any
of the proposals accepted previously that have lower utility values than any of the newly
received proposals, and replace them with the more-preferred new proposals to fill the P
total slots. The process repeats until no proposers are rejected. As in the one-to-many case,
the outside option is also allowed for both the reviewers and proposers in many-to-many
relationships to fill any or all of the allowed slots.
Curiously, tables 4.6-4.8 and Figures 4.1–4.4 reveal that the same characteristics from
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one-to-one relationships persist in various choice situations for both sides in many-to-many
relationships. In addition, these results demonstrate that the difference in the average in-
clusive value of the opportunity sets between the extremal matchings diminishes even faster
as the number of choice situations increases for the same sample size. As such, this suggests
a faster convergence rate for the inclusive value of the opportunity sets as the number of
choice situations increases. Intuitively, this faster convergence with more choice situations
is analogous to achieving higher accuracy by taking the average of more repeated measure-
ments. This empirical finding may suggest that estimators for many-to-many relationships
are more efficient than those for one-to-one relationships. We demonstrate further evidence
of this finding when we examine the results from our proposed estimation method in section
4.4.
Table 4.6: Comparisons of the proposer- and reviewer-optimal matchings: 3
choice situations for both sides
n |RPi | − |RRi | #{RPi 6= RRi } Ip[RPi ] Ip[RRi ] Ip[RPi ]− Ip[RRi ]
10 0.10000 0.88 11.53825 11.30459 0.2336625
20 0.09900 1.84 11.75736 11.59379 0.1635721
50 0.11920 5.12 11.37053 11.24597 0.1245605
100 0.14980 12.50 10.86117 10.75049 0.1106881
200 0.04820 9.00 11.24722 11.22204 0.0251838
500 0.04588 21.54 11.07425 11.05908 0.0151610
1000 0.01584 15.52 11.12048 11.11678 0.0037012
2000 0.02347 45.56 11.36305 11.35918 0.0038778
As in one-to-one relationships, although the exact underlying mechanism of the match-
ing need not be as described in this modified deferred-acceptance algorithm, the resulting
asymptotic characteristics of the inclusive value is still applicable in estimation because the
stability of the matching is inherently assumed in the data (see the equilibrium condition
described in section 3.1.5.1). The algorithm is simply used as a device to guarantee a stable
matching for further analysis and estimation. Nevertheless, the results herein validate the
application of the same equality constraints for estimation in one-to-one relationships to
many-to-many relationships.
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Table 4.7: Comparisons of the proposer- and reviewer-optimal matchings: 6
choice situations for both sides
n |RPi | − |RRi | #{RPi 6= RRi } Ip[RPi ] Ip[RRi ] Ip[RPi ]− Ip[RRi ]
10 0.00000 0.00 15.04319 15.04319 0.0000000
20 0.02800 0.48 16.09781 16.05154 0.0462628
50 0.04800 2.24 15.52701 15.47685 0.0501586
100 0.04520 4.22 15.06688 15.03348 0.0333985
200 0.01300 2.52 15.36765 15.36085 0.0067923
500 0.01288 6.36 15.36866 15.36441 0.0042562
1000 0.01012 9.94 15.46380 15.46143 0.0023647
2000 0.00990 19.26 15.71434 15.71270 0.0016357
Table 4.8: Comparisons of the proposer- and reviewer-optimal matchings:
10 choice situations for both sides
n |RPi | − |RRi | #{RPi 6= RRi } Ip[RPi ] Ip[RRi ] Ip[RPi ]− Ip[RRi ]
10 0.00000 0.00 16.34235 16.34235 0.0000000
20 0.00400 0.08 19.49317 19.48656 0.0066090
50 0.01320 0.64 19.37459 19.36079 0.0137936
100 0.01420 1.36 18.93948 18.92899 0.0104925
200 0.00600 1.20 19.44951 19.44638 0.0031349
500 0.01336 6.40 19.51192 19.50751 0.0044148
1000 0.01154 11.32 19.52589 19.52320 0.0026965
2000 0.00322 6.42 19.89841 19.89788 0.0005320
4.2 Degree Distribution of Simulated Networks
In this section, we compare the degree distribution of the networks for one-to-one, many-
to-many, and one-to-many relationships. All networks in this section are generated by the
modified Gale–Shapley matching algorithm described in section 4.1 using the preference
parameter set described in 4.2. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 illustrate the degree distributions for
many-to-many relationships (one-to-one relationships are special cases where τ = 1). The
results are similar for both the proposer- and reviewer-side. Recall that equation 4.1 defines
the random utility for the outside option as the maximum of the J independent draws for the
taste shifter. Menzel’s rationale for this modeling choice of the outside option is to keep the
outside option sufficiently attractive such that the share of unmatched agents remains stable
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even when the agents face a growing set of potential matching partners as the network size
increases. The effect of this approach is evident in the degree distribution of the resulting
networks. Also note that the vast majority of agents form the maximum number of pairs
allowed for each value of τ in many-to-many relationships.
Figure 4.5: Degree distributions for one-to-one (τ = 1) and many-to-many
relationships with various τ values for both sides. All networks have 2000
agents on each side. Suppliers are the proposers in the results illustrated.
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 display the degree distributions generated for one-to-many relation-
ships where one side has τ = 1 and the other side has τ > 1. Notice that a vast majority of
agents on the side with τ = 1 has degree of 1, whereas the agents on the side with τ > 1 favor
the outside option instead; only few choose to form the maximum number of pairs allowed in
the case of τ = 6 and none in the case of τ = 20. This observation is consistent with the rela-
tively constant inclusive values illustrated in Table 4.3 and 4.5 as τ increases from 6 to 20. It
appears that the maximum degree actually achieved for the side with multiple pairings grows
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Figure 4.6: Degree distribution for a many-to-many matching with τ = 30
for both sides.
significantly slower than the maximum degree allowed. Therefore, the matching behavior
of one-to-many relationships is very different from that of one-to-one and many-to-many
relationships. Further research is necessary to understand the equilibrium condition, along
with the equality constraint that is needed for the estimation of one-to-many relationships.
4.3 Inclusive Values
Recall from sections 3.1.5.1 and 3.3.3 that the inclusive values play a significant role in deter-
mining the corresponding conditional choice probabilities and establishing pairwise stability
at equilibrium. We now present the supportive evidence for the connection between many-to-
many and one-to-one relationships through the inclusive values of their opportunity sets. In
general, we find that the inclusive values from repeated choice situations are related through
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Figure 4.7: Degree distribution for a one-to-many matching with τs = 1 for
the supplier side and τc = 6 for the consumer side.
Figure 4.8: Degree distribution for a one-to-many matching with τs = 1 for
the supplier side and τc = 20 for the consumer side.
τ alone as illustrated in equation 3.29, restated here for the supplier side for convenience:
Iˆτ = (Iτ0 − 1)
√
τ
τ0
+ 1
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Tables C.1–C.4 in Appendeix C illustrate the mean of the projected inclusive values for
many-to-many matchings over 50 replications (i.e. 50 random graphs). The notation Iˆp[R
P
i ]
denotes the estimated values. These estimated values are computed using various baseline
values from section 4.1 without information on the true parameters in the data generation
process or the size of the sample. Figure 4.9 presents the bias of the mean projected inclusive
values over 50 replications comparing to the corresponding observed values. As expected,
the estimated values are more accurate with larger sample sizes. Comparing the sub-figures
also reveals that the estimates for inclusive values with τ closer to the baseline τ0 value are
generally more accurate. Moreover, using τ0 = 1 as a baseline value for prediction appears
to be less accurate. This is likely due to the fact that the inclusive values for one-to-one
relationships generally converge slower.
4.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Preference Parameters
This section focuses on the performance evaluation of our proposed estimation method on
many-to-many relationships. Estimation is not performed on one-to-many relationships be-
cause of the non-converging behavior of the inclusive value of the opportunity sets illustrated
in section 4.1.2, which leads to inconsistency of the estimator. In particular, we examine the
mean and standard deviation of the estimates over 200 independent replications (i.e. 200
random graphs) for each sample size: 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000, and 2000. The following
preference parameters are used to generate the matching data used in this section:1
κS = κC = 0.5,
θU1 = θV1 = 0.5,
θU2 = θV2 = 1.0
(4.3)
1Other values show similar results.
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(a) Iˆτ=1 (b) Iˆτ=3
(c) Iˆτ=6 (d) Iˆτ=10
Figure 4.9: Bias of the projected inclusive values using various baseline
values. Each line represents the mean value over 50 replications (i.e. 50
random graphs)
The matching data is generated as described in section 4.1.3. Each random graph is generated
using the supplier-optimal Gale–Shapely matching algorithm with the utility model:
Usc = κ
S + θU1xi1 + θU2 abs(xi1 − zj1) + ηsc
Vcs = κ
C + θV1zj1 + θV2 abs(zj1 − xi1) + ζcs
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where xi1 ∈ {0, 1} and zj1 ∈ {0, 1}. The preference parameters κS = κC = 0.5 indicate a
fixed positive payoff for pair formation of any type in each choice situation. The parameters
θU1 = θV1 = 0.5 indicate a positive payoff for any type of pair formation for self-type xi1 = 1
and zj1 = 1 only, whereas θU2 = θV2 = 1 indicate a positive payoff for heterophily for all
matching types. Figure 4.10 and 4.11 demonstrate the effects of the preference parameters
in terms of the characteristics of the pairs formed. Overall, these figures provide supportive
evidence of data fidelity for the matchings generated using the Gale–Shapley algorithm since
the positive payoffs are demonstrated to encourage the respective types of intended effects.
(a) κS = κC = 0.5 (b) θU1 = θV1 = 0.5
(c) θU2 = θV2 = 1.0
Figure 4.10: Effects of the preference parameters in data generation. Data
from a single realization with sample size of 2000 and τ = 5 is shown.
For estimation, we set the starting values for the components of θU and θV to 0, and
the components of the auxiliary parameters ΓS and ΓC to 1. The Monte Carlo evidence
on estimation of κS, κC , θU , θV is presented in Tables C.5–C.8 in Appendix C and Figures
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(a) κS = κC = 0.5 (b) θU1 = θV1 = 0.5
(c) θU2 = θV2 = 1.0
Figure 4.11: Effects of the preference parameters in data generation. Data
from a single realization with sample size of 2000 and τ = 3 is shown.
4.12–4.17. The corresponding estimated asymptotic standard errors for these parameters
are also presented in Tables C.9–C.12 in Appendix C and Figures 4.18–4.20. Estimates
that exceed one standard deviation from the mean are deemed as outliers and are excluded.
Estimates that are higher than 2 or lower than -2 are also excluded for τ = 1, 2 for display
resolution. Note that θ0 in Table V in [Men15] is functionally equivalent to κ
(.) in our
notation. However, as discussed in section 3.3.3, due to the correlation that is inherent in
many-to-many matching, this quantity is recovered through δ¯(.) and θ(.)0 using equation 3.27.
As displayed in the boxplots from Figures 4.12–4.17, the estimates of the preference
parameters mostly converge near the true values when the sample size is 2000, although the
bias is generally larger for κS and κC with smaller sample size. This is most likely due to the
fact that these terms absorb the correlation that arises from the underlying matching process,
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Figure 4.12: A boxplot of the estimates grouped by n with τ = 1. The true
values of the parameters are marked by the red lines.
which becomes more significant as τ increases. As a result, estimates with larger τ values tend
to be poor with smaller sample sizes. For example, with τ = 6, the estimates for κS and κC
become reasonable only when n = 2000. Overall, both the bias and variance of the estimates
decreases as n increases. The estimates for θU and θV mostly remain consistent regardless
of τ . As noted in section 4.1.3, due to the faster convergence of the inclusive value, the
variance of the estimates decreases significantly faster in many-to-many relationships than
in one-to-one relationships. In general, the estimators become more efficient as τ increases.
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Figure 4.13: A boxplot of the estimates grouped by n with τ = 2. The true
values of the parameters are marked by the red lines.
4.5 Analysis of Variance: Observed vs. Unobserved Factors
We compare the strength of the “signal”, or the information portion of the simulated random
utility, to the strength of the “noise” portion by analyzing the variances of its observed and
unobserved factors. Specifically, we examine the ratio of the variance of observed factors to
the variance of unobserved factors as the sample size increases. In this section, we use the
preference parameters set in equation 4.3 and the random utility function for the supplier
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Figure 4.14: A boxplot of the estimates grouped by n with τ = 3. The true
values of the parameters are marked by the red lines.
side illustrated below (same as defined in equation 4.1).
Usc = κ
S + θU1xi + θU2xizj︸ ︷︷ ︸
observed
+ ηsc︸︷︷︸
unobserved
Us0 = 0 + max
k=1,...,J
{ηs0,k}︸ ︷︷ ︸
unobserved
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Figure 4.15: A boxplot of the estimates grouped by n with τ = 4. The true
values of the parameters are marked by the red lines.
In this section, the strength of the information content of the random utility function is
assessed by the ratio of the variances as follows:
var(Usc − Us0)− var(ηsc −maxk=1,...,J{ηs0,k})
var(ηsc −maxk=1,...,J{ηs0,k}) =
var(Usc − Us0)
var(ηsc −maxk=1,...,J{ηs0,k}) − 1 (4.4)
Note that in decision-making, only the differences in utility matters; the absolute level of
utility is irrelevant to the decision maker or the model. Thus, the variances used in the ratio
defined in equation 4.4 consider the difference in utility between being paired and remaining
unpaired. Figure 4.21 displays the probability density of the ratio of the variances as the
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Figure 4.16: A boxplot of the estimates grouped by n with τ = 5. The true
values of the parameters are marked by the red lines.
sample size increases. This figure demonstrates that the variance of the unobserved factors
is larger than that of the observed factors for all sample sizes, and the variance of this ratio
decreases as the sample size increases. Therefore, this result suggests that the information
content from the observed factor becomes less dispersed as the sample size increases, hence
larger data sets tend to provide more information about the preference parameters. This
observation regarding information content is supported by the estimation results illustrated
in Figures 4.12–4.17 since the estimates tend to approach their true values as the sample
size increases. As an aside, in this simulation, the mean value of the observed factors is
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Figure 4.17: A boxplot of the estimates grouped by n with τ = 6. The true
values of the parameters are marked by the red lines.
1.25 and the mean value of the unobserved factor, ηsc, is the Euler-Mascheroni constant
(approximately 0.5772) because the standard extreme-value type-I distribution is used.
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Figure 4.18: Asymptotic standard errors of the κ parameter for both the
supplier and consumer sides with various τ values.
4.6 Goodness of Fit and Hypothesis Testing
The following hypothesis testing is of interest when evaluating the estimated preference
parameters:
H0 : {θU = 0, θV = 0}
H1 : {θU 6= 0, θV 6= 0}
In the literature, the log-likelihood ratio is often used to assess how well the estimated
model fits the data, comparing to the null model. In our case, it may be more appropriate
to assess the goodness of fit using a chi-squared test for contingency tables because our data
is of discrete value and our variables are categorical in nature. However, there is a more
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Figure 4.19: Asymptotic standard errors of the θ parameters for both the
supplier and consumer sides with various τ values.
important reason for not using the usual log-likelihood ratio. Recall from section 3.1.5.1
and 3.3.3 that the auxiliary parameters, ΓS and ΓC (which are the terms
∫
eUsrc(r)dr and∫
eVcrs(r)dr in the denominators of the choice probabilities), are estimated along with the
preference parameters, θU and θV . [Men15] demonstrates that in the limit, these auxiliary
parameters are sufficient statistics with respect to the conditional choice probabilities, which
in turn identify the preference parameters. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to set the
preference parameters for the null model, θ0U and θ0V , to zero and use the corresponding
values ΓS0 and Γ
C
0 to compute the likelihood value for the null model because the null model
would fit the data just as well by construction. However, it would also be inappropriate
to use the values for ΓS and ΓC from the estimated model with θ0U and θ0V set to zero
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Figure 4.20: Asymptotic standard errors of the Γ parameters for both the
supplier and consumer sides with various τ values.
because ΓS and ΓC are sufficient statistics for θU and θV (i.e. not θ0U and θ0V ) through
the choice probabilities. Instead, we propose using a chi-squared test to determine whether
there is a significant difference between the predicted matching frequency distribution and
its theoretical analog generated by the null model, in which θ0U and θ0V are set to zero and
the corresponding ΓS0 and Γ
C
0 are used.
Using the unconditional choice probabilities defined in equations 3.8 and 3.10, the pre-
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Figure 4.21: The probability densities of the ratio of the variances of ob-
served to unobserved factors for various sample sizes. Each sample size con-
tains 600 iterations. The result for the supplier side is illustrated. The corre-
sponding result for the consumer side shares the same characteristics.
dicted matching frequency distribution is defined as
fˆ(xi, zj) = n p
S
sc p
C
cs
fˆ(zj, xi) = n p
C
cs p
S
sc
fˆ(xi, 0) = n p
S
s0
fˆ(0, zj) = n p
C
c0
where n is the number of agents on each side (note that symmetry is assumed here). The
null matching frequency distribution is computed in the same manner and is denoted as
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f0(xi, zj) below.
2 Therefore, the chi-squared statistic is
χ2 =
I+1∑
i
J+1∑
j
(fˆ(xi, zj)− f0(xi, zj))2
f0(xi, zj)
where the I and J represent the total number of observed characteristics types for the
supplier and consumer side, respectively (added 1 to include the outside option for each
side). The degree of freedom for the chi-squared distribution is (I + 1)× (J + 1)− 2 since
there are only (I+1)× (J +1)−1 matching types. All results presented in this dissertation
have p-values less than 0.001.
2Note that the additional parameters, δ¯S(.) and δ¯
C
(.) are left as free parameters to be estimated. Otherwise,
the null model would always be a uniform distribution because pSsc = p
C
cs = p
S
s0 = p
C
c0 as U(xi, zj) =
V (zj , xi) = 0 when δ¯
S
(.) = δ¯
C
(.) = 0.
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CHAPTER 5
Application for Estimating Many-to-Many
Relationships: A Case Study of Heterosexual
Partnerships in an Actual Survey
This chapter focuses on applying our proposed method for estimation of many-to-many
relationships to the 1996–2012 data on heterosexual marriages and cohabitations in the
U.S. Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). In particular, our objective is to
investigate preferences for partner characteristics that may contribute to the longevity of
unions, which may in turn serve as an indicator for the strength of the bond between the
two partners. Because SIPP is a longitudinal survey that captures changes in household and
family composition over time, we model the longevity of unions as the number of times that
the spouses choose each other throughout the data collection period. Therefore, the stronger
the bond between the two partners, the more likely they would continue to choose each other.
Under this interpretation, the correlation among subsequent choices is significant because
marital status tends to remain the same from one time period to the next. Therefore, it is
suitable to use our proposed method in Chapter 3 to account for the correlation and model
this type of preference estimation across time as many-to-many relationships.
Each of the 1996, 2001, 2004 and 2008 panel studies in SIPP contains 5 waves of surveys.
Our current subset of the data only contains new formation of marriages and cohabitations
that occurred during the 1996-2012 period. In addition, the data only includes respondents
who entered new partnerships from an unpartnered state (i.e. not married and not cohabit-
ing). Thus, for this rendition of the data, 1) there are no new partnerships from individuals
transitioning directly from cohabitation to marriage and vice versa, 2) no new partnerships
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for individuals transitioning from one cohabitation to another cohabitation without passing
through an unpartnered state, 3) and no new partnerships for individuals transitioning from
separated to married or separated to cohabiting without passing through an unpartnered
state first. Moreover, the respondents from one panel are not tracked across other panels;
and for any given panel, wave 2 is the earliest wave in which any new marriages or co-
habitations are reported. As a result, we further subset the data to only include new pair
formations that occurred at wave 2 in order to maximize the observation period. Therefore,
our final data set contains 1435 pairs with a maximum of 4 choices for each respondent (i.e.
τ = 4). For example, if a couple married at wave 2 and divorced at wave 4, the sequence
of matching choices of these two respondents would be: paired, paired, single, single. The
likelihood contribution of the pair is then calculated from the choice probabilities using their
respective observed characteristics.
The final data set used for this study contains 3 attributes for each respondent: educa-
tional attainment, race, and age. Educational attainment is categorized as: 1) less than high
school, 2) high school, 3) some college, and 4) Bachelor’s degree and beyond. Only 4 racial
categories are included: 1) Hispanic, 2) Black, 3) White, and 4) Asian. The following age
groups are used: 1) 18-27.9, 2) 28-38.9, 3) 39-48.9, and 4) 49-59. The choice probabilities are
calculated according to whether the partners share the same educational attainment level
and belong to the same race and age group. Additional details and criteria that define a
match are discussed in section 5.1 and 5.2.
In this study, we consider two research questions: 1) do unions of partners with matching
attributes tend to have longer duration? 2) does age disparity seem to correlate with any
trends in the length of the union? It is important to note that we can only address these
questions in a non-causal manner—our only goal is to explore any association between the
longevity of the unions and the matching attributes of the partners within the SIPP data
collection. Section 5.1 discusses the matching criteria and results for the first question.
Section 5.2 addresses the second question and illustrates the results for age disparity and
the longevity of unions.
In this chapter, bar charts are used to illustrate the relationships between the preference
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parameters, such as homophily and heterophily, and the length of unions. In Figures 5.1–5.3
and 5.7, the vertical axis shows the magnitude of the estimated coefficients of the prefer-
ence parameters and the horizontal axis shows the categories of the observed characteristics
groups. The magnitude of an estimated coefficient reflects the importance of the preference
in decision-making—in this case, the decision on whether to remain in a union at each time
interval. In these plots, a category with high coefficient value means that unions of that
characteristics type (e.g. homophily in race among Asians) tend to have partners who con-
tinue to choose each other (i.e. resulting in longer unions). On the contrary, a category
with low coefficient value means that partners in those unions often cease to choose each
other (i.e. resulting in shorter unions). To summarize, higher estimated preference coeffi-
cients correspond to more important characteristics that are associated with longer unions.
This also suggests that stronger preference of the underlying characteristics correlates to
stronger bonding in relationships since the partners choose to remain in their unions longer.
The magnitudes of the preference estimates are annotated with error bars which indicate
±1 standard deviation obtained from bootstrapping with 1000 iterations. The bootstrap
procedure is describe in detail in section 5.4.
5.1 Duration of Unions and Partners with Matching Characteris-
tics
This section focuses on exploring any association between homophily in observed character-
istics and the duration of unions within any given panel in the SIPP data. In particular,
we investigate homophily in each category of eduation attainment level, race, and age sep-
arately. Consider a 26 year-old White female with some college education married a 30
year-old White male with some college education. The characteristics vectors constructed
using the attribute category description above would be x = [3, 3, 1] and z = [3, 3, 2] for the
female and male, respectively, with education attainment level as the first component, race as
the second component, and age group as the last component. In this example, the matching
attribute vector for the race variable would be X = Z = [0, 0, 1, 0] for both respondents with
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1 representing a match and 0 otherwise. The third dimension is a match because White is
enumerated as 3 from the attribute category description above. Similarly, a union between
a Hispanic female and an Black male would be X = Z = [0, 0, 0, 0]. Therefore, under this
definition of matching attribute vectors, the estimated preference parameters for both gen-
ders would always be identical because we are only considering a pair of respondents who
evaluate each other based on whether their characteristics are identical. Nevertheless, we
display the preference estimates for both gender in this section to contrast with our findings
in the next section where their estimates are not identical. In addition, an intercept term
is added to each of the matching attribute vectors to estimate θUs0 and θVc0 in the overall
utility function defined in equation 3.26. In this chapter, these intercept terms are denoted
as θF0 and θ
M
0 for the female and male sides, respectively.
Concretely, the deterministic utility models used in assessing the degree of homophily
in various observed characteristics are defined in the following ways. For homophily in
educational attainment, our utility model is
U(xi, zj) =κ
F + θF<HS1(< HSi, < HSj) + θ
F
HS1(HSi, HSj) +
θFSomeCollege1(SomeCollegei, SomeCollegej) + θ
F
BA+1(BA+i, BA+j)
V (zj, xi) =κ
M + θM<HS1(< HSi, < HSj) + θ
M
HS1(HSi, HSj) +
θMSomeCollege1(SomeCollegei, SomeCollegej) + θ
M
BA+1(BA+i, BA+j)
(5.1)
where 1(xi, zj) = 1 if xi = zj; zero otherwise. We estimate the parameters κ
F , θF<HS, θ
F
HS,
θFSomeCollege, and θ
F
BA+ for the female side, and κ
M , θM<HS, θ
M
HS, θ
M
SomeCollege, and θ
M
BA+ for the
male side. Similarly, the utility model for homophily in race is defined as
U(xi, zj) =κ
F + θFHispanic1(Hispanici, Hispanicj) + θ
F
Black1(Blacki, Blackj) +
θFWhite1(Whitei,Whitej) + θ
F
Asian1(Asiani, Asianj)
V (zj, xi) =κ
M + θMHispanic1(Hispanici, Hispanicj) + θ
M
Black1(Blacki, Blackj) +
θMWhite1(Whitei,Whitej) + θ
M
Asian1(Asiani, Asianj)
(5.2)
We estimate the parameters κF , θFHispanic, θ
F
Black, θ
F
White, and θ
F
Asian for the female side, and
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κM , θMHispanic, θ
M
Black, θ
M
White, and θ
M
Asian for the male side. Finally, the utility model for
homophily in age is defined as
U(xi, zj) =κ
F + θF18−27.91({18− 27.9}i, {18− 27.9}j) + θF28−38.91({28− 38.9}i, {28− 38.9}j) +
θF39−48.91({39− 48.9}i, {39− 48.9}j) + θF49−591({49− 59}i, {49− 59}j)
V (zj, xi) =κ
M + θM18−27.91({18− 27.9}i, {18− 27.9}j) + θM28−38.91({28− 38.9}i, {28− 38.9}j) +
θM39−48.91({39− 48.9}i, {39− 48.9}j) + θM49−591({49− 59}i, {49− 59}j)
(5.3)
We estimate the parameters κF , θF18−27.9, θ
F
28−38.9, θ
F
39−48.9, and θ
F
49−59 for the female side, and
κM , θM18−27.9, θ
M
28−38.9, θ
M
39−48.9, and θ
M
49−59 for the male side.
Figures 5.1–5.3 plot the magnitude of the estimated parameters in equations 5.1–5.3. As
discussed above, the estimation result for homophily is with respect to the length of unions.
A coefficient with zero magnitude serves as the reference that corresponds to the lack of
homophily (i.e. the partners do not share the characteristics in that model). In each of
these figures, higher level of homophily indicates stronger correlation between a matching
category and the longer length of unions. For example, Figure 5.2 suggests that the unions of
Black-Black and Asian-Asian couples tend to have longer duration than unions of Hispanic-
Hispanic and White-White couples. On the other hand, Figures 5.4–5.6 display the observed
pairwise distribution of the matching attributes in the data set. Comparing Figures 5.2 and
5.5 reveals a stark contrast between the overwhelmingly high count of White-White couples
in the data set and the relatively short duration of this type of union. On the contrary,
Asian-Asian couples tend to share longer duration of unions despite the fact that this type
of union is much less prevalent in the data set. Therefore, this result demonstrates that the
preference parameters are estimated independently from the availability of the characteris-
tics types in the data set. This separation is evident from the definition of the unconditional
choice probabilities in equations 3.8 and 3.10—only the preference parameters are involved
in the calculation of the conditional choice probabilities (via the random utility function);
the availability of the characteristics types is not involved in the conditional choice proba-
bilities in any manner. Instead, the type availability only enters the unconditional choice
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probabilities through the marginal distributions of the respective types. Tables E.1–E.3 in
Appendix D show the estimates of the preference parameters (i.e. strength of homophily in
reference to the longevity of unions) along with their asymptotic standard errors computed
as described in section 3.4.
Figure 5.1 suggests that educational homophily between partners of the less than high
school and the Bachelor’s degree and beyond groups both have stronger positive correlation
with the duration of unions comparing to the other groups. Interestingly, various social
science studies (including McPherson et al.[MSC01]) also reveal evidence that supports such
trend in educational homophily for the two groups, which some claim contributes to the
distinction in social statuses and hierarchy. Similarly, age homophily also significantly struc-
tures one’s relations with others, especially in strong ties such as marriages and confiding
relations. Figure 5.3 illustrates the relatively high degree of age homophily that reflects the
stronger partner bonding in the youngest and the eldest groups. Especially for the 49-59 age
group, longer duration of unions (i.e. higher degree of age homophily) is common despite
the relatively low occurrences of new unions between partners from that age group (shown in
Figure 5.6). This result is consistent with McPherson’s conclusion: individuals from minority
groups who would otherwise have networks dominated by the majority groups actually have
associates that are much more similar to them than would have predicted from the oppor-
tunity structure alone. Once again, this lends further supportive evidence that estimating
preferences independently from the availability or opportunity structure, as proposed by our
method, is foreseeable from the sociological standpoint.
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Figure 5.1: Relationship between homophily in educational attainment level
and the longevity of unions. The error bars show ±1 standard deviation of
the estimates using bootstrap with 1000 iterations.
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Figure 5.2: Relationship between homophily in race and the longevity of
unions. The error bars show ±1 standard deviation of the estimates using
bootstrap with 1000 iterations.
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Figure 5.3: Relationship between homophily in age and the longevity of
unions. The error bars show ±1 standard deviation of the estimates using
bootstrap with 1000 iterations.
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Figure 5.4: Distribution of the pairwise educational attainment levels in the
data. Female is abbreviated as “F” and male is abbreviated as “M”. The same
data is presented in different formats.
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of the pairwise race categories in the data. Female
is abbreviated as “F” and male is abbreviated as “M”. The same data is
presented in different formats.
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Figure 5.6: Distribution of the pairwise age groups in the data. Female
is abbreviated as “F” and male is abbreviated as “M”. The same data is
presented in different formats.
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5.2 Duration of Unions and Age Groups
This section focuses on the age disparity between the partners and the longevity of unions
within any given panel in the SIPP data. In contrast to section 5.1, the notion of age
homophily in this section is not separated by age groups. Instead, unions of partners from
different age groups are classified as either “greater than own” or “less than own”. The goal
of this section is to illustrate any gender differences in age preference that are associated
with the duration of unions and therefore the strength of the bond between the partners.
For example, a 25 year-old female married a 27 year-old male would result in the same
matching attribute vector X = Z = [1, 0, 0] for both partners, where the first element
indicates homophily (they belong to the same age category), the second element indicates
“greater than own”, and the last element indicates “less than own”. Consider the same
female pairing with a 30 year-old male instead. Her matching attribute vector would then
be X = [0, 1, 0] and his would be Z = [0, 0, 1].
Concretely, the deterministic utility model used in assessing the degree of preference for
age disparity for the female side is defined as
U(xi, zj) =κ
F + θFhomophily1({18− 27.9}i, {18− 27.9}j||{28− 38.9}i, {28− 38.9}j||
{39− 48.9}i, {39− 48.9}j || {49− 59}i, {49− 59}j) +
θFgreaterthanown1({18− 27.9}i, {28− 38.9}j ||
{18− 27.9}i, {39− 48.9}j || {18− 27.9}i, {49− 59}j ||
{28− 38.9}i, {39− 48.9}j)|| {39− 48.9}i, {49− 59}j) +
θFlessthanown1({49− 59}i, {18− 27.9}j || {49− 59}i, {28− 38.9}j ||
{49− 59}i, {39− 48.9}j || {39− 48.9}i, {28− 38.9}j)||
{39− 48.9}i, {18− 27.9}j) || {28− 38.9}i, {18− 27.9}j)
where 1(xi, zj) = 1 if xi = zj; zero otherwise. The utility model for the male side is similarly
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constructed:
V (zj, xi) =κ
M + θMhomophily1({18− 27.9}i, {18− 27.9}j||{28− 38.9}i, {28− 38.9}j||
{39− 48.9}i, {39− 48.9}j || {49− 59}i, {49− 59}j) +
θMgreaterthanown1({18− 27.9}i, {28− 38.9}j ||
{18− 27.9}i, {39− 48.9}j || {18− 27.9}i, {49− 59}j ||
{28− 38.9}i, {39− 48.9}j)|| {39− 48.9}i, {49− 59}j) +
θMlessthanown1({49− 59}i, {18− 27.9}j || {49− 59}i, {28− 38.9}j ||
{49− 59}i, {39− 48.9}j || {39− 48.9}i, {28− 38.9}j)||
{39− 48.9}i, {18− 27.9}j) || {28− 38.9}i, {18− 27.9}j)
We estimate the parameters κF , θFhomophily, θ
F
greaterthanown, and θ
F
lessthanown for the female sides,
and κM , θMhomophily, θ
M
greaterthanown, and θ
M
lessthanown for the male side.
The estimation result for the preferences in age disparity with respect to the longevity
of unions using the same final subset of the SIPP data is displayed in Figure 5.7. The
magnitudes of the estimated preference parameters above along with ±1 standard deviation
of error are displayed as a bar chart. In this case, a value of zero in magnitude is not a
meaningful quantity because any partnered individual has to belong to one of the three types
as defined in the utility model above. The numerical estimates along with their asymptotic
standard errors are also illustrated in Table D.4 in Appendix D. Figure 5.8 illustrates the
observed age distribution of the pairings in terms of homophily, greater than own, and less
than own for both genders in the data. Note that these distributions are mirror images of
each other.
Figure 5.7 suggests that the estimated preference for age disparity with respect to the
duration of unions is different for females and males, in contrast to the results from section
5.1). The result here suggests that homophily in age may have the strongest correlation with
longer duration of unions for both genders, although the error of its estimate is considerably
large. Moreover, unions between older males and younger females also tend to be positively
correlated with longer lasting unions. However, the result also suggests that unions between
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Figure 5.7: Age disparity and the longevity of union. The error bars show
±1 standard deviation of the estimates using bootstrap with 1000 iterations.
older females and younger males tend to be negatively correlated with the length of unions.
Lee and McKinnish [LM18] has a somewhat similar finding in their study using the House-
hold, Income and Labor Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) data set. Their model suggests
that there is a higher level of marital satisfaction for both males with younger females and
females with younger males at the beginning of the marriage. However, this higher level of
satisfaction dissipates rather rapidly for the older males after 6 to 10 years of marriage and
is erased by the 6th year of the marriage for the older females. Since each panel in SIPP
lasts only 4-5 years, our result in age homophily seems to be consistent with their finding
in that new unions between males with younger females tend to last longer than those be-
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Figure 5.8: Distribution of female and male age pairings in the data.
tween females with younger males. Lee and McKinnish further suggest that couples with
larger marital age gaps experience declines in marital satisfaction over the duration of the
marriage relative to couples with smaller age gaps. Unfortunately, we have yet been able to
confirm their result because our current data set is limited to records of new unions within
the duration of each panel, which is too short to estimate for such long term effect.
5.3 Counterfactual Matching Frequency Distribution
Marital sorting is an outcome consists of both partner preferences as well as the opportunity
structure in terms of the distribution of characteristics types in a marriage market. Analysis
of homophily and heterophily in matching characteristics is therefore important to policy
makers and social scientists who seek to understand factors that influence the social structure
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of the married and unmarried populations. In particular, any changes in partner preferences
or availability of certain characteristics types may result in changes in the population avail-
able to marry or at risk of divorce in the future. This kind of changes can be predicted by
constructing a counterfactual matching frequency distribution using the estimated (or hypo-
thetical) preference parameters and the new marginal distributions of characteristics types.
For example, we can hypothesize the impact to the marriage market if there had been an
increase in educational attainment in the female population that resulted in a change in the
marginal distribution of educational attainment on the female side. This type of information
on potential changes in household composition may be useful in planning the future needs
of certain government assistance programs.
A counterfactual distribution can be calculated by re-solving the equilibrium condition
for the weighted average of the exponentiated utility of the opportunity set for each observed
characteristics type (defined in equation 3.11) using the previously estimated (or hypotheti-
cal) preference parameters. This re-estimation is necessary because this quantity represents
the odds of being paired and is therefore dependent on the marginal distribution of the
potential partners’ characteristics types. With these new estimates, we can obtain the un-
conditional choice probabilities from equation 3.8 and 3.10, which can then be interpreted
as the predicted shares of the matching types in the population.
A counterfactual distribution can also provide an intuitive interpretation of the mag-
nitude of the estimated preference coefficients in a model. In general, the magnitude of
the coefficients, or the effects of the observed attributes, is proportional to the variance of
the unobserved factors in that model (e.g. normal vs. extreme-value type-I distributed).
Therefore, interpretation of the estimated results from different models must account for the
normalization of the scale of this variance (see [Tra09]). Similarly, when the same model
is estimated on different data sets, the relative scale of the estimates reflects the relative
variance of unobserved factors in the data sets. For example, consider applying the same
model with two preference coefficients on two data sets. Suppose this results in a set of
estimates with higher magnitudes for both coefficients, but the ratio of the two coefficients
within the same data set is about the same for both data sets. The scale difference in their
105
magnitudes means that the unobserved portion of utility has less variance in the data set
with higher coefficient magnitudes. In other words, lower coefficients mean higher variance
in the unobserved factors. This is consistent with the intuitive interpretation of larger scale
of the coefficients. However, understanding the reason behind the coefficient magnitude does
not lend itself to an explicit way to assess the significance of the difference in their magni-
tudes within the same data set or across different data sets. As such, we suggest projecting
the preference estimates on to a hypothetical (or actual) population as described above and
then examine the resulting counterfactual matching frequency distributions. If a standard-
ized metric is desired, we can compute the chi-squared statistic between the two distributions
using a similar procedure described in section 4.6. The p-value can then be used to assess
the significance of the difference between the two distributions.
5.4 Bootstrap Variance of the Maximum Likelihood Estimates
With a single data set, the asymptotic variance of the estimates computed as described in
section 3.4 can only provide error estimates for the inclusive values, ΓˆF and ΓˆM , of the
respective characteristics groups because the inclusive values of the opportunity sets are
sufficient statistics with respect to the conditional choice probabilities (proven in [Men15]).
Therefore, the asymptotic error estimates for the preference parameters, θˆF and θˆM , are
extremely small given the inclusive values, and are grossly underestimated if taken at face
value. However, it would be inappropriate to obtain the errors for the preference parameters
by re-estimating them from the lower and upper bounds of the asymptotic estimates of the
inclusive values because the stable matching condition may not be guaranteed by doing so—
the maximum likelihood estimates are the exact parameter values that are required to meet
the stable matching condition. Therefore, we suggest obtaining the error estimates for the
preference parameters (along with the inclusive values) by bootstrapping. In this study, the
model is re-estimated 1000 times on random samples taken from the final data set of 1435
pairs. Specifically, in each iteration, we randomly sample 1435 pairs with replacement from
the original 1435 pairs and re-estimate the model on this new sample. Denoting the original
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estimate with the final data set as θˆ = (θˆU , θˆV , Γˆ
S, ΓˆC), the covariance of the resulting
estimates around the original estimate is calculated as
V =
1
R
R∑
r
(θr − θˆ)(θr − θˆ)′
where R is the total number of iterations and θr is the estimate from iteration r. Using
this procedure, the bootstrap covariance acts as an estimate of the asymptotic covariance
matrix, and is calculated with only estimates that meet the stable matching condition. The
bootstrap errors of ±1 standard deviation of the preference parameter estimates are shown
as error bars in Figure 5.1–5.3 and 5.7. Appendix D provides their numerical values along
with the asymptotic errors computed as described in section 3.4.
5.5 Method Comparison With Survival Models
Survival analysis is often used to compare the time to a specific event for two or more
groups of patients or time to failure of mechanical parts produced by different manufacturers.
In particular, as an alternative, we use the Cox proportional hazards model [Cox72] to
investigate any association between longevity of unions and homophily in characteristics
types described in this chapter. This model is commonly used in evaluating how specific
factors influence the rate of a particular event happening at a particular point in time. This
rate is generally referred to as the hazard rate, which in this case, is the rate of dissolution
of unions. The Cox model is defined as:
h(t) = h0(t) e
(θ1x1+θ2x2+···+θkxk)
where k is the number of groups excluding the reference group, t represents the survival time,
h(t) is the hazard at time t determined by the set of characteristics factors (x1, x2, . . . , xk),
and h0(t) is the baseline hazard function that describes the risk for individuals with all
factors set to 0 (i.e. the reference group). Thus, h(t) = h0(t) for the reference group and
e(θ1x1+θ2x2+···+θkxk) is the relative risk, which is a proportional increase or reduction in risk
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associated with the set of characteristics factors. The quantities eθ1 , eθ2 , . . . , eθk are called
hazard ratios. A value of hazard ratio greater than 1 indicates the event hazard increases
and is therefore negatively associated with the length of survival. Essentially, the Cox model
separates the effect of time from the effect of the factors. It is also related to multiple linear
regression through the logarithm of the hazard with the logarithm of the baseline hazard
being the intercept term: log(h(t)) = log(h0(t)) + θ1x1 + θ2x2 + · · ·+ θkxk.
To illustrate the idea behind this model, consider a two-sample problem where a binary
variable x serves as a group identifier:
h(t) =

h0(t) if x = 0,
h0(t) e
θ if x = 1.
Therefore, h0(t) represents the risk at time t for group 0 (the reference group) and γ = e
θ
represents the ratio of the risk for group 1 relative to group 0 at time t. If γ = 1 (i.e. θ = 0),
the risks for the two groups are the same. If γ = 2 (i.e. θ = log(2) = 0.6931), the risk for an
individual in group 1 is twice as much as that of an individual in group 0 at any given time
t.
In order to compare results from the Cox proportional hazards model and the two-sided
revealed preference model with many-to-many estimation as described in sections 5.1 and
5.2, the input data to the Cox model is constructed by assigning each individual to one of
the groups as follows. The assignment for the homophily group in educational attainment
for female i is
Gedui =

0 if female i and her partner do not have the same education level,
1 if female i and her partner both have <HS level,
2 if female i and her partner both have HS level,
3 if female i and her partner both have some college level,
4 if female i and her partner both have BA+ level.
(5.4)
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The assignment for the homophily group in race for female i is
Gracei =

0 if female i and her partner are not of the same race,
1 if female i and her partner are both Hispanic,
2 if female i and her partner are both Black,
3 if female i and her partner are both White,
4 if female i and her partner are both Asian.
(5.5)
The assignment for the homophily group in age for female i is
Gagei =

0 if female i and her partner do not belong to the same age group,
1 if female i and her partner are both 18-27.9 in age,
2 if female i and her partner are both 28-38.9 in age,
3 if female i and her partner are both 39-48.9 in age,
4 if female i and her partner are both 49-59 in age.
(5.6)
The corresponding groups are similarly assigned for the male side. The assignment for the
age disparity group for female i is
Gdisparityi =

0 if both female i and her partner belong to the same age group,
1 if her partner belongs to an age group greater than hers,
2 if her partner belongs to an age group less than hers.
(5.7)
The assignment for the age disparity group for male j is
Gdisparityj =

0 if both male j and his partner belong to the same age group,
1 if his partner belongs to an age group greater than his,
2 if his partner belongs to an age group less than his.
(5.8)
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Each of the group assignment above corresponds to a specific characteristics vector for the
relative risk. For example, if female i belongs to the reference group for race homophily, i.e.
Gracei = 0, she would be assigned a vector (xi1 , xi2 , xi3 , xi4 , xi5) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0). If she belongs
to group 3, then her characteristic vector would be (0, 0, 1, 0, 0). Note that the reference
groups for the respective characteristics groups are always assigned the zero vector. These
group assignments and the corresponding characteristics vectors are used to generate the
plots in Figure 5.9–5.13 using ggforest from the survminer R package. The function coxph
from the survival R package is used to fit the Cox model. Note that all reference groups
in these plots have hazard ratio of 1. The numerical estimates of the coefficients and the
corresponding hazard ratios are shown in Appendix E.
Inherently, the Cox proportional hazards model can only represent unilateral decision,
which is different from our two-sided revealed preference model that focuses on bilateral
decisions. Overall, the results from the Cox model share some similarities with our results
from sections 5.1 and 5.2. However, there are a few notable differences: 1) the Cox model
shows a statistically significant estimate for the 18-27.9 group with age homophily that
suggests higher risk for union dissolution, while our result shows that age homophily in this
group is associated with longer unions 2) race homophily in Whites is estimated to have
higher risk for union dissolution than the reference group, but our result indicates that all
types of race homophily are associated with longer unions. In addition, the estimated hazard
ratio for race homophily in Asians is about the same as the reference, although our result
suggests that this group has a relatively strong association with longer unions. The relatively
large standard deviation for the Asian group in both methods is likely due to the sparse data
from this group 3) education homophily for the HS group has an elevated risk for union
dissolution compared to the reference group, whereas our estimate shows that homophily for
this group is associated with longer unions. However, the Cox model’s estimate is not shown
to be statistically significant for this group.
Essentially, the Cox model estimates the hazard ratios based on the number of partic-
ipants in each group who survived passed a set of benchmarks. Therefore, the estimated
hazard ratios highly depend on the distribution of the characteristics of the participants.
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Cross-examining Figures 5.9–5.13 with Tables E.6–E.10 in Appendix E also reveals that the
proportions of the characteristics groups that survived all 4 waves in the observation period
highly reflect the hazard ratios relative to the respective reference groups. Note that a char-
acteristics group with a higher proportion of pairs that survived 4 waves comparing to that
of the reference group corresponds to having a decreased risk of union dissolution (i.e. haz-
ard ratio below 1.0). On the other hand, our proposed two-sided revealed preference model
intrinsically estimates preferences independently from the availability of the characteristics
groups in the data. As such, our proposed method may be more robust against sampling bias
in the data. It would be of further interest to compare the two methods by projecting their
respective estimates on to randomly sampled data and assessing their respective bootstrap
errors based on their counterfactual (or predicted) distributions. It would also be useful to
compare the efficiency of the two methods by using data sets with longer observation periods.
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Figure 5.9: Hazard ratios for educational attainment homophily computed
using the Cox proportional hazards model. The group assignment is described
in equation 5.4. The result for the female side is illustrated with 95% confi-
dence interval for each group estimate. The result is identical for both sides.
112
Figure 5.10: Hazard ratios for race homophily computed using the Cox
proportional hazards model. The group assignment is described in equation
5.5. The result for the female side is illustrated with 95% confidence interval
for each group estimate. The result is identical for both sides.
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Figure 5.11: Hazard ratios for age homophily computed using the Cox pro-
portional hazards model. The group assignment is described in equation 5.6.
The result for the female side is illustrated with 95% confidence interval for
each group estimate. The result is identical for both sides.
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Figure 5.12: Hazard ratios for preferences in age disparity computed using
the Cox proportional hazards model. Partnerships with age homophily serve as
the reference for those with age disparity. The group assignment is described in
equation 5.7. The result for the female side is illustrated with 95% confidence
interval for each group estimate.
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Figure 5.13: Hazard ratios for preferences in age disparity computed using
the Cox proportional hazards model. Partnerships with age homophily serve
as the reference for those with age disparity. The group assignment is described
in equation 5.8. The result for the male side is illustrated with 95% confidence
interval for each group estimate.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
This dissertation focuses on estimation methods that are applicable in two-mode networks
where “two-mode” refers to the two disjoint sets of agents (for example, men and women
in a marriage market, firms and workers in a labor market, colleges and students in college
admission, and suppliers and consumers in business transactions). We propose a method for
estimating the network participants’ preferences for potential partners on the opposite side,
under the assumption that the observed matching outcome is pairwise stable in the sense
that no two individuals can gain from forming a new partnership and no agents can gain
from breaking with their partners. The main focus of this project is on estimation in the face
of correlation that stems from both repeated choice situations and the underlying matching
mechanism, where matches tend to form between agents with similar ranking, assuming
that there is some common sorting standard among agents on the same side. However, the
difficulty for the estimation problem lies in the fact that neither the ranking of the agents
nor the agents’ choice sets are observed.
Our proposed method adopted Menzel’s method where the central behavioral model is
a modified logit model for discrete-choice in which the choice set is latent and therefore
deviates from the standard logit model. In the development of our proposed method, we
provide justification for the use of an additional parameter to account for the average effect
of unobserved factors that give rise to correlation among choices made by the same individual
in many-to-many matchings. In essence, this additional parameter absorbs the correlation
such that it is justified to choose the estimate that makes the residuals uncorrelated with
the explanatory variables, thereby satisfying the usual first-order condition for the maximum
likelihood estimator. We also propose using an additional equality constraint to ensure that
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the predicted shares of the matched characteristics equal the observed shares in order to
correct the bias in the average utility gain from specific types of pair formations. This bias is
inherent in the two-sided matching models using latent opportunity sets, unlike the standard
logit model where the choice set is exhaustive. In this study, we opt to use a common payoff
for all types of pairings as a proof of concept. However, we anticipate performance gains in
terms of the accuracy and variance of the resulting estimates.
Our Monte Carlo simulations provide supportive evidence that the efficiency of the pro-
posed estimator increases in repeated choice situations, such as in many-to-many relation-
ships, given that the sample size is sufficiently large relative to the maximum number of
pairings allowed. We also find Monte Carlo evidence for the empirical relationships among
many-to-many (and also one-to-one) relationships through the inclusive values.
In addition to the estimation aspect, this research also includes a study of the asymptotic
statistical characteristics of one-to-many and many-to-many relationships in two-mode net-
works, although the scope of these characteristics is limited to properties pertaining to pref-
erence parameter estimation. Our results demonstrate that if we allow a different maximum
number of pairings for each side as in one-to-many relationships, the equilibrium condition
that is necessary for our estimation method does not hold. Therefore, further research is
needed to understand their behavior, especially in terms of the asymptotic distribution of
the matched characteristics and the inclusive values of the opportunity sets.
Our extended goal in this project is to infer preferences from observed matching outcomes,
and to use the estimated preferences to make counterfactual predictions of the network
connectivity outcomes under different circumstances of supply and demand. For instance,
with knowledge of the preferences or trends in healthcare of patients, public health policy
makers can understand and predict the implications of shortfalls in the supply of certain types
of doctor skillsets or hospital facilities, which might be due to changes in salaries, operation
costs, and demography in general. Or the effect of a drop in enrollment or preference in
certain fields of study among students could help economists gauge the severity of labor
shortage in the future job market. Overall, policy makers could employ an increased range
of potential interventions by gaining better knowledge of the participants from both sides.
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In this study, for simplicity reasons, we use the same set of parameters for all agents on
the same side. However, our proposed probabilistic framework allows for flexibility in the
choice of behavior model. Ideally, estimation of preference parameters can be performed at
various levels of resolution. For example, consider having different sets of parameters for
different classes. The latent class logit model can estimate the set of parameters that is
shared by all individuals within each class, whereas the mixed-logit model can accommodate
randomness within each class such that individual-level parameters can be obtained. In
Chapter 7, we discuss incorporating the mixed-logit model in our proposed method as a
potential avenue for future work.
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CHAPTER 7
Future Work
As described in [Men15], it may be reasonable to assume that in one-to-one matching, the
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property holds as a limiting property when each agent’s choice
set contains a large number of alternatives as the number of market participants grows
large. In addition, any individual in a choice set with a given set of attributes can be
replaced easily in a large market because a very similar alternative can serve as a substitute
if the initial individual in the choice set becomes unavailable. As a result, the choice set of
an individual is essentially determined by her own characteristics and the choices made by
different individuals are uncorrelated as the market grows large. Therefore, Menzel argues
that it is reasonable to use the logit model in one-to-one matching in a large market.
On the other hand, since the logit model assumes that the unobserved factors are uncor-
related over alternatives, it becomes inappropriate when some unobserved factors pertaining
to one alternative share similarities with those related to another alternative. Furthermore,
the assumption that each choice is independent of the others is also invalid when we consider
a sequence of choices over time, as in panel data. This assumption is also invalid when there
is a set of choices made by the same individual, as is the case in one-to-many and many-to-
many relationships when the decision is induced by the same underlying unobserved factors
that persist over the choice situations. In this chapter, we propose using a mixed logit model
to overcome the IIA limitation to allow for random taste variation over types of observed
characteristics and correlation in unobserved factors over repeated choice situations as in
many-to-one and many-to-many matchings. In fact, we demonstrated in section 3.3.2 that
our proposed method is well-suited to use this model.
The standard logit model (MNL) has been used in discrete-choice modeling for many
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years. Its popularity can be attributed to its ability to represent systematic taste variation
due to observed characteristics and to capture the dynamics of repeated choice situations if
the unobserved factors are independent over time. It is also a simple model that assumes
proportional substitution across alternatives where an improvement in one alternative draws
proportionately from the other alternatives (and the opposite for a decrease in utility for
an alternative). This pattern of substitution is known as proportionate shifting, which is a
manifestation of the IIA property discussed in sections 1.1.5 and 2.1.2.
However, the shortcomings of this basic model prohibit some of its more realistic appli-
cations when tastes vary with unobserved variables or the unobserved factors are correlated
over repeated choice situations. As such, research communities are motivated to develop
more flexible, often more complex, models to overcome the deficiencies of the multinomial
logit model. The potential future work suggested here particularly focuses on using the mixed
logit model (MIXL) for estimation of the preference parameters for one-to-one and many-
to-many relationships in conjunction with our proposed method in the manner discussed in
section 3.3.2.
In our proposed method, the MIXL model is desirable because it is compatible with
Dagsvik’s latent opportunity set approach. The model is also desirable because it can rep-
resent the heterogeneity of preferences across individuals without forcing all individuals on
the same side to have the same preference parameter, as is the case in Menzel’s method.
More importantly, it does not make the IIA assumption. Therefore, it can be applied in
situations where unobserved factors may persist over time in repeated choices. This model
assumes that individual behavior depends on the observable characteristics and that latent
heterogeneity varies with factors unobserved by the researcher. We now discuss the details
of an implementation of a MIXL estimation method adopted from [Tra09].
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7.1 Expectation-Maximization (EM) Algorithms for Preference
Parameter Estimation
More complex and realistic models are usually required to appropriately explain the pref-
erences and the choice behaviors of decision makers. Greater flexibility in a model is often
achieved by increasing the number of parameters being estimated. However, methods that
require gradient calculation, such as maximum likelihood estimators, become increasingly
time-consuming as the number of parameters rises. The Hessian matrix (or any approxi-
mated Hessian) needs to be computed and inverted, which may lead to numeric instability
when a large number of parameters is being estimated. While the log-likelihood function for
simple models is often approximately quadratic, the same cannot be said for more complex
models. Therefore, these iterative procedures may get stuck in areas close to local modes of
the log-likelihood function, taking very small steps without ever reaching the maximum, or
repeatedly bounce over the maximum by taking large steps in each iteration without being
able to locate the maximum. Furthermore, creating a more realistic model would generally
need to rely more on a data-driven approach and less on assumptions.
In general, EM algorithms are good candidates for maximizing log-likelihood functions
when standard procedures are numerically difficult or infeasible. An EM algorithm for
estimating a mixed logit model is therefore developed in the following section.
7.1.1 An EM Algorithm for Estimating a Mixed Logit Model (MIXL)
It is a common practice to estimate a mixed logit model (MIXL) by choosing a mixing distri-
bution that is mathematically convenient, although that is unlikely to be a true reflection of
reality. On the other hand, nonparametric models achieve greater flexibility by allowing the
number of parameters to rise with sample size. However, the large number of parameters in
nonparametric models makes direct maximization of the log-likelihood function infeasible.
The EM method for estimating the preference parameters for a two-mode network proposed
herein takes a nonparametric approach by using a sufficiently large number of fixed points
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to approximate any arbitrary discrete mixing distribution for a MIXL model.
Consider the density of the preference parameters, f(θU |φU), to be represented by Q
points, with θUq being the value at the q
th point. The location of each of the Q points
is predetermined and the mass (i.e. the share of the population at each point) is to be
estimated by the EM algorithm. In this project, a simple grid comprised of evenly spaced
points between the lower and upper bounds of each of the coefficients is used. The share
of the population at each of the grid point is then estimated. Since EM algorithms are
capable of estimating a large number of parameters, we can increase the number of points
to make the grid become ever finer, such that the estimation of the mass at each point can
approximate any underlying mixing distribution.
In this specification, grid points are the support of the discrete distribution of the random
preference coefficients, with wq being the share of the population at point θUq . Recall from
the linear utility equation 1.3 for supplier s with characteristics xi:
U(xi, zj|θUi) = θUi0 + θUi1xi1 + θUi2xi2zj3 + . . .
Therefore, the multi-dimensional random coefficient distribution is expressed as
f(θUi) =

w1, if θUi = θU1
w2, if θUi = θU2
...
wQ, if θUq = θUQ
0, otherwise
where
∑
q wq = 1. This specification shares similarities with the LCM model from equation
2.8 in that there are Q number of classes. The specification is also similar because all
agents that belong to the same class have the same preference coefficient, θUq , and wq is the
probability that an agent is assigned to class q.
Just as specified in the MIXL model from 2.7, conditional on θUi = θUq for some q, the
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following expression represents the probability that supplier s with characteristics xi makes,
in T choice situations, the sequence of choices that were observed:
P si*|θUq =
T∏
t
C+1∏
c
(
P si∗t |θUq
)ysct (7.1)
Since θUi is not known for each agent, the choice probability is the expected choice probability
over the discrete mixing distribution of θUi :
P si* =
∑
q
wq P
s
i*|θUq
The missing data in this EM model are the coefficients of each agent. The distribution f(θUi)
gives the share of the population with each predetermined coefficient value. Since an agent’s
observed choices reveal information about their preference coefficients, conditional on the
choices i* made by supplier s, the probability that supplier s has a coefficient vector θUq is
given by Bayes’ rule:
P s(θUq |i*, w) =
wq P
s
i*|θUq
P si*
This conditional distribution is used in the EM procedure. The expectation for the supplier
side is
ε(w|wt) =
∑
s
∑
q
P s(θUq |i*, wt) log(wq P si*|θUq)
where t is the iteration number. The analog for the consumer side can be derived in the
same way. Since log(wq P
s
i*|θUq) = log(wq) + log(P si*|θUq), the expectation can be separated
into two parts:
ε(w|wt) =
∑
s
∑
q
P s(θUq |i*, wt) log(wq) +
∑
s
∑
q
P s(θUq |i*, wt) log(P si*|θUq)
This expectation is maximized with respect to the parameter w. Note that the second part
above does not depend on w, it only depends on the coefficients θUq , which are fixed points on
a grid in this method. Therefore, only the first part needs to be maximized. Combining both
the supplier and consumer sides, the maximizing value of wq, accounting for the constraint
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that the shares sum to 1, is
wt+1q =
∑
s P
s(θUq |i*, wt) +
∑
c P
c(θUq |j*, wt)∑
s
∑′
q P
s(θU ′q |i*, wt) +
∑
c
∑′
q P
c(θU ′q |j*, wt)
(7.2)
In this way, the probability of supplier s (or consumer c) having a certain value of the
coefficient vector, P s(θUq |i*, wt), can be viewed as weights calculated at the current value of
the shares wt. The updated share for point q is the sum of weights at point q as a share of
the sum of weights at all points across the grid.
Overall, this EM algorithm can be summarized as follows:
1. Define the grid points θUq for q = 1, . . . , Q.
2. Calculate P si*|θUq , the probability of observing the choice sequence for each agent at
each point using equation 7.1.
3. Specify the initial values of the shares at each point, w0q . In this project, the initial
shares are wq = 1/Q ∀q.
4. For each agent (both suppliers and consumers) and each point, calculate P s(θUq |i*, w0) =
w0q P
s
i*
|θUq
P s
i*
, the probability of an agent having those coefficients conditional on the choices
made, using the initial shares w0 in the denominator.
5. Calculate the updated population share, w1q , at each point q as specified in equation
7.2.
6. Repeat steps4 and 5 using the updated shares, wt, from the last iteration (in lieu of
the original starting values) until convergence, where the updated share values change
below a small threshold.
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APPENDIX A
Choice Probability Representation of Menzel’s
Large-population Approximation Method
This section demonstrates that the key quantities in Menzel’s (2015) large-population ap-
proximation method can be translated directly to the choice probabilities defined in the
framework proposed in this dissertation. In fact, the one-to-one relationships described
in Menzel’s paper are a special case of many-to-many relationships. For ease of cross-
referencing, we follow his formulation for the stable marriage problem in which females
and males are on the opposing sides. We also assume that the gender proportion is ap-
proximately equal in the limit for simplicity.1 Because the characterization of the limiting
matching frequency distribution is crucial to Menzel’s approach for estimation, we start by
introducing the distribution in his notation and then show the equivalence in our notation.
For identification reason, he defines W (xi, zj) as the marital pseudo-surplus of a match be-
tween a woman with type xi characteristics and a man with type zj characteristics. The
marital pseudo-surplus is the sum of the observed components of the utility
W (xi, zj) = U(xi, zj) + V (zj, xi)
1We assume γw = γm = 0 in Menzel’s paper because these parameters mainly serve as a device to
facilitate asymptotic analysis.
126
Assuming that the IIA property holds in large choice set, the choice probabilities converge
to the logit model. Menzel defined the following limiting matching frequency distribution:
f(xi, zj) =
exp {W (xi, zj)}w(xi)m(zj)
(1 + Γw(xi))(1 + Γm(zj))
(A.1)
f(xi, ∗) = w(xi)
1 + Γw(xi)
(A.2)
f(∗, zj) = m(zj)
1 + Γm(zj)
(A.3)
where f(xi, zj) is the limiting density of matches between women with characteristics xi and
men with characteristics zj, f(xi, ∗) and f(∗, zj) denote the limiting densities of unmatched
women and men of the respective characteristics types. With the assumption that the
observed matching is a stable outcome (i.e. the market equilibrium is reached), these limiting
densities then represent the observed matching frequency distribution. The quantities Γw(.)
and Γm(.) are state variables that approximate the conditional expectation of the inclusive
values of women and men of the respective types. They are defined as
Γw(xi) =
J∑
j=1
exp {W (xi, zj)}m(zj)
1 + Γm(zj)
Γm(zj) =
K∑
k=1
exp {W (xk, zj)}w(xk)
1 + Γw(xk)
where the summation is over the number of different characteristics types on the respective
sides, m(zj) and w(xk) are the marginal distributions of the observed characteristics of
men and women, respectively. Note the similarity in their form to our definition of the
conditional probabilities in equation 3.6. It can be seen that Γw(xi) has the same meaning
as
∫
eU(xi,r)c(r)dr, which is part of the denominators of the choice probabilities for random
sets of alternatives derived in [Dag94].
The estimation method proposed by Menzel is based on a fixed-point mapping in which
the equilibrium is reached when stable matching is achieved. He defined the operators
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Ψm : Γw 7→ Γm and Ψw : Γm 7→ Γw, where
Ψw[Γm](xi) =
J∑
j=1
exp {W (xi, zj)}m(zj)
1 + Γm(zj)
Ψm[Γw](zj) =
K∑
k=1
exp {W (xk, zj)}w(xk)
1 + Γw(xk)
(A.4)
In this representation, the equilibrium conditions become the fixed-point problem
Γw(xi) = Ψw[Γm](xi)
Γm(zj) = Ψm[Γw](zj)
Menzel demonstrates that the mapping log(Γw(xi)) 7→ log(Ψw[Γm](xi)) is a contraction,
implying the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium inclusive value Γw(xi). The same
specification can be applied to the men’s side. Note that from the density distributions for
the unmatched types in A.2 and A.3, we obtain
Γw(xi) =
w(xi)
f(xi, ∗) − 1 (A.5)
Γm(zj) =
m(zj)
f(∗, zj) − 1 (A.6)
By substituting out Γw and Γm from A.1–A.3, , we can rewrite the limiting distribution as
f(xi, zj) =
exp {W (xi, zj)}w(xi)m(zj)
(1 + Γw(xi))(1 + Γm(zj))
=
exp {W (xi, zj)}w(xi)m(zj)
(1 + w(xi)
f(xi,∗) − 1)(1 +
m(zj)
f(∗,zj) − 1)
= exp {W (xi, zj)}f(xi, ∗)f(∗, zj) (A.7)
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thus
f(xi, ∗) = f(xi, zj)
exp {W (xi, zj)}f(∗, zj) (A.8)
f(∗, zj) = f(xi, zj)
exp {W (xi, zj)}f(xi, ∗) (A.9)
and
f(xi, ∗)f(∗, zj) = f(xi, zj)
exp {W (xi, zj)} (A.10)
The same result can be obtained by substituting f(xi, ∗) and f(∗, zj) directly into f(xi, zj).
Also, by taking log on both sides of the f(xi, zj) equation in A.7, we have the following:
log(f(xi, zj)) = log(exp {W (xi, zj)}f(xi, ∗)f(∗, zj))
= W (xi, zj) + log(f(xi, ∗)) + log(f(∗, zj)) (A.11)
Therefore, we can express the marital-surplus as
W (xi, zj) = log(f(xi, zj))− log(f(xi, ∗))− log(f(∗, zj))
= log
(
f(xi, zj)
f(xi, ∗)f(∗, zj)
)
(A.12)
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As a result, we can rewrite the equilibrium condition in A.4 as
Ψw[Γm](xi) =
J∑
j=1
exp {W (xi, zj)}m(zj)
1 + Γm(zj)
=
J∑
j=1
exp {W (xk, zj)}m(zj)
1 +
m(zj)
f(∗,zj) − 1
(by substituting with A.6)
=
J∑
j=1
exp {W (xk, zj)}f(∗, zj)
=
J∑
j=1
f(xi, zj)
f(xi, ∗)f(∗, zj)f(∗, zj) (by substituting with A.12)
=
J∑
j=1
f(xk, zj)
f(xk, ∗)
(A.13)
Ψm[Γw](zj) =
K∑
k=1
exp {W (xk, zj)}w(xk)
1 + Γw(xk)
=
K∑
k=1
exp {W (xk, zj)}w(xk)
1 + w(xk)
f(xk,∗) − 1
(by substituting with A.5)
=
K∑
k=1
exp {W (xk, zj)}f(xk, ∗)
=
K∑
k=1
f(xk, zj)
f(xk, ∗)f(∗, zj)f(xk, ∗) (by substituting with A.12)
=
K∑
k=1
f(xk, zj)
f(∗, zj)
(A.14)
In the notation used in the main body of this dissertation, the unconditional choice prob-
abilities from 3.8 and 3.10 are functionally equivalent to the limiting matching frequency
distribution in equation A.1–A.3 because they are derived from the same latent choice prob-
abilities from 3.4 and 3.9. The unconditional choice probabilities are restated here in the
130
context of females and males:
pWij = p
M
ji := P
W
ij (xi)m(zj)P
M
ji (zj)w(xi)
pWi0 := P
W
i0 (xi)w(xi)
pMj0 := P
M
j0 (zj)m(zj)
(A.15)
Note that by definition, the notion of choice probability, Pij, can also be interpreted as the
share of the people who choose alternative j within the population of people who face the
same observed utility for each alternative as person i. Therefore,
J∑
j=1
f(xk, zj) = 1− PWk0
K∑
k=1
f(xk, zj) = 1− PMj0
and we can rewrite Menzel’s equilibrium condition as
Ψw[Γm](xi) =
∑J
j=1 f(xk, zj)
f(xk, ∗) =
1− PWi0
PWk0
Ψm[Γw](zj) =
∑K
k=1 f(xk, zj)
f(∗, zj) =
1− PMj0
PMj0
which is the same as the optimization constraint shown in 3.11.
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APPENDIX B
Sampling Strategies and Matching Frequency
Distribution
Large-population estimation relies on the theoretical limiting distribution of the character-
istics of paired and unpaired suppliers and consumers, as the population size approaches
infinity. For estimation, we regard the matching frequency distribution from the observed
data as the theoretical limiting distribution so that we can fit our proposed model to the data
set to obtain the estimates for the preference parameters. Our proposed equality constraint
from equation 3.22 ensures that the predicted market shares computed from our estimated
preference parameters match the observed shares in the data. Therefore, it is important to
calculate the observed shares properly according to the sampling strategy used to obtain the
data. Using the notation for the choice probabilities from equations 3.8 and 3.10, we have
the following theoretical limiting distribution:
f(xi, zj) = n p
S
sc p
C
cs (paired suppliers and consumers)
f(zj, xi) = n p
C
cs p
S
sc (paired suppliers and consumers)
f(xi, 0) = n p
S
s0 (unpaired suppliers)
f(0, zj) = n p
C
c0 (unpaired consumers) (B.1)
where xi denotes supplier i with observable characteristics xi, and zj denotes consumer j
with observable characteristics zj. The unconditional choice probabilities for the supplier and
consumer sides are represented by pS(.) and p
C
(.), respectively. The number of agents on each
side is denoted as n (note that symmetry is assumed here). A convenient way to visualize
the limiting distribution is with a contingency table. Note that the observed shares, f(s, c)
132
and f(c, s), in equation 3.22 are entries in the contingency table.
Table B.1: An example of sampling distribution
Consumers
Unpaired suppliers
z1 z2
Suppliers
x1 5 1 3
x2 2 3 4
Unpaired consumers 0 1 N/A
For example, in a sample of 30 suppliers and consumers in total as illustrated in Table
B.1, there are 5 pairings that consist of suppliers with x1 characteristics and consumers with
z1 characteristics. As noted in [Men15], assuming sampling with replacement, the probability
that a paired supplier is included in the survey equals the probability that it is selected as a
primary respondent plus the probability that its partner is selected as a primary respondent.
On the other hand, an unpaired supplier is only included if it is selected as a primary
respondent. Therefore, if such an individual-based sampling method is used, we must count
10 such occurrences instead of 5 in the sampling distribution. However, if a survey design
calls for drawing from a population of pairs, where an unpaired supplier is considered as
being “paired” with a missing consumer, then the sampling distribution for the (x1, z1) pairs
would be
5
total mass of “pairs” observed
=
5
# of suppliers in sample + # of consumers in sample – # of matched pairs in sample
=
5
(5 + 1 + 3 + 2 + 3 + 4) + (5 + 2 + 0 + 1 + 3 + 1)− (5 + 1 + 2 + 3)
=
5
19
Note that the denominator is simply equivalent to the sum of the table entries above. As
demonstrated here, it is necessary to take the sampling strategy employed into account when
deriving the sampling distribution for parameter estimation. For simplicity, any discussion
in this project assumes individual-based sampling with replacement.
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B.1 Application of Discrete-choice Models to Empirical Data
It is necessary to exercise caution when fitting any discrete-choice models to empirical data.
All of the aforementioned models assume the random taste shifters ηij and ζji to be zero-mean
random variables. However, this may not be a reasonable assumption for empirical data.
As such, an alternative-specific constant (ASC) for each of the alternatives, along with the
preference parameters in the random utility model, should be estimated in order to capture
the average effect on utility due to the unobserved factors. In other words, the unobserved
portions of utility, ηij and ζji, have zero mean by construction when the ASCs are included
in the estimation procedure. However, since only the differences in utility matter in choices,
only J − 1 ASCs are needed when the ASC for one of the alternatives is set to zero.
[Tra09] includes a discussion of the special role the ASC plays in the maximum likelihood
estimator for logit models. Including the ASCs in the random utility model induces the
predicted share for an alternative in the sample to equal to the observed share. The estimated
model is therefore correct on average within the sample. The role of the ASC is therefore
analogous to adding an intercept in a linear regression model to ensure that the average of
the predicted values of the dependent variable equals the observed average in the sample.
Section 3.3 also discusses constants similar in function to the ASCs used to capture the
average effect of unobserved factors, which are essential in repeated choice situations such
as one-to-many and many-to-many relationships.
For consistency, any sections and chapters in this project involving simulated data use
a zero-mean extreme-value type-I distribution to generate the random taste shifters. As a
result, the ASCs are omitted.
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APPENDIX C
Monte Carlo Simulation Results
C.1 Inclusive Values
Table C.1: Actual and projected inclusive values for the proposer side using
τ = 1 as the baseline value.
n τ Ip[R
P
i ] Iˆp[R
P
i ] τ Ip[R
P
i ] Iˆp[R
P
i ] τ Ip[R
P
i ] Iˆp[R
P
i ]
10 3 11.5383 12.0650 6 15.0432 16.6483 10 16.3424 21.2019
20 3 11.7574 12.0057 6 16.0978 16.5644 10 19.4932 21.0935
50 3 11.3705 11.7819 6 15.5270 16.2479 10 19.3746 20.6849
100 3 10.8612 10.7730 6 15.0669 14.8212 10 18.9395 18.8430
200 3 11.2472 11.3506 6 15.3677 15.6379 10 19.4495 19.8975
500 3 11.0743 11.3436 6 15.3687 15.6280 10 19.5119 19.8847
1000 3 11.1205 11.2438 6 15.4638 15.4870 10 19.5259 19.7026
2000 3 11.3631 11.2096 6 15.7143 15.4386 10 19.8984 19.6402
Table C.2: Actual and projected inclusive values for the proposer side using
τ = 3 as the baseline value.
n τ Ip[R
P
i ] Iˆp[R
P
i ] τ Ip[R
P
i ] Iˆp[R
P
i ] τ Ip[R
P
i ] Iˆp[R
P
i ]
10 1 7.3884 7.0843 6 15.0432 15.9033 10 16.3424 20.2401
20 1 7.3541 7.2108 6 16.0978 16.2132 10 19.4932 20.6402
50 1 7.2249 6.9874 6 15.5270 15.6661 10 19.3746 19.9339
100 1 6.6425 6.6933 6 15.0669 14.9458 10 18.9395 19.0040
200 1 6.9759 6.9162 6 15.3677 15.4918 10 19.4495 19.7088
500 1 6.9719 6.8164 6 15.3687 15.2471 10 19.5119 19.3930
1000 1 6.9143 6.8431 6 15.4638 15.3125 10 19.5259 19.4774
2000 1 6.8945 6.9831 6 15.7143 15.6556 10 19.8984 19.9203
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Table C.3: Actual and projected inclusive values for the proposer side using
τ = 6 as the baseline value.
n τ Ip[R
P
i ] Iˆp[R
P
i ] τ Ip[R
P
i ] Iˆp[R
P
i ] τ Ip[R
P
i ] Iˆp[R
P
i ]
10 1 7.3884 6.7331 3 11.5383 10.9300 10 16.3424 19.1297
20 1 7.3541 7.1637 3 11.7574 11.6758 10 19.4932 20.4912
50 1 7.2249 6.9306 3 11.3705 11.2721 10 19.3746 19.7543
100 1 6.6425 6.7428 3 10.8612 10.9468 10 18.9395 19.1603
200 1 6.9759 6.8656 3 11.2472 11.1595 10 19.4495 19.5486
500 1 6.9719 6.8660 3 11.0743 11.1602 10 19.5119 19.5499
1000 1 6.9143 6.9048 3 11.1205 11.2275 10 19.5259 19.6727
2000 1 6.8945 7.0071 3 11.3631 11.4046 10 19.8984 19.9961
Table C.4: Actual and projected inclusive values for the proposer side using
τ = 10 as the baseline value.
n τ Ip[R
P
i ] Iˆp[R
P
i ] τ Ip[R
P
i ] Iˆp[R
P
i ] τ Ip[R
P
i ] Iˆp[R
P
i ]
10 1 7.3884 5.8516 3 11.5382 9.4033 6 15.0431 12.8841
20 1 7.3541 6.8480 3 11.7573 11.1291 6 16.0978 15.3247
50 1 7.2249 6.8105 3 11.3705 11.0641 6 15.5270 15.2328
100 1 6.6424 6.6729 3 10.8611 10.8258 6 15.0668 14.8958
200 1 6.9759 6.8342 3 11.2472 11.1052 6 15.3676 15.2909
500 1 6.9718 6.8539 3 11.0742 11.1393 6 15.3686 15.3392
1000 1 6.9142 6.8584 3 11.1204 11.1470 6 15.4638 15.3500
2000 1 6.8945 6.9762 3 11.3630 11.3510 6 15.7143 15.6386
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C.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Preference Parameters
Table C.5: Distribution of MLE for preference parameters with 1-3 choice
situations for both sides: mean and standard deviation (in parentheses)
Suppliers
n τ κS θU1 θU2
20 1 0.7106 (0.6776) 0.2708 (0.9567) 0.5189 (0.6718)
50 1 0.3938 (0.4790) 0.4962 (0.6990) 0.9086 (0.2282)
100 1 0.4312 (0.4721) 0.4860 (0.5152) 0.9393 (0.2745)
200 1 0.4537 (0.1982) 0.4513 (0.4290) 0.9780 (0.1321)
500 1 0.5162 (0.1349) 0.4851 (0.2574) 0.9796 (0.0898)
1000 1 0.4877 (0.0991) 0.4999 (0.1086) 0.9729 (0.0300)
2000 1 0.4772 (0.0604) 0.5074 (0.0635) 0.9802 (0.0205)
20 2 0.5946 (0.7108) 0.2191 (0.9296) 0.7636 (0.4153)
50 2 0.5108 (0.3730) 0.4751 (0.6315) 0.9061 (0.2174)
100 2 0.4787 (0.1676) 0.5245 (0.2698) 0.9270 (0.0795)
200 2 0.5039 (0.1824) 0.5133 (0.1905) 0.9419 (0.0434)
500 2 0.4453 (0.1147) 0.5110 (0.1109) 0.9676 (0.0278)
1000 2 0.4471 (0.0640) 0.4922 (0.0773) 0.9737 (0.0200)
2000 2 0.4330 (0.0564) 0.4969 (0.0520) 0.9836 (0.0156)
20 3 0.5488 (0.5794) 0.3835 (0.7587) 0.7928 (0.2119)
50 3 0.4191 (0.3776) 0.6019 (0.4353) 0.9073 (0.1455)
100 3 0.4816 (0.1553) 0.5466 (0.2076) 0.9185 (0.0537)
200 3 0.5636 (0.1073) 0.5165 (0.1465) 0.9338 (0.0362)
500 3 0.6021 (0.0657) 0.4988 (0.1056) 0.9626 (0.0256)
1000 3 0.5839 (0.0483) 0.4957 (0.0681) 0.9726 (0.0156)
2000 3 0.6008 (0.0292) 0.5066 (0.0487) 0.9782 (0.0124)
(DGP) 0.5 0.5 1
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Table C.6: Distribution of MLE for preference parameters with 4-6 choice
situations for both sides: mean and standard deviation (in parentheses)
Suppliers
n τ κS θU1 θU2
20 4 0.4092 (0.6367) 0.6177 (0.6865) 0.7619 (0.1902)
50 4 0.3875 (0.2782) 0.5837 (0.3267) 0.8449 (0.0612)
100 4 0.4585 (0.1980) 0.4758 (0.1870) 0.9057 (0.0513)
200 4 0.5078 (0.1261) 0.5018 (0.1557) 0.9331 (0.0367)
500 4 0.5550 (0.0807) 0.5201 (0.0969) 0.9462 (0.0208)
1000 4 0.5358 (0.0610) 0.4993 (0.0694) 0.9704 (0.0153)
2000 4 0.5698 (0.0477) 0.4951 (0.0545) 0.9760 (0.0107)
20 5 0.1381 (0.5028) 0.5192 (0.6157) 0.7545 (0.1749)
50 5 0.1719 (0.2588) 0.5607 (0.2909) 0.8394 (0.0586)
100 5 0.2469 (0.1702) 0.4901 (0.1873) 0.8846 (0.0408)
200 5 0.3933 (0.1451) 0.5175 (0.1469) 0.9286 (0.0305)
500 5 0.4874 (0.0606) 0.4794 (0.0895) 0.9456 (0.0180)
1000 5 0.4371 (0.0441) 0.5217 (0.0626) 0.9644 (0.0137)
2000 5 0.4458 (0.0319) 0.5180 (0.0506) 0.9728 (0.0106)
20 6 -0.0077 (0.3994) 0.5828 (0.4172) 0.6762 (0.0780)
50 6 -0.0575 (0.2387) 0.4713 (0.2530) 0.8161 (0.0541)
100 6 0.1195 (0.1800) 0.5544 (0.1854) 0.8823 (0.0362)
200 6 0.2311 (0.1316) 0.5312 (0.1492) 0.9142 (0.0307)
500 6 0.3478 (0.1094) 0.5346 (0.0905) 0.9452 (0.0180)
1000 6 0.3513 (0.1117) 0.5012 (0.0661) 0.9627 (0.0131)
2000 6 0.4630 (0.0561) 0.5151 (0.0415) 0.9746 (0.0087)
(DGP) 0.5 0.5 1
138
Table C.7: Distribution of MLE for preference parameters with 1-3 choice
situations for both sides: mean and standard deviation (in parentheses)
Consumers
n τ κC θV1 θV2
20 1 0.7338 (0.6969) 0.2426 (0.9291) 0.5190 (0.6718)
50 1 0.4023 (0.5082) 0.4694 (0.7325) 0.9086 (0.2282)
100 1 0.4614 (0.4585) 0.4681 (0.5569) 0.9393 (0.2745)
200 1 0.4620 (0.2016) 0.4620 (0.4685) 0.9780 (0.1321)
500 1 0.4964 (0.1350) 0.4911 (0.2550) 0.9796 (0.0898)
1000 1 0.4800 (0.0980) 0.4810 (0.1089) 0.9729 (0.0300)
2000 1 0.4738 (0.0534) 0.5140 (0.0705) 0.9802 (0.0205)
20 2 0.6054 (0.6430) 0.3501 (0.8270) 0.7636 (0.4154)
50 2 0.5094 (0.3443) 0.4394 (0.6679) 0.9061 (0.2174)
100 2 0.5006 (0.1683) 0.5173 (0.2642) 0.9270 (0.0795)
200 2 0.4889 (0.1577) 0.4589 (0.1942) 0.9419 (0.0434)
500 2 0.4387 (0.0995) 0.4914 (0.1070) 0.9676 (0.0278)
1000 2 0.4508 (0.0661) 0.5206 (0.0878) 0.9737 (0.0200)
2000 2 0.4337 (0.0570) 0.4862 (0.0626) 0.9836 (0.0156)
20 3 0.4923 (0.6170) 0.4337 (0.7142) 0.7928 (0.2119)
50 3 0.4064 (0.3683) 0.6190 (0.3867) 0.9073 (0.1455)
100 3 0.4568 (0.1633) 0.4999 (0.2131) 0.9185 (0.0537)
200 3 0.5439 (0.1070) 0.5112 (0.1624) 0.9338 (0.0362)
500 3 0.6030 (0.0620) 0.4955 (0.1082) 0.9626 (0.0256)
1000 3 0.5883 (0.0462) 0.5135 (0.0742) 0.9726 (0.0156)
2000 3 0.6008 (0.0285) 0.5024 (0.0474) 0.9782 (0.0124)
(DGP) 0.5 0.5 1
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Table C.8: Distribution of MLE for preference parameters with 4-6 choice
situations for both sides: mean and standard deviation (in parentheses)
Consumers
n τ κC θV1 θV2
20 4 0.4050 (0.6168) 0.4722 (0.7557) 0.7619 (0.1902)
50 4 0.3324 (0.2817) 0.5492 (0.3007) 0.8449 (0.0612)
100 4 0.4588 (0.1833) 0.5003 (0.1985) 0.9057 (0.0513)
200 4 0.5143 (0.1132) 0.5037 (0.1557) 0.9331 (0.0367)
500 4 0.5518 (0.0709) 0.5388 (0.1107) 0.9462 (0.0208)
1000 4 0.5394 (0.0622) 0.5161 (0.0674) 0.9704 (0.0153)
2000 4 0.5786 (0.0505) 0.5081 (0.0536) 0.9760 (0.0107)
20 5 0.1527 (0.5355) 0.5873 (0.6146) 0.7545 (0.1749)
50 5 0.1799 (0.2382) 0.5175 (0.2797) 0.8394 (0.0586)
100 5 0.2645 (0.1956) 0.5145 (0.2086) 0.8846 (0.0408)
200 5 0.4179 (0.1428) 0.5274 (0.1458) 0.9286 (0.0305)
500 5 0.4966 (0.0601) 0.5088 (0.0988) 0.9456 (0.0180)
1000 5 0.4426 (0.0474) 0.5165 (0.0679) 0.9644 (0.0137)
2000 5 0.4445 (0.0319) 0.5240 (0.0469) 0.9728 (0.0106)
20 6 -0.0392 (0.4095) 0.4958 (0.4324) 0.6762 (0.0780)
50 6 -0.0275 (0.2423) 0.5032 (0.2567) 0.8161 (0.0541)
100 6 0.0858 (0.1876) 0.4760 (0.2004) 0.8823 (0.0362)
200 6 0.2290 (0.1444) 0.5349 (0.1429) 0.9142 (0.0307)
500 6 0.3347 (0.1118) 0.5151 (0.0814) 0.9452 (0.0180)
1000 6 0.3512 (0.1066) 0.5013 (0.0673) 0.9627 (0.0131)
2000 6 0.4662 (0.0600) 0.5259 (0.0512) 0.9746 (0.0087)
(DGP) 0.5 0.5 1
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Table C.9: Asymptotic standard errors of the supplier side preference pa-
rameters and Γ values with 1-3 choice situations for both sides
Suppliers
n τ κS θU1 θU2 Γ
S
1 Γ
S
2
20 1 0.1408 2.726e-10 5.028e-10 2.688 1.862
50 1 0.06734 6.755e-10 6.854e-10 1.35 1.235
100 1 0.04212 4.765e-10 1.574e-10 1.095 1.56
200 1 0.02553 5.075e-09 1.442e-09 0.9012 1.509
500 1 0.01231 1.594e-09 3.126e-10 1.309 1.693
1000 1 0.007071 2.3e-10 1.432e-10 0.69 0.9723
2000 1 0.004303 1.531e-10 1.746e-10 0.5373 0.6625
20 2 0.1864 2.125e-09 3.711e-10 1.877 2.26
50 2 0.09203 1.154e-09 1.061e-09 0.9514 1.059
100 2 0.04848 1.563e-10 1.867e-10 0.7474 1.093
200 2 0.03275 1.394e-09 7.524e-10 1.754 2.213
500 2 0.01567 3.576e-10 2.869e-10 0.7435 0.8303
1000 2 0.008959 6.412e-10 1.415e-09 0.219 0.28
2000 2 0.005338 2.788e-09 2.96e-10 0.1362 0.1748
20 3 0.5535 1.79e-08 8.427e-10 1.272 1.565
50 3 0.2727 1.341e-09 5.775e-10 1.497 2.025
100 3 0.138 1.391e-10 6.187e-11 0.3627 0.5364
200 3 0.07715 1.205e-10 9.458e-11 0.1867 0.2844
500 3 0.04372 2.202e-11 3.027e-11 0.1537 0.2062
1000 3 0.02367 1.374e-11 5.591e-12 0.04617 0.06255
2000 3 0.01422 2.624e-12 1.326e-12 0.02936 0.04088
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Table C.10: Asymptotic standard errors of the supplier side preference pa-
rameters and Γ values with 4-6 choice situations for both sides
Suppliers
n τ κS θU1 θU2 Γ
S
1 Γ
S
2
20 4 0.6179 7.801e-10 4.41e-10 1.327 1.057
50 4 0.2478 2.078e-09 9.679e-10 0.3736 0.4493
100 4 0.1536 1.542e-08 4.923e-10 0.1985 0.2642
200 4 0.09112 1.569e-10 1.967e-11 0.1242 0.1372
500 4 0.04415 9.166e-12 3.672e-12 0.06593 0.07144
1000 4 0.02702 5.284e-12 2.489e-12 0.04031 0.04505
2000 4 0.0156 3.07e-12 1.441e-12 0.02384 0.02627
20 5 0.1977 5.039e-09 1.075e-09 0.7496 0.8068
50 5 0.09367 1.468e-08 4.549e-10 0.3322 0.3665
100 5 0.05551 1.992e-09 2.601e-10 0.2037 0.2279
200 5 0.03587 8.591e-10 8.103e-11 0.1163 0.1416
500 5 0.01736 9.203e-12 6.769e-12 0.06429 0.07487
1000 5 0.01098 5.543e-12 2.749e-12 0.04067 0.04864
2000 5 0.00677 3.712e-12 2.379e-12 0.02532 0.02942
20 6 0.1956 4.093e-09 6.825e-09 0.6788 0.7172
50 6 0.09157 1.007e-08 6.429e-09 0.3017 0.3436
100 6 0.05572 1.729e-09 1.545e-09 0.2032 0.2139
200 6 0.03256 6.211e-10 5.329e-10 0.1233 0.1446
500 6 0.01786 3.294e-11 1.584e-11 0.06965 0.07221
1000 6 0.01057 3.315e-11 2.134e-11 0.0461 0.05648
2000 6 0.006668 5.855e-12 3.434e-12 0.02808 0.03521
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Table C.11: Asymptotic standard errors of the consumer side preference
parameters and Γ values with 1-3 choice situations for both sides
Consumers
n τ κC θV1 θV2 Γ
C
1 Γ
C
2
20 1 0.1429 3.167e-09 8.62e-10 2.168 2.861
50 1 0.06542 6.467e-10 3.862e-10 1.152 1.922
100 1 0.04153 3.525e-10 1.557e-10 1.079 1.538
200 1 0.02548 4.46e-09 8.529e-10 0.7843 1.175
500 1 0.01265 6.941e-10 5.721e-10 1.304 1.693
1000 1 0.007157 2.313e-10 9.023e-11 0.8146 1.056
2000 1 0.004425 1.99e-10 6.888e-11 0.5209 0.6748
20 2 0.1795 2.851e-09 6.343e-10 2.8 1.808
50 2 0.09259 1.025e-09 8.116e-10 2.659 1.908
100 2 0.04822 1.769e-10 1.492e-10 0.7192 1.087
200 2 0.0331 9.817e-10 2.771e-09 0.9098 1.11
500 2 0.0158 9.8e-10 1.862e-10 0.5855 0.8446
1000 2 0.008925 3.192e-10 4.915e-10 0.2158 0.2827
2000 2 0.005375 1.119e-09 4.327e-10 0.1368 0.178
20 3 0.5465 1.328e-08 2.086e-09 1.818 1.638
50 3 0.2728 6.431e-09 5.272e-10 0.8661 1.477
100 3 0.1374 2.022e-10 9.537e-11 0.4233 0.5751
200 3 0.07714 1.521e-10 2.546e-11 0.1735 0.2869
500 3 0.04458 4.367e-11 2.055e-11 0.1559 0.2032
1000 3 0.02399 4.77e-12 4.574e-12 0.04537 0.06392
2000 3 0.01407 2.901e-12 1.859e-12 0.03003 0.03952
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Table C.12: Asymptotic standard errors of the consumer side preference
parameters and Γ values with 4-6 choice situations for both sides
Consumers
n τ κC θV1 θV2 Γ
C
1 Γ
C
2
20 4 0.618 6.307e-10 3.737e-10 1.123 1.138
50 4 0.244 1.372e-09 1.597e-09 0.3714 0.4476
100 4 0.1539 3.249e-10 3.028e-10 0.2582 0.2505
200 4 0.09206 4.499e-11 1.965e-11 0.1283 0.1342
500 4 0.04504 9.427e-12 4.363e-12 0.06308 0.07368
1000 4 0.02728 5.679e-12 2.264e-12 0.04112 0.04394
2000 4 0.0156 2.435e-12 1.601e-12 0.02476 0.02559
20 5 0.1985 1.036e-09 7.268e-10 0.7059 0.7831
50 5 0.09262 9.557e-09 3.012e-08 0.3443 0.3618
100 5 0.05642 1.224e-08 1.038e-09 0.2078 0.2188
200 5 0.03606 2.946e-09 1.47e-09 0.1241 0.1383
500 5 0.01683 1.063e-11 4.633e-12 0.06575 0.07653
1000 5 0.01105 5.206e-12 3.59e-12 0.04128 0.05087
2000 5 0.006705 3.392e-12 2.056e-12 0.0252 0.02886
20 6 0.2021 1.006e-08 7.508e-09 0.6899 0.7325
50 6 0.09008 1.069e-08 4.307e-09 0.3141 0.3478
100 6 0.05691 1.229e-08 9.674e-10 0.2024 0.2104
200 6 0.03231 2.867e-10 2.319e-09 0.1249 0.1298
500 6 0.01776 2.141e-11 1.821e-11 0.06497 0.07685
1000 6 0.0106 1.49e-11 2.486e-11 0.04722 0.05499
2000 6 0.006633 4.607e-12 3.6e-12 0.02932 0.03536
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APPENDIX D
Many-to-Many Estimation Using SIPP Data
Table D.1: Estimation of educational homophily in longevity of unions
parameters estimates asymptotic standard error bootstrap standard error
θF0 0.9256 1.255e-12 0.3341
θF<HS 0.9816 1.289e-12 0.1093
θFHS 0.3056 1.210e-12 0.0653
θFSomeCollege 0.0395 6.195e-12 0.0665
θFBA+ 0.9181 8.181e-14 0.0809
θM0 0.9256 8.128e-12 0.3341
θM<HS 0.9816 7.595e-13 0.1093
θMHS 0.3056 1.420e-12 0.0653
θMSomeCollege 0.0395 7.045e-12 0.0665
θMBA+ 0.9181 1.272e-12 0.0809
ΓF<HS 3.4961 2.450e-01 0.8575
ΓFHS 2.8281 1.418e-01 0.6783
ΓFSomeCollege 2.2369 1.067e-01 0.5372
ΓFBA+ 3.9350 1.951e-01 0.9405
ΓM<HS 3.2141 2.149e-01 0.7920
ΓMHS 2.6239 1.247e-01 0.6320
ΓMSomeCollege 2.2004 1.083e-01 0.5384
ΓMBA+ 4.4018 2.269e-01 1.0701
δ¯F 1.9297 6.368e-02 0.2956
δ¯M 1.9501 6.371e-02 0.2967
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Table D.2: Estimation of racial homophily in longevity of unions
parameters estimates asymptotic standard error bootstrap standard error
θF0 0.2189 1.500e-10 0.2214
θFHispanic 1.4454 6.355e-13 0.1397
θFBlack 2.1997 3.971e-13 0.5552
θFWhite 0.9306 2.921e-12 0.1414
θFAsian 3.0352 1.761e-11 0.7176
θM0 0.2189 1.729e-11 0.2214
θMHispanic 1.4454 3.553e-13 0.1397
θMBlack 2.1997 1.670e-12 0.5552
θMWhite 0.9306 2.026e-12 0.1414
θMAsian 3.0352 5.360e-14 0.7176
ΓFHispanic 1.6327 1.123e-01 0.5656
ΓFBlack 4.3057 3.137e-01 4.6096
ΓFWhite 2.2769 9.103e-02 0.7405
ΓFAsian 1.8190 2.231e-01 0.8125
ΓMHispanic 2.3389 1.612e-01 0.6409
ΓMBlack 3.1253 2.199e-01 1.3692
ΓMWhite 3.3647 1.346e-01 0.5809
ΓMAsian 10.7619 1.428e+00 7.2496
δ¯F 2.1634 6.366e-02 0.4164
δ¯M 1.8038 6.364e-02 0.2324
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Table D.3: Estimation of age homophily in longevity of unions
parameters estimates asymptotic standard error bootstrap standard error
θF0 0.7702 4.695e-12 0.2495
θF18−27.9 0.9402 1.851e-12 0.0681
θF28−38.9 0.0455 8.272e-12 0.0642
θF39−48.9 0.7270 6.629e-13 0.0791
θF49−59 1.3442 3.919e-12 0.1249
θM0 0.7702 1.436e-11 0.2495
θM18−27.9 0.9402 7.825e-14 0.0681
θM28−38.9 0.0455 6.968e-12 0.0642
θM39−48.9 0.7270 1.041e-12 0.0791
θM49−59 1.3442 3.737e-12 0.1249
ΓF18−27.9 3.3735 1.542e-01 0.7010
ΓF28−38.9 1.9156 9.193e-02 0.4171
ΓF39−48.9 3.0297 1.660e-01 0.6457
ΓF49−59 4.7938 3.821e-01 1.1331
ΓM18−27.9 4.4828 2.215e-01 0.8810
ΓM28−38.9 1.7307 8.089e-02 0.3558
ΓM39−48.9 2.6368 1.415e-01 0.5483
ΓM49−59 2.5787 1.671e-01 0.5331
δ¯F 1.9916 6.362e-02 0.2349
δ¯M 2.0880 6.363e-02 0.2235
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Table D.4: Estimation of age disparity in longevity of unions
parameters estimates asymptotic standard error bootstrap standard error
θF0 0.5428 6.668e-12 0.2940
θFhomophily 0.6171 3.292e-12 0.2619
θFgreaterthanown 0.5135 6.301e-12 0.1697
θFlessthanown -0.5877 7.377e-13 0.3010
θM0 0.5428 3.929e-12 0.3092
θMhomophily 0.6171 2.054e-12 0.2667
θMgreaterthanown -0.5877 9.432e-13 0.3139
θMlessthanown 0.5135 2.679e-12 0.1643
ΓF18−27.9 3.7799 1.693e-01 1.5719
ΓF28−38.9 2.3877 1.123e-01 1.0228
ΓF39−48.9 1.1445 6.468e-02 0.9062
ΓF49−59 0.6371 5.803e-02 1.0610
ΓM18−27.9 1.4148 7.229e-02 0.9833
ΓM28−38.9 2.4644 1.131e-01 1.0991
ΓM39−48.9 3.6713 1.918e-01 1.5934
ΓM49−59 4.2116 2.732e-01 1.8798
δ¯F 2.4051 6.600e-02 0.5258
δ¯M 2.2436 6.623e-02 0.7062
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APPENDIX E
Cox Proportional Hazards Model
Table E.1: Estimation of educational homophily in dissolution of unions for
the female side. For the reference group, θF = 0 and hazard ratio is set to 1
by design of the model. The result is identical for the male side.
parameters estimates hazard ratio standard error
θF<HS -0.4257 0.6533 0.4196
θFHS 0.0549 1.0564 0.2068
θFSomeCollege -0.0677 0.9344 0.2188
θFBA+ -1.0112 0.3637 0.3167
Table E.2: Estimation of racial homophily in dissolution of unions for the
female side. For the reference group, θF = 0 and hazard ratio is set to 1 by
design of the model. The result is identical for the male side.
parameters estimates hazard ratio standard error
θFHispanic -0.1218 0.8852 0.40032
θFBlack -0.4252 0.6536 0.43363
θFWhite 0.2104 1.2342 0.28977
θFAsian 0.0359 1.0366 0.64051
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Table E.3: Estimation of age homophily in dissolution of unions for the
female side. For the reference group, θF = 0 and hazard ratio is set to 1 by
design of the model. The result is identical for the male side.
parameters estimates hazard ratio standard error
θF18−27.9 0.3600 1.4333 0.1781
θF28−38.9 -0.2889 0.7491 0.2291
θF39−48.9 -0.2254 0.7982 0.2814
θF49−59 -0.2039 0.8155 0.3942
Table E.4: Estimation of age disparity in dissolution of unions for the female
side. For the reference group, θFhomophily = 0 and hazard ratio is set to 1 by
design of the model.
parameters estimates hazard ratio standard error
θFgreaterthanown -0.0413 0.9595 0.1662
θFlessthanown 0.0344 1.0350 0.2314
Table E.5: Estimation of age disparity in dissolution of unions for the male
side. For the reference group, θMhomophily = 0 and hazard ratio is set to 1 by
design of the model.
parameters estimates hazard ratio standard error
θMgreaterthanown 0.0344 1.0350 0.2314
θMlessthanown -0.0413 0.9595 0.1662
Table E.6: The length of survival of the unions in the data by education
homophily groups. Entry (r, c) indicates the proportion of the unions in group
r that survived c wave(s). The data for the female side is illustrated.
group 1 2 3 4
0: ref 0.0144 0.0512 0.0735 0.8607
1: <HS 0.0156 0.0156 0.0625 0.9062
2: HS 0.0098 0.0443 0.0935 0.8522
3: SomeCollege 0.0000 0.0703 0.0603 0.8693
4: BA+ 0.0048 0.0288 0.0192 0.9471
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Table E.7: The length of survival of the unions in the data by race homophily
groups. Entry (r, c) indicates the proportion of the unions in group r that
survived c wave(s). The data for the female side is illustrated.
group 1 2 3 4
0: ref 0.0168 0.0672 0.0252 0.8907
1: Hispanic 0.0083 0.0166 0.0750 0.9000
2: Black 0.0082 0.0165 0.0495 0.9256
3: White 0.0095 0.0524 0.0734 0.8645
4: Asian 0.0370 0.0740 0.0000 0.8888
Table E.8: The length of survival of the unions in the data by age homophily
groups. Entry (r, c) indicates the proportion of the unions in group r that
survived c wave(s). The data for the female side is illustrated.
group 1 2 3 4
0: ref 0.0092 0.0523 0.0616 0.8767
1: 18-27.9 0.0166 0.0500 0.1066 0.8266
2: 28-38.9 0.0149 0.0410 0.0373 0.9067
3: 39-48.9 0.0000 0.0466 0.0533 0.9000
4: 49-59 0.0000 0.0294 0.0735 0.8970
Table E.9: The length of survival of the unions in the data by age disparity
groups. Entry (r, c) indicates the proportion of the unions in group r that
survived c wave(s). The data for the female side is illustrated.
group 1 2 3 4
0: homophily 0.0114 0.0445 0.0699 0.8740
1: greater than own 0.0105 0.0549 0.0549 0.8794
2: less than own 0.0056 0.0454 0.0795 0.8693
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Table E.10: The length of survival of the unions in the data by age disparity
groups. Entry (r, c) indicates the proportion of the unions in group r that
survived c wave(s). The data for the male side is illustrated.
group 1 2 3 4
0: homophily 0.0114 0.0445 0.0699 0.8740
2: greater than own 0.0056 0.0454 0.0795 0.8693
1: less than own 0.0105 0.0549 0.0549 0.8794
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